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ABSTRACT 
The series of financial crises that cascaded through and rocked much of the world over the 
past decade created opportunities to draw meaning from the pattern of countries succumbing 
to crisis and those who appear to be wholly or partially immune. This thesis examines the 
case of Australia, a developed country that has seldom experienced an endogenous crisis in 
the last few decades, but has experienced crisis by contagion. This study designs a financial 
stress index to measure and forecast the health of the Australian economy and proposes a 
custom-made stress index to: Gauge the potential for a crisis; and Signal when a timely 
intervention may minimise fear and contagion losses in the Australian financial market. 
Financial and economic data is used to design indicators for stress in the banking sector and 
equity, currency and bond markets. Further, this study explores how movements in equity 
markets of key trading partners of Australia can be used to predict movements in the 
Australian equity market. The variance-equal weights (VEW) and principal components 
approach (PCA) are used to subsume 22 stress indicators into a composite stress index. The 
VEW and PCA stress indexes were examined to determine monitoring and their forecasting 
capabilities. It was found that the VEW stress index performed better than the PCA stress 
index, because it provided more consistent estimates for the level of Australian financial 
stress. Although, both models show some promise, each model fell short of giving adequate 
forecasts in financial stress especially at the peak time of the 2007-2009 GFC. Thus, more 
research is needed to understand the complex nature of financial crisis, how crises develop 
and the techniques that can be used to predict the onset of financial crises. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Due to the complex and often devastating nature of financial crises, a considerable amount of 
research has been, and is, devoted to understanding their causes and anatomy. Most studies 
focus on comprehending one or a few aspects of a financial crisis, because it is difficult to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of a crisis in one study. Specifically, some 
researchers focus on identifying factors that contribute to the development or spread of 
financial crises (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000; Kriesler, 2009; Liang, 2012; Scott, 2010; Trow, 
2010), while others are interested in understanding how financial crises disrupt the normal 
functioning of different sectors of an economy (Chan, 2010; Ploscaru & Nistorescu, 2010). 
The detrimental effects of financial crises extend beyond the economic impact on which most 
studies focus. As a result, some scholars seek to shed light on the non-monetary effects of 
financial crises. Some studies, for instance, investigate how financial crises can lead to 
deteriorating mental health among individuals facing financial difficulties or stress resulting 
from the financial crises (Butterworth, Rodgers, & Windsor, 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Sargent-
Cox, Butterworth, & Anstey, 2011). The varied scope of these studies suggests that financial 
crises are a poorly understood economic phenomena with an expanding body of literature. 
This is why this study is geared towards developing an anticipatory tool for detecting early 
stages of financial crises in the Australian context.  
 
This chapter is designed to clarify the scope of this research and explain how this research 
contributes to existing literature. This chapter and its subsections outline the: Motivation for 
this research; Research objectives and questions; Theoretical framework of this research; 
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Challenges faced when conducting this research; and Ethical issues. In this introductory 
chapter, a brief overview of the research is included in this chapter; a more detailed review of 
literature is provided in the second chapter of this thesis.  
 
1.1 Brief Overview of the Thesis 
The magnitude and timing of financial crises are difficult to predetermine, but financial crises 
tend to occur roughly in 10-20-year intervals (Ferguson, 2009). Recent historical evidence in 
support of this notion shows that the global financial market experienced a crash in 1987, an 
Asian financial crisis occurred in 1997, and a subprime mortgage crisis in the USA ignited a 
world-wide banking crisis in 2007. Also, other episodes of financial turmoil occurred within 
this period, including: the 1990 start of the Japanese economic crisis, and the 1994/95 
Mexican Peso crisis, and the 1998 Russian default crisis (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002; 
Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Mazumder & Ahmad, 2010). The occurrence and pattern of 
these crises is renewing debate, among analysts and academics, over extant economic 
theories and regulatory practices that may exacerbate and/or contribute to the onset of these 
crises. For example, economists are now challenging widely accepted theories over what 
influences behaviour in financial markets, such as the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
which considers the relationship between security prices and different types of information 
available in the financial market. Fama (1991) contends that the EMH has heavily influenced 
market behaviour, as investors believe that, in an efficient market, it is impossible to ‘beat the 
market’ without insider information –which is rarely lawful to be used by an investor. 
Furthermore, since securities tend to reflect all publicly available information in the long-run, 
it is impossible for an investor to use prevailing information to consistently make abnormal 
profits on their investment over a long period. Fox (2010) believes that economists were 
preoccupied with achieving theoretical ideals proposed in the elusive strong form of 
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efficiency when they should have concentrated on economic analysis that facilitates timely 
intervention that could prevent financial crises. Ball (2009) offers a contrasting view that the 
EMH merely predicts that large changes in asset prices can occur and does not suggest that it 
is possible to predict when future changes in asset prices will occur or help forecast future 
financial crises; such predications would be more likely in an inefficient market. Essentially, 
even if the securities were overpriced, investors in the financial markets are still human and 
not all act in the rational manner proclaimed by neo-classical economists. It is important to 
note that the human interaction with financial markets can either be in the form of human 
trading or algorithmic trading. Human traders need to place the trades to buy or sell a 
security, while algorithmic trades can be placed without human interaction. This is why 
algorithm trading is regarded as a form of non-human trading. Algorithms can be used to 
establish the best times to buy or sell a security and have been found to be more efficient than 
humans in assessing large volumes of information relating to price changes, announcements 
from the company or media (Gsell & Gomber, 2009). Human behaviour combined with a 
laissez faire ideology that discourages policy makers from intervening when they realise that 
the market is in distress can create fertile grounds for financial crashes. The key issue is 
whether crises are inevitable and necessary to how markets function (as some argue), or can 
authorities (such as politicians and regulators) implement policies that strengthen financial 
systems to ward-off impending financial crises. 
 
Analysts and policy makers often address the above issue via investigative research aimed at 
proposing macroeconomic policies to ensure timely intervention that can prevent future 
episodes of financial crisis or stress. While the notions of financial stress and financial crisis 
are closely related, they are not synonyms. Please note: throughout this document, the term 
stress refers to financial stress and crisis/crises refer to financial crisis/crises). Specifically, 
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financial stress is often (but not always) a precursor to the much more severe financial crisis 
(Illing & Liu, 2006). It follows that, if rising stress precedes crisis, then economists should 
design policies to mitigate stress before it progresses to a crisis. Accordingly, macroeconomic 
stability may be achieved if economists closely monitor the economic environment and 
implement policies that safeguard against stress and the spill-over effects of a crisis. 
Economists in countries that have experienced crisis in the last generation are familiar with 
warning signs associated with past crises and can design and implement policies and other 
ways and means to forestall the recurrence of similar crises. However, there are always new 
causes and new twists. As a result, there is always the risk that policy makers will seek 
expedience, ignore contrary evidence, and enslave their policies to “... some defunct 
economist” (Keynes, 1936a, Book 6, p. 383).  
 
1.1.1 Australia, Past Crises and the Case for a Financial Stress Index 
Deregulation has increased the integration of international financial markets. Essentially, the 
main objective of deregulation is to encourage the interconnectivity and macroeconomic 
stability of global financial markets. Along with the many benefits provided by integrating 
financial markets, the resulting global network also facilitates the spread of financial crisis 
from one economy to another. The Australian government has been deregulating financial 
markets for the three decades after 1983 (Dyster & Meredith, 2012). While Australia has not 
experienced an endogenous financial crisis since the 1980s, it has suffered from financial 
crises that flowed in from other nations (e.g., the 1987 Black Monday, the 2007 US Sub-
Prime Mortgage Crisis and the 2011 European Credit Crunch) and spread to Australian 
financial markets via trade and interbank linkages. The fact that Australian investors can 
suffer financial losses due to financial instability experienced in foreign financial markets 
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underscores the need for policy makers to be ever vigilant of endogenous and exogenous 
risks of financial crisis. Since prevention is better than cure, countries would be better off 
investing time and resources in preventing economic crises as opposed to bailing out 
financial institutions as part of an aftermath response. However, in the event that prevention 
is not possible, economic resilience plays an important role in determining the extent and 
duration of financial crisis experienced by a country. Economic resilience can be nurtured 
through the continued improvement of policies and economic tools aimed at reducing 
financial vulnerability to crises. Minsky (1986) accentuated the need for policy makers to 
understand what leads to economic instability as a key step in developing adaptive policies to 
modify or eliminate it.  
 
Unlike other developed countries, Australia has seldom experienced a crisis in the last few 
decades. Paradoxically, this is an issue of concern because countries that have experienced 
financial crises are familiar with the steps that need to be taken in order to spearhead 
economic recovery. Because Australia is a country with limited first-hand experience of 
financial crises, it is likely that an Australian financial crisis would be more detrimental to 
Australia in comparison to other countries that have weathered several financial crises before. 
Thus, Australian economists can only develop economic tools and policies based on factors 
that led to crisis in other countries and adjust those tools and well-as-possible to the 
institutions and conditions within Australia. The goal of this research is to add to the 
available financial economic tools by designing a suitable stress index that signals when a 
timely intervention may isolate and/or minimise fear and contagion effects which might 
precipitate losses in Australia. Contagion inspired financial crises occur when financial 
difficulties spread from one country to another and (in some cases) to the rest of the world. 
Once investors suspect contagion may lead to losses in the local financial markets, they begin 
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to operate in fear of those future losses and may sell investments or shift to less risky 
investments. These actions, while prudent for an individual, they can create a self-fulfilling 
prophecy when competitively pursued by large numbers of investors. If the domestic markets 
are fundamentally strong, a short and sharp intervention can short-circuit the self-fulfilling 
prophecy effect. The strength and duration of the intervention will depend on the underlying 
strength or weakness of the domestic markets. In cases where a market adjustment is needed 
or might be timely, the regulatory authorities’ intervention may be limited to reducing the 
depth and duration of the downturn. For instance, early intervention was instrumental in 
reducing the exposure of the Australian economy to the contagion of the 2007 subprime 
crisis. Notably, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) progressively increased interest rates 
during 2007 when the “credit bubble entered its most excessive phase” (Trow, 2010, p. 17). 
In addition, the Australian government bought Residential Mortgage Backed Securities worth 
$4 billion and “... guaranteed bank deposits up to one million dollars ...” in order to mitigate 
fears of negative effects from the global financial crisis (GFC). As a result, Australia 
forestalled a technical recession and fared better than other developed countries during the 
GFC (Forster, 2010; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure 
Transport Regional Development & Local Government, 2009, p. 2). 
 
This study used empirical and quantitative techniques to examine risk factors that predispose 
the Australian economy to a financial crisis. The underlying notion is that a combination of 
factors contributes to the development of a crisis and that in the early stages of a crisis a 
country experiences episodes of stress. If these episodes of financial stress are dealt with 
earlier (as opposed to later), a country could save the time and money spent on managing a 
financial crisis (an extreme form of financial stress). This study explains the nature of stress, 
how it can mature into a crisis and the role of globalisation and international trade play in the 
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transmission and upsurge of stress. Since financial stress either originates from within the 
financial system or is a result of financial contagion, the impact of financial contagion on 
Australian financial markets is considered. At this point, the origin of trade and financial 
linkages and the role they play in the economic growth and stability of Australia will be 
discussed. Finally, empirical techniques appropriate for modelling the sources, nature, flow 
and effects of financial stress are discussed before proposing suitable methodologies for 
measuring financial stress. 
 
1.2 The Gap in Literature 
This section of the chapter provides a brief overview of past studies on Australian financial 
stress indexes. Three aspects of previous research on Australian stress indexes were 
examined. The first aspect is the choice of variables that were used to measure financial 
stress. The choice of variables is important because each variable represents a stress indicator 
that a researcher deemed as being potentially useful for gauging the level of stress in different 
sectors of the Australian economy. Data frequency is the second aspect considered. Once a 
researcher identifies the variables to be used in constructing the composite stress index, they 
can proceed to collect data at a particular frequency (e.g. at daily, monthly, quarterly or 
annual intervals). Generally, the data-frequency choice depends on the research questions and 
the researcher’s motivations for constructing the stress index. The third aspect examined is 
the method of index aggregation used to construct a composite stress index. Additionally, the 
findings of previous studies were discussed with the aim of identifying avenues for further 
research that can be addressed by this thesis. 
 
A review of literature identified five studies that constructed a composite financial stress 
index for Australia (Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag, & Tytell, 2011; Cardarelli, Elekdag, 
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& Lall, 2011; Duca & Peltonen, 2013; Vašíček et al., 2017; Vermeulen et al., 2015). Table 
1.1 summarises the studies with reference to the data frequency, index-aggregation method 
and variables used to construct the composite stress index. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) 
estimated composite financial stress indexes for 17 advanced countries and 26 emerging 
countries. Co-movements in estimated stress indexes were examined in order to establish 
whether financial crises had spilled over from advanced to emerging countries. Balakrishnan 
et al. (2011) found that the transmission of stress was faster from advanced to emerging 
countries especially when there were more financial linkages in the form of bank lending 
present. Cardarelli et al. (2011) estimated stress indexes for 17 advanced countries in order to 
examine their trending behaviour over three decades. It was found that countries that 
experienced crises that were linked to bank stress suffered more detrimental crises. Moreover, 
countries with asset and credit bubbles were found to be more vulnerable to crises once the 
rapid rise in credit or asset prices could no longer be sustained. Vašíček et al. (2017) used 
data from 25 countries to estimate and explore the predictive power of the estimated 
composite stress indexes. The aforementioned authors found that real estate prices were a 
better leading indicator of stress than credit. Moreover, forecasting performance of estimated 
stress indexes was poor especially when performing out-of-sample forecasts for the 
occurrence of the 2007-2009 Global financial crises. Vermeulen et al. (2015) estimated 
financial stress indexes for 28 countries. Components of the composite stress indexes and the 
estimated stress indexes were examined in order to establish their relationship with episodes 
of crises identified in literature. A weak relationship was found between the stress index 
components (or the stress indexes) and the onset of crises. Consequently, it was concluded 
that the stress indexes were suitable for measuring the prevailing level of financial stress but 
inadequate tools for forecasting the likelihood of stress or crises in the future (Vermeulen et 
al., 2015).  
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Table 1.1: Past Studies using an Australian Financial Stress Index 
Author Data 
frequency 
(time period)  
Index aggregation 
Method 
Variables included in the index 
Balakrishnan 
et al. (2011) 
Monthly 
(1983 M6 to 
2009 M4) 
Variance-equal 
weighting of seven 
variables 
i) Banking sector beta 
ii) TED spread 
iii) Inverted term spread 
iv) Equity market returns 
v) Equity market volatility 
vi) Exchange market volatility 
vii) Corporate debt spread 
 
Cardarelli et 
al. (2011) 
Quarterly  
(1980 Q1 to 
2010 Q4) 
Variance equal 
weighting of three 
subindexes. These are 
the banking sector, 
securities market and 
foreign exchange 
market subindexes. 
Seven variables that are summarised 
as three subindexes.  
 
Banking subindex: 
i) Banking sector beta 
ii) TED spread 
iii) Inverted term spread 
 
Securities market subindex: 
i) Corporate bond spread 
ii) Equity market volatility 
iii) Equity market returns 
 
Foreign market subindex: 
i) Exchange rate volatility 
 
Vašíček et 
al. (2017) 
Quarterly  
1986 Q1 to 
2010 Q1) 
Variance-equal 
weight of five 
variables 
i) Equity market volatility 
ii) Exchange rate volatility 
iii) Banking sector beta 
iv) Long term interest rate 
v) Inverse yield curve 
Vermeulen 
et al. ( 2015) 
Quarterly  
(1980 Q1 to 
2010 Q4) 
Variance-equal 
weight of five 
variables 
i) Equity market volatility 
ii) Exchange rate volatility 
iii) Banking sector beta 
iv) Long term interest rate 
v) Inverse yield curve 
Duca and 
Peltonen 
(2013) 
Quarterly  
(1990 Q1 to 
2009 Q4) 
Average of variables 
that were transformed 
to range from 0 to 3 
i) 3-month spread interbank to 
government bill rate 
ii) Negative equity index returns 
multiplied by one 
iii) Volatility on equity index 
iv) Volatility of exchange rate 
v) Volatility of yield on 3-month 
government bill  
 
Duca and Peltonen (2013) evaluate the performance of composite stress indexes and the 
components of the stress indexes of 28 countries. The stress index components were assessed 
individually in order to determine whether the variables correctly signalled the presence or 
likelihood of a crisis occurring. It was found that consideration of both local and global 
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factors which could contribute to a crisis in a country provides better forecasts of the 
likelihood of crises in the future (Duca & Peltonen, 2013). 
 
Overall, the following observations were made regarding past studies which included an 
Australian stress index. All studies used of the same set of variables to estimate stress indexes 
for several countries over a certain time horizon. This was probably done for ease of 
comparison of the stress indexes of different countries. The decision of which variables to 
include in the stress index was determined by: economic plausibility and then whether it was 
possible to obtain data for the variable for all the countries being studied. Given the second 
constraint, it is possible that some variables that are useful stress indicators were discarded 
simply because data for all the countries being studied were not reasonably available. This 
means that country-specific factors which could contribute to a crisis were not included in the 
estimated stress indexes (e.g., if agriculture is a mainstay of a country and agricultural 
exports are a leading source of revenue for that country, then due consideration should be 
given to the potential impact that a major shock to the agricultural sector could have on the 
health of the economy). A stress index for an agriculture producing country should include 
variables which track changes in the prices of the top agricultural exports, so that lower than 
usual drops in the price of agricultural goods over consecutive periods could signal stress in 
the agricultural sector. It should be noted that the proposed agricultural variables are country-
specific and it is unlikely that if one is examining several countries that all the countries will 
have comparable variables which are relevant for gauging a country’s level of stress. 
Therefore, it is important to consider factors that are unique to each country in order to 
identify country-specific factors that are relevant for measuring stress in those countries. In 
the case of Australia, due consideration should be given to the impact that a shock to the 
resource sector could have on the Australian economy. This is because mined resources are 
11 
 
the leading global exports from Australia (which is primarily a resource-based economy). It 
follows then that larger than usual drops in the prices of minerals will lead to distress in the 
mining sector. This study posits that previous studies on Australian financial stress failed to 
sufficiently account for country-specific factors (such as the mining sector) that could 
contribute to the development of stress in the economy. Instead of a country-specific stress 
index (to gauge the specific factors that contribute to financial stress in Australia), previous 
researcher propose a ‘generic’ stress index that is deemed to sufficiently gauge the level of 
stress in all the countries being studied. This study proposes the use of country-specific 
variables that gauge the level of stress in the Australian. In addition to the consideration of 
the mining sector, this study also examines market co-movements of Australia’s leading 
trading partners and explores how these movements could be used to predict future patterns 
of contagion across borders. 
 
With the exception of the study by Balakrishnan et al. (2011) the other studies preferred to 
use quarterly data. Cardarelli et al. (2011) argue that the using quarterly data, in constructing 
a composite stress index, makes it is easier to compare the trending of the estimated stress 
index alongside other macroeconomic variables (which are often reported at quarterly 
frequency). Moreover, the use of quarterly data allows for data to be obtained for a longer 
number of periods, which is desirable when estimating stress indexes for several countries, as 
noted by Vermeulen et al. ( 2015). Nevertheless, from a policy makers perspective, a stress 
index that is estimated at a higher frequency (daily, weekly or monthly) could allow for 
closer monitoring of the level of financial stress and faster response time than indexes which 
are estimated at a quarterly frequency. In fact higher frequency data could allow for more 
reliable tracking of stressful events especially since early indications of a crisis are more 
visible as the timing of crisis draws near (Christensen & Li, 2014). Unfortunately, there are 
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three problems that could arise from using higher frequency data in place of quarterly or 
monthly data. First, there is no guarantee that a researcher will be able to obtain sufficient 
historical data to assess the performance of the index over past periods of crisis (Vermeulen 
et al., 2015). This problem is more common when using daily or weekly data than it is with 
monthly or quarterly data. Second, using higher frequency data may limit the number of 
variables available to measure the level of financial stress. Third, very-high-frequency data 
such as weekly or daily data are more likely to highlight momentary shocks which quickly 
reverse as being worthy of intervention rather than the more prudent strategy of endurance 
(Vermeulen et al., 2015). This study gave due consideration to the challenges faced when 
using weekly or daily data and opted against using these data frequencies. Instead, this study 
follows Balakrishnan et al. (2011) in the use of monthly data because it is more readily 
available than higher frequency data, provides a higher frequency of stress monitoring than 
quarterly interval, and smooths out ephemeral blips. It is believed that a monthly financial 
stress index is a good tool for close monitoring of the level of Australian financial stress.  
 
With the exception of Duca and Peltonen (2013) who use a simple average of transformed 
variables, all other studies used the variance-equal weighting technique of index aggregation. 
The variance-equal weighting technique involves standardising all the stress variables and 
estimating the average of the standardised stress variables in order to obtain the aggregated 
index. The use of this technique results in equal weights being allocated to all stress variables 
(i.e. all are deemed to be equally important). Some critics of the variance-equal-weights 
method suggest that it can allocate more weight to sectors of the economy with more 
variables (Oet, Dooley, & Ong, 2015). For example, suppose a composite stress index was 
constructed using stress variables from the equity, currency, bond and currency markets; now 
let the number of stress variables that is used to represent each market be equal to five, two, 
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one and one for the equity, currency, bond and currency markets respectively; the Variance-
Equal-Weights Approach and nine stress variables can then be used to estimate a composite 
measure of financial stress in the form of an index. The Variance-Equal-Weights Approach to 
index aggregation estimates a stress index that deems the equity market as the most important 
determinant of financial stress simply because, in this case, the equity market makes the 
highest contribution to the composite stress index overall; with about 55.6 percent (five out of 
nine variables) of the stress variable components coming from the equity market. However, 
this problem can easily be resolved by summarising variables from different sectors of the 
economy and then allocating weights to subindexes of the variables representing sectors of 
the economy instead of the variables themselves. Accordingly, this study explores the use of 
the variance-equal weighting method and subindexes. Moreover, this study explores the use 
of the Principal-Components-Analysis method of index aggregation which has not been used 
in previous studies highlighted in this section. Further, while earlier studies explore the use of 
at most seven variables, this study proposes the use of 22 variables, to estimate a composite 
measure of financial stress for Australia. The number of variables considered in this study is 
more than triple the number of variables that have been considered in any other study that has 
attempted to develop a summary measure of financial stress. Thus, this study is likely to 
provide a greater understanding of the factors contributing to the development of stress in 
Australian financial markets. 
 
1.3 Contribution to the Literature 
This research adopts a broad-spectrum analysis, shifting the focus from the impact of stress at 
a microeconomic to a macroeconomic level. Initially, this research identifies and assesses 
factors that may increase Australia’s susceptibility to financial crises, with a focus on how 
that knowledge might contribute to the development of policies directed at avoiding or at 
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least ameliorating the adverse effects of financial crises. This study also explores how 
increased globalisation has driven changes in the nature and/or extent of Australia’s 
vulnerability to financial stress, including the impact the changes have had on policy strength 
and development. Key networking relationships within the Australian market are considered, 
including how they differ from or resemble their counterparts in nations that have 
experienced financial crises (e.g., the study looks at how Australia’s mining boom and its 
extensive trade with China may have shielded it from the adverse effects of the GFC). While 
it is likely that the dramatically increased importance of trade with China and other Asian-
tiger economies ameliorates Australia’s risk from financial crises arising in the USA, Europe, 
and other developed nations, Australia may (as a result) be more susceptible to financial 
crises in Asia—particularly, any crises that reduces the purchase of Australian ore by Japan 
and/or China. This study explores the forecasting performance of the financial index designed 
using the methodology discussed in Chapter 9. This study suggests why factors, which 
recently contributed to financial stress/crisis in other developed countries, appear to generate 
little or no economic harm in Australia.  
 
1.4 Statement of Thesis Intent 
This study seeks to understanding the nature of stress in Australia by identifying factors that 
likely contribute to stress and increased vulnerability to financial contagion. The intent of this 
study is to design a suitable index that can be used to model, estimate, and forecast stress, so 
as to provide policy makers/economists with an opportunity to anticipate and forestall or 
divert a crisis emerging in the Australian economy.  
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1.5 Objectives of the Study 
This thesis examines the concept of financial stress with the intent to determine whether 
financial indexes can be developed into cost-effective tools that extend and expand the 
capacity of financial managers to identify, stave-off, and/or mitigate financial crises. A 
secondary objective of this study is to explore market co-movements of Australia and its key 
bilateral partners, so as to determine possible pathways of financial contagion via equity 
markets. An initial step to achieve this objective is to develop a stress index for Australia. 
The estimated stress index will then be assessed to determine how effective it is as a tool for 
monitoring and forecasting emerging financial stress in Australia. 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
This research seeks to achieve its research objective by answering the following inter-related 
questions:  
A) What are the primary stress indicators in Australia? 
B) How can the stress indicators in question A be combined into a composite index 
for Australian financial stress? 
C) What environmental, structural, institutional, and other key factors can 
contribute to the emergence and/or severity of an Australian financial crisis? 
D) Is a comprehensive stress index for Australia an efficient and effective way to 
model, predict, and pre-empt or mitigate Australian financial stress? 
 
The following subsidiary questions are directed at assessing the potential value and 
application of the research outcomes: 
A) Potential uses of being able to predict the occurrence, extent and magnitude of 
future periods of stress in Australia? 
B) Limitations and risks of using stress indicators to forecast financial crises? 
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C) Policy implications of a stress index for Australia? 
 
1.7 Ethical Issues 
The use of primary and secondary data sources was considered and the latter source was 
deemed as more suitable for constructing a financial stress index. Specifically, the credit, 
macroeconomic and financial market measures required for this study can be obtained from 
SIRCA and the Reserve Bank of Australia, Australia Bureau of Statistics, Wren Research and 
Yahoo finance websites. Thus, there is no need to directly involve humans or their personal 
data in the conduct of this research. Because no primary data is gathered or directly used in 
this research, the research poses little or no risk of harm via inappropriate disclosure or other 
breaches of human-rights ethics. Due to the nature of the data required for this research 
ethical clearance was neither needed, nor sought from the Federation University Human 
Research Ethics Committee (i.e. no primary-data survey and/or other acquisition of direct 
data were conducted). 
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter of the subject matter of this thesis. In this chapter, the 
scope of the study and its importance are discussed and information about the research 
objectives and questions are outlined.  
 
1.9 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis has ten chapters. The subsequent chapters are organised in the following manner: 
Chapter 2, provides a literature review of definitions of stress, crises and how contagion of 
financial crises can occur; Chapter 3, outlines the conceptual framework of this thesis and 
discusses research approaches and methods used in this study; The gathering and analysis of 
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this data is labour intensive and is discussed in multiple chapters—Specifically, the data and 
variables used in the construction of the composite stress index are discussed in Chapters 4-8; 
Financial stress indicators for the equity markets are discussed in Chapter 4; Stress indicators 
for the bond and money markets are discussed in Chapter 5; Chapter 6 focuses on stress 
indicators for currency markets and the Australian banking sector; Other Australian-focused 
stress indicators are discussed in Chapter 7; Chapter 8, proposes foreign-sourced indicators of 
stress that are important for the monitoring and forecasting of Australian financial stress; The 
variables developed in Chapters 4-8 are then assembled into an index in Chapter 9—Chapter 
9 (also) discusses how the stress indicators developed in previous chapters are aggregated 
into indexes and the feasibility of use of resultant indexes in monitoring, identifying, and 
predicting the potential for stress or a crisis; Chapter 10 is the final and concluding chapter of 
this thesis —it, also, provides a discussion of the results and recommendations for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of literature related to understanding financial crises and 
financial contagion. First, a discussion of the various notions of financial stress concludes 
with a definition that is applicable to this research; Second, an analogy for understanding 
financial stress is provided; Third, a discussion of parties that can contribute to or prevent the 
occurrence of a financial crisis; Fourth, a similar discussion of how the parties can contribute 
to the transmission of financial crises across borders, and Finally, the chapter concludes with 
a discussion of how globalisation and trade or financial links may contribute to the 
development or spread of financial crises. 
 
2.2 Macroeconomic versus Microeconomic Financial Stress 
Financial stress definitions can be classified and evaluated based on whether the perceived 
impacts tend to occur mostly at the micro- or macro-economic level. While the impacts of 
micro- and macro-economic stress differ, there is often an interdependent relationship 
between them — as illustrated in Figure 2.1, micro-economic stress can cause and/or 
exacerbate stress at the macroeconomic level and vice versa, as shown. 
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Figure 2.1: The Relationship between Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Stress 
 
2.2.1 Microeconomic Stress 
At the microeconomic level, stress can be defined in terms of how it affects households or 
businesses. Household-related stress is described as: 
“...the adverse economic or social outcomes associated with a household’s financial 
situation, including debt repayment problems, delinquency, bankruptcy and lack of 
discretionary income” (Worthington, 2006, pp. 2-3). 
Researchers usually measure this kind of stress using national or regional surveys. The 1986 
Australian Standard of Living survey was the first national survey of financial anxiety in 
Australia (Marks, 2005). Current examples of national surveys include the 2010 Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey conducted by the Melbourne 
Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research in partnership with the Australian 
government and the 2003-04 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) conducted by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (ABS, 2006; University of Melbourne, 2012). An 
example of a regional survey is the Wesley Mission (2006) survey of stress in Sydney 
households.  
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2.2.2 Macroeconomic Stress 
In a business context, financial distress occurs when a business undertakes excessive levels of 
debt beyond the optimal level. The level of debt versus equity financing is determined by a 
firm’s choice capital structure that in turn influences the value of a firm as suggested by 
fundamental capital structure theories such as Static Trade-Off Theory
1
 (Myers, 1984) and 
Modigliani and Miller (MM) tax adjusted leverage theory (Miller, 1988).
2
 According to Fama 
and French (2002), the optimal level of leverage exists when the marginal benefit of debt just 
offsets its cost.
3
 Beyond the optimum level of debt, a business will begin to experience the 
costs of financial distress. In the early stages of distress, a business may reject profitable 
investments because it is illiquid, reduce expenditure on current projects, and/or delay 
payments to stakeholders. At this stage, various stakeholders may adopt a jump ship 
mentality with creditors extending less or no credit, shareholders selling all investments, 
employees seeking employment elsewhere and customers switching to competitor businesses 
(Petty, Titman, Keown, & Martin, 2012). Extensive episodes of stress often culminate in 
bankruptcy, receivership or liquidation (Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp, 2012). In 
extreme cases of distress, a business will have to close down and default on its obligations to 
stakeholders. For this reason, lenders, suppliers and shareholders of a company should 
regularly monitor the operations of a business so that the potential for default is minimised. 
 
Hakkio and Keeton (2009) suggest that when financial markets are in distress, savers are 
more reluctant to lend money to borrowers, unless given a premium to offset the increased 
risk of default. Though the development-stage of a crisis is often accompanied by rising 
                                                 
 
1
  Myers (1984) suggests that when an optimum level of debt is maintained the firm’s value is maximized. 
 
2
 
 
This theory discussed the tax advantages of debt and  the positive relationships between debt and i) a firm’s 
value, ii) risk to ordinary shareholders, and iii) risk of bankruptcy. 
 
3
  The benefits of debt include the tax deductibility of interest while the costs include an increased risk that the 
firm will not be able to service its debt (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973).  
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levels of risk, lenders will continue to extend credit to borrowers as long as the risk of default 
can reasonably be ascertained. The problem arises during the latter stages of a crisis, when 
lenders are uncertain about the borrower’s capability to repay a debt due to rapidly 
deteriorating market conditions and the likelihood that the “market will … plummet, carrying 
the investor’s portfolio with it” (Brealey & Myers, 2003, p. 168). In this case, uncertainty at 
the macroeconomic level can cause a subsequent credit crunch at the microeconomic level. 
However, Gramlich and Oet (2011) are of the opinion that structural fragility in key-financial 
markets and regulatory authorities could potentially lead to a crisis as observed in the 2007-
2009 subprime mortgage crisis. Edgar (2009) asserts that the abundance of specialized 
regulatory authorities that set and followed their own set of rules, create a toxic environment 
where regulators can make decisions aimed at self-preservation as opposed to furthering the 
common good of society or the financial institutions.
4
 In this case, stress experienced by the 
financial institutions can quickly spread to the macroeconomic level, due to lax macro- 
prudential regulation. 
 
Macroeconomic definitions of stress focus on the impact of stress on an economy and can be 
defined in several ways, based on what factors triggered the episode of stress. Since these 
factors can vary with a country’s history and socio-economic characteristics, it is difficult to 
find one definition that has the capacity to do justice to all the key characteristics, of all 
historical episodes of stress. Nevertheless, Hakkio and Keeton (2009) maintain that 
regardless of the origin of macroeconomic stress, stress causes interruption of financial 
markets. Illing and Liu (2006) define stress as anxiety due to increased uncertainty and 
changing expectations of economic losses in financial markets and institutions. In this case, 
                                                 
 
4
  During the GFC, rating agencies such as Moody’s engaged in incorrect assessments of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) yet were not held accountable for doing so. Providing favourable ratings for high-risk 
mortgages translated into higher profits and the agencies’ ability to regulate the MBS-market was hampered. 
22 
 
stress develops due to financial fragility
5
 and “some exogenous shock”; whereby, 
vulnerabilities in a financial system cause the shock
6
 to develop into stress and facilitate the 
spread of the shock through the financial system (Illing & Liu, 2006, p. 244). This definition 
of stress is limited since it fails to account for endogenous causes of financial fragility as 
highlighted by Minsky (1986).
7
 A macroeconomic episode of stress occurs when a country’s 
financial system is under pressure and the country lacks adequate resources to facilitate a 
quick transition out of an economic slump. Typically, countries under stress experience 
significant changes in commodity prices, a rapid increase in risk and/or uncertainty, limited 
liquidity, and fears about the health of the banking system (Balakrishnan et al., 2011).  
 
Microeconomic stress could potentially lower the standards of living of the affected 
household or business. Macroeconomic stress may culminate in an economic crisis. Given 
that there is extensive research on the impact of stress at the microeconomic level (Bray, 
2001; Breunig & Cobb-Clark, 2004; Commonwealth Department of Family and Community 
Services, 2003; Marks, 2005; Wesley Mission, 2006; Worthington, 2006); this concentrates 
on the macroeconomic impact of stress and its possible links to crisis in Australia. 
 
  
                                                 
  
5
 This is often characterised by excessive leverage, reduced lending, and/or poor or inadequate regulation of 
the system. 
  
6
 Economic shocks result from major devaluation or appreciation of a currency, large changes in prices of 
commodities such as oil or housing. 
  
7
 Minsky (1986) provides a good description of financial instability arising due to endogenous factors (e.g., 
government intervention and monetary policy implementation). Notably, Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis may explain the development of the 2007-2009 GFC. 
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2.3 An Analogy of Macroeconomic Crises 
In order to address the problem of financial crises, researchers must first understand the 
nature and anatomy of crises. This research posits that crises are in some way analogous to 
illness. In that when an individual gets sick, it is in the individual’s best interest to consult a 
doctor in order to determine possible causes of the illness and procure a mode of treatment 
that suits the patient’s needs. Generally, treatment is often more effective when obtained in 
the early stages of any disease. This is because earlier detection often results in early 
treatment of the disease and increased probability of a quick recovery. Moreover, doctors are 
able to obtain an individual’s illness history which can be useful in prescribing medication or 
treatment that is effective and has the least side effects. For example, a patient is better off if 
cancer is detected in the early stages as the patient has a better chance of getting treatment 
and beating the cancer. Failure to obtain early treatment could result in the spread of 
cancerous tumours or growths to surrounding tissues, the rest of the body and eventual death 
of a patient. Unfortunately, if the patient has waited too long there is often no cure and few 
treatment options and doctors are left with no option but to manage the symptoms of the 
cancer as it progresses to a fatal stage. According to Baerheim (2001), the chance of 
successful treatment of a disease is also dependent on a patient’s ability to articulate their 
symptoms to the doctor so that the doctor can correctly diagnose the patient and recommend 
suitable treatment. Moreover, it is worth noting that experienced and knowledgeable doctors 
(as opposed to doctors with less experience and knowledge) are more likely to correctly 
diagnose an illness based on a patient’s history. Now turning to the case of financial crises, 
some parallels can be drawn between illness and crises as shown in Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2: An analogy of human illness and financial crises  
 
Two-way arrows are used in Figure 2.2 to show the parallels between treatment of a human 
illness and addressing crises. The analogous relationships are such that: 
 A patient that is ill or diseased is analogous to a country experiencing a crisis, 
 Human illness is analogous to financial crises, 
 A doctor treating a sick or diseased patient is equivalent to the economists and 
analysts responsible for monitoring or diagnosing early or late signs of a crisis, and 
 Treatment of the illness is equivalent to the austerity measures or changes in 
economic policies implemented to minimize losses resulting from the crises and 
initiate economic recovery 
Much like a patient’s genes, lifestyle and environment may predispose them to certain 
illnesses; the likelihood of a country experiencing a financial crisis is determined by a 
combination of factors such as the health and stability of major financial institutions in a 
country, the state of economy, prevailing regulatory practices and political influence on 
regulation of financial markets. However, a major difference between doctors and economists 
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is that in most cases the former is able to ask the patient about their symptoms and check for 
symptoms before diagnosing an illness or disease whereas the latter would only be able to 
check for symptoms of deteriorating economic health. Besides, the patient can help the doctor 
to identify early stages of sickness which is not possible in the case of a country that has 
suffered a financial crisis. In this respect it can be argued that economists face more 
challenges when trying to identify whether a country is in the early stages of a financial crisis 
or when trying to pinpoint the best time to introduce more stringent monetary or fiscal 
policies in order to alleviate or minimize the impact of a crisis. 
 
2.4 Financial Crises Are Here To Stay 
In an ideal world, there would be transparent financial systems, no information asymmetry,
8
 
no greedy investors, and effective regulation of the financial systems which would mean that 
financial crises would be rare. The prospect of such tranquil financial markets is particularly 
appealing. Indeed this may be the kind of financial environment of which economists and 
regulators dream. However, the current world is far from ideal and issues are exacerbated 
because, as long as humans participate in financial markets, there is a potential for human 
nature to impact on the efficient functioning of the financial markets. Since the investors and 
regulators are human it follows that there will always be greedy or over-optimistic
9
 investors 
that underestimate the riskiness of an investment, potential for lax regulation due to political 
influence on regulatory practices, information asymmetry and inadequate responses to 
                                                 
 
8
  Information asymmetry in financial markets is due to the fact that all investors will not have the same set of 
information at any given time and could contribute to the development of asset bubbles   
 
9
  Being overoptimistic is particularly harmful if it leads investors to invest in unprofitable investment because 
they strongly believe that the ‘lemons’ will become profitable in the near future. These investors may ignore 
media reports, the advice of portfolio managers or general pessimism among investors because they believe 
they are better equipped to assess the riskiness and expected return of an investment.   
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macroeconomic imbalances.
10
 Moreover, as long as there is potential for irrational 
exuberance, crises are bound to happen somewhere on this planet. Alan Greenspan
11
 argued 
that irrational exuberance was characterized by the rise of asset prices to exorbitant levels, an 
issue of particular concern because it fosters the development of asset bubbles. If the asset 
bubble bursts, it is only an issue of concern if it impacts negatively on the normal functioning 
of the economy (The Federal Reserve Board, December 5, 1996). In this regard an 
understanding of how bubbles form and why some contribute to the onset of financial crises 
would be particularly useful. Accordingly, in the discussion that follows is geared towards 
providing a better understanding of factors that cause bubbles to form, grow and burst.  
 
2.4.1 Bubbles as a Precursor to Financial Crises 
More than three centuries after what is probably one of the oldest and most popular asset 
bubbles, the 1636 Dutch Tulip Bulb Bubble (DTBB), the incidence of similar bubbles in 
global financial markets is still prevalent. Most bubbles can be categorised into asset-price 
bubbles and credit bubbles. Generally, bubbles develop naturally over time during the normal 
operation of an economy and are characterised by a progressive rise in the value of assets, 
prices of securities or credit over a given period of time (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005). The 
rise in the values of assets or credit may be rapid or gradual depending on speculative forces 
in a financial market. Speculative forces which cause bubbles to develop are also integral to 
the normal functioning of financial markets. For instance, an investor could invest in shares 
because he believes that it is currently under- or mispriced. Although the investor does not 
know whether the price of the shares will go up or down, he has an optimistic outlook on the 
future movement of prices; he speculates that the price of shares will go up in future. Based 
                                                 
10
  Economists may downplay or fail to respond to the macroeconomic imbalances due to a firm belief in the 
Keynesian versus the monetarism schools of thought.  
11
 These are remarks by the former Federal Reserve chairman in a speech delivered on 5 December 1996. 
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on this logic, the investor is convinced that purchasing the shares now is a good investment 
decision, as it would result in a future benefit if the investor chooses to sell off his shares in 
future. Additionally, in order to capitalize on the upward trend in prices investors often opt to 
acquire more debt in order to invest more now and enjoy economic benefits in the near 
future. This is why asset price bubbles are often accompanied by rising levels of credit. 
Investors justify acquiring more credit now because money borrowed today can be used to 
purchase an asset that is expected to increase in value in the near future. The investors 
speculate that the: i) Prices will continue to increase in future; ii) Purchased asset can easily 
be sold in future; and iii) Proceeds from the sale of the asset will be sufficient to not only 
finance the repayment of the loan but also to make a profit on the investment. At this point it 
is important to note that even among optimistic investors there is a broad spectrum of 
opinions that motivates investment behaviour. For example, optimistic investors will have 
different opinions about the following: i) whether it is best to make rational or irrational 
investment decisions, ii) what the true value of a security is, iii) the best time to purchase (or 
sell) a security, and iv) the best price to pay (or receive payment) for a security. Some factors 
that contribute to the difference in investor opinion include information asymmetry, varying 
investor experience and differing investment goals or objectives such as the desire for short 
versus long term gain from investments. Thaler (1988) states that the nature of financial 
markets is such that the investor that is willing to pay the highest price for a security is the 
one that is most likely to gain possession of the security. It is, therefore, likely that investors 
who eventually obtain a security have probably overestimated the true value of that security 
and overpaid to obtain it; this is what Thaler (1988) calls the ‘winner’s curse’. Moreover, 
because it is not always clear whether the investor is acting rationally or irrationally, it is 
possible for investors to inadvertently nurture the development of an asset bubble by driving 
the prices of securities up as the try to outbid each other for a security. So far this discussion 
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has focused on the scenario that speculation led the investor to conclude that the investment 
was worthwhile. However it is also possible other potential investors have opposing views 
and envisage a possible decline in the price of the security in future. For the pessimistic 
investor divestment is seen as the best course of action because it safeguards against future 
losses from a share when the price drops in future. These opposing views ensure that there is 
a willing buyer and willing seller of a security at any given time, thereby, facilitating trade 
and the normal functioning of financial markets. It is important to clarify at this point that 
speculation in itself is not usually problematic. Typically, speculation becomes an issue of 
concern when there is an overall shift in investor sentiment from an optimistic to a 
pessimistic outlook, such that commodities or stock that were once viewed as a profitable 
investment are now viewed as a bad investment –a ‘lemon’. Overall, the investors who are 
the last to adopt this pessimistic outlook are usually the ones that are stuck with the ‘lemons’ 
which no one is willing to buy; consequently, these investors bear the financial losses.  
 
Uncertainty and information asymmetry may influence the speculative behaviour of investors 
in financial markets in the following manner. As long as a bubble is growing, investors with 
an optimistic outlook can look forward to a good return on investment. However, there is no 
guarantee that prices will continue rising. Similarly, there is no guarantee that the investor 
will get a fair return on the money invested in the asset. Nonetheless, this it is a risk that the 
investor is willing to take. A certain level of uncertainty is present in all financial markets but 
the degree of uncertainty differs from one investor to another. This is because investors are 
constantly trying to predict future price movements based on a certain set of information. Due 
to information asymmetry, some investors tend to have better information compared to others 
and it is not fully understood which investors possess the superior knowledge about future 
price trends. In the absence of equal access to information for all market players, information 
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asymmetry and speculation play an important role in the development of asset bubbles. 
Higher levels of information asymmetry cause more speculation and the subsequent rise or 
drop in prices. An asset bubble is likely to burst if potential buyers of an asset have generally 
become convinced that an asset is excessively overpriced and, as a result, refuse to purchase 
it. Bubbles burst when faith in the continued rise in the prices of the assets can no longer be 
sustained and it is usually after a bubble bursts that problems begin to emerge in the financial 
system. For instance, in the case of the 1636 DTBB, investors entered into future contracts 
for future delivery and payment of tulip bulbs. While there was a general upward trend in the 
prices of tulip bulbs from 1623 to 1637, Garber (1989) states that it was in January 1637, just 
a month before the tulip bulb bubble burst, that the bubble was most prominent. In January 
speculation was rife and prices of bulbs increased at the faster rate than in previous months. 
Sellers benefitted from investor speculation as long as it exerted upward pressure on the 
prices of tulip bulbs. Unfortunately, things took a turn for the worse when investor sentiment 
changed and buyers were unwilling to pay even ten percent of the original price of the bulbs. 
This made it difficult for sellers to sell the tulip bulbs at a profit or even at breakeven, tulip 
bulb prices plummeted and sellers were left holding near worthless tulip bulbs. Kindleberger 
and Aliber (2005) claim that once the tulip bulb bubble burst, Holland households were less 
eager to spend due to the lower levels of wealth (p. 117). The negative economic effects of an 
asset bubble bursting are, therefore, evident in the Holland case. From this example, it can be 
seen that crises arise from a combination of factors, including speculation and changing 
investor sentiment in financial markets. Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between investor 
speculation, bubbles and financial crises. It is important to note that Figure 2.3 focuses on the 
negative impact of a bursting bubble because it is the outcome that this research and analysts 
are most concerned about. Nevertheless, this research acknowledges that it is possible for a 
bubble to burst without it adversely affecting an economy; this is in part because a 
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combination of factors contributes to the onset of a financial crisis. This is why the pathway 
from a bubble to a crisis, in Figure 2.3, is indicated by using an arrow with a dotted line. For 
example, Mishkin (2009, p. 574) attributed the 2007-2009 GFC to: “the mismanagement of 
financial innovation, an asset price bubble that burst, and deterioration of financial institution 
balance sheets”. Schoenbaum (2012, p. 55) provides a total of 15 possible causes of the GFC 
which can be grouped into the four categories of: “a) failure of oversight and regulation 
b)private sector abuses c) bad government and policies and d) international monetary 
imbalances and a lack of preparedness of international economic institutions”. 
 
Figure 2.3: How investor behaviour causes financial crises 
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The fact that several factors may have led to the onset of a financial crisis, implies that in the 
event of a bubble bursting, policy makers should check for the presence of a combination of 
factors that may signal increased likelihood of a crisis. Furthermore, by adopting anticipatory 
policy measures, the negative impacts of a bubble bursting could be lessened.  
It should be noted that bubbles can also play a role in the cross-border transmission of 
financial crisis. Specifically, if a country (country A) benefits economically from the 
presence of a bubble in another country (country B) and the benefit is significant,
12
 when the 
bubble bursts in country B it could potentially lead to economic problems in country A. This 
indirect impact of bubbles depends on the extent to which country A is reliant on the bubble 
developing in country B. Moreover, the economic resilience of country A may influence the 
extent and degree of contagion of economic problems from country B. If country A is able to 
withstand, avoid or recover from economic or financial shocks from country B, it can be 
regarded as being economically resilient (Candelon, Dumitrescu, & Hurlin, 2012). Policy 
makers would find the development and implementation of policies that encourage economic 
resilience desirable because these policies would help to strengthen the financial system. 
In summary, this section explained how human involvement in financial markets often results 
in speculation which in turn can prove both beneficial for and harmful to financial markets. 
On one hand, speculation is a necessary component for the normal functioning of financial 
markets while, on the other hand, speculation leads to growth and development of asset 
bubbles. On bursting, asset bubbles could potentially lead to a decline in economic activity, 
an issue of particular concern to policy makers and economists alike. Therefore, It follows 
that, research on how to address the problem of crises is an area of considerable interest as it 
is hoped that more research will shed some light on why crises occur, how they can be 
                                                 
12
  Significant here refers to the possibility that if a bubble bursts in country B, country A could potentially 
suffer economic loss, even if a bubble has not burst in country A. 
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contained or managed, how they spread to neighbouring countries and how to be better 
prepared for the eventuality of future crises. Accordingly, the subsequent sections (Sections 
2.5 to 2.8) focus on the relationship between crises and economic recession, possible 
channels for contagion of a crisis and investor behavioural factors that contribute to financial 
contagion. 
 
2.5 Post-Crisis: Who Is To Blame? 
In the words of the famous philosopher George Santayana, “Those who cannot remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it” (Santayana, 1905, p. 284). Likewise, mankind must look to 
the past to understand how and why financial crises develop and how to prevent future crises. 
For this reason, it seems almost ‘customary’ that in the aftermath of any financial crisis, 
researchers, analysts, and policy wonks engage in a finger-pointing exercise in order to 
establish what went wrong and/or to divert blame. This blame game is perhaps motivated by 
a belief that once researchers find a party to blame for the occurrence of the crisis, they are 
one step closer to determining how to address the problem of financial crises. The groups 
most often identified as having caused or nurtured financial crises include: investors, 
regulatory authorities, and economists. Investors are blamed for failing to adequately assess 
the risks of the investment before investing in an asset or commodity or for being too 
optimistic. Regulatory authorities are deemed to have taken too long to respond to a crisis as 
it unfolded. For this reason, analysts often try to establish whether regulatory authorities 
could have prevented a financial crisis. Abolafia (2010) argues that to a certain degree 
regulatory authorities are able to curb excessive market speculation via improved regulation 
of financial markets, introducing higher penalties for institutions or investors that fail to 
comply with the rules and implementing policies that prevent investors from gaining access 
to easy credit.  
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Economists, as ‘custodians’ of an economy, are often deemed to have fallen asleep on the job 
when things go wrong as they should have noticed the deterioration in macroeconomic 
fundamentals and sounded the alarm in the early stages of a developing crisis. There is some 
truth in this argument, in so far as the deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals could have 
been foreseen before the occurrence of the financial crisis. Even though there will always be 
certain elements of a crisis that resemble past crises, Taleb (2007) argues that there is always 
the potential for ‘Black Swan’ events. A ‘Black Swan’ is a massively unexpected crisis that 
profoundly differs from past episodes of crisis. When policymakers are unfamiliar with such 
events, they may resort to naïve predictions. For instance, the 1987 stock market crash 
occurred when least expected, especially because familiar precursors of a crisis were absent. 
In the immediate aftermath of this crisis, traders erroneously anticipated a repeat of a similar 
crisis in October of subsequent years (Taleb, 2007, p. 42). It later became apparent that a 
prediction based on such logic was ill-founded.  
 
It is possible for even the most astute economist to fail to anticipate the incidence of a crisis. 
According to Megalogenis (2012), “Economists struggle with human beings. Just when they 
think they have accumulated all relationships in a society within the boundaries of a 
mathematical model, emotion will overwhelm all logic and create a bust [that] no one sees 
coming” (p. 60). It can, therefore, be argued that economists can only be blamed to the extent 
to which they can or should be able to anticipate the occurrence of the crises and opt not to 
recommend timely implementation of policies to forestall a crisis. If one considers that as 
financial systems and markets are changing and there is a corresponding change in the 
anatomy of financial crises. Then it follows that the occurrence of crises that are the same as 
past crises is unlikely; that is unless regulators failed to address factors that led to past crises. 
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In general, attributing blame to one party demonstrates an inaccurate and simplistic 
understanding of the financial crises; especially as it is plausible that several parties played a 
role in the development and onset of a crisis. For instance, a financial crisis may result from a 
combination of factors such as lax regulation of financial institutions or inadequate regulation 
for the trade of certain classes of financial instruments, overoptimism and greed on the part of 
investors and a prevailing belief among economists that deteriorating macroeconomic 
fundamentals are not an issue of concern. The fact that several parties may be at fault 
contributes to the complexity of financial crises especially since the actions by investors, 
economists or regulators may be based on rational or irrational reasons and the reasons are 
not always evident until after an action has been taken or a decision has been made. 
Nevertheless, all parties can learn from past mistakes–investors can try to be less optimistic 
and greedy in future while economists and regulators can strive to be more vigilant 
implement more stringent economic policies. 
 
2.6 Financial Stress, Crises and Recessions 
Harmful episodes of stress are linked to economic crises and recessions and are of particular 
interest to policy makers. The main issue of concern for analysts is the origin of the stress. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) asserts that the probability of an economic recession 
depends on the degree to which house prices or aggregate credit rose before an episode of 
stress (IMF, 2008). There is a positive relationship between stress and large increases in 
housing prices or credit; the larger the increase in credit and house prices the more the stress 
and vice versa. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) assert that the degree of subsequent recession will 
depend on the extent of reduced spending and cost cutting by businesses and households. 
Moreover, distress from structural weaknesses in the banking sector often results in more 
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severe economic downturns, as compared to securities or foreign market related stress. Illing 
and Liu (2006) suggest that countries with weak financial systems provide a fertile ground for 
exogenous shocks to germinate into stress. In extreme cases, if timely corrective action is not 
taken, stress can spread within local financial systems affecting liquidity in households and 
financial markets – and culminate in a local crisis. If left unchecked, this could spread to 
neighbouring economies and eventually affect the global financial market (see Figure 2.4). 
Cross-border links that exist for trade and financial purposes may provide conduits for the 
transmission of stress. Specifically, countries with “more-arm’s-length financial systems” and 
“financial innovation” are susceptible to worse periods of recession following an episode of 
stress compared to countries with negligible financial system integration or linkages (IMF, 
2008).  
 
Figure 2.4: Transmission of Financial Stress 
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2.7 International Trade Theories and Trade Linkages 
Stress spreads from one country to another via trade links established to facilitate 
international trade. It may be argued that reducing trade links that exist between countries 
reduces financial-contagion risks. However, international trade plays an important role in 
economic development of Australia and understanding the economic theory relating to 
international trade could help to explain the importance of trade linkages (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012). This discussion of trade theories is a prelude to a more 
extended examination of contagion that spreads via international or regional trade networks 
in the following section.  
 
The concept of comparative advantage goes back to the early days of economic theory with 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Eli Heckscher (Heckscher, 1950; Ricardo, 1981; Smith, 
1977). The comparative advantage concept suggests that when one country specialises in the 
production of a good, that requires the least number of person-hours and imports the other 
good from another country, both countries realize increased production of both goods 
(Czinkota, Ronkainen, Moffett, & Moynihan, 2001). Theoretically, Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) 
theory provides valid arguments for why some bilateral trade links are established between 
countries (Sheng & Song, 2008). However, the empirical performance of the H-O theory in 
explaining bilateral trade flows has proved problematic in some cases, as first demonstrated 
by Leontief (1953) and subsequent researchers. Leontief revealed contradictory findings of 
the H-O theorem using the trading relationship between US and trading partners in the 1950s. 
Baskaran, Blöchl, Brück, and Theis (2011) offer a plausible explanation for the model’s 
empirical inadequacies by proposing that international trade occurs in a complex network, 
which is not considered in most tests of the H-O model. If the network relationship of factor 
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differentials that exist between trading countries was examined and incorporated into H-O 
testing models, empirical findings would favour the H-O theory.
13
  
 
Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) argued that H-O theory could be ameliorated to 
account for varying technological predispositions of trading countries by relaxing the 
technology assumption and subsequently developed a Ricardian model with a continuum of 
goods. This model is based on the idea that comparative advantages mainly reflect 
differences in technology across different countries and labour is the most relevant factor to 
consider in the analysis of comparative trade. In this case, trade results due to the disparities 
in technological endowments. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) used the Ricardian model to 
explore the relationship between wages and international trade in a capital-based economy 
(the United States (US)), versus a labour-based economy (Mexico). The study found that 
outsourcing of labour created more jobs in Mexico and contributed to an increase in wages of 
the US non-production labour rates by about 31 percent in the 1980s. Overall, trade 
benefitted parties in both economies and countries establish multilateral trade agreements in 
order to enjoy similar mutually beneficial relationships.  
 
2.8 Globalization, Contagion and Financial Stress 
Financial globalization provides avenues for both economic growth and economic recessions. 
On one hand, a good mix of policies to reduce trade barriers will provide businesses and 
individuals with welfare gains (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2007). Reduced trade restrictions can 
minimize trade costs and businesses that undertake transactions in more than one country can 
diversify away country specific risk associated with doing business in one country only. On 
                                                 
13
 Baskaran et al. (2011) showed that modified tests yielded better results compared to unmodified versions of 
H-O model tests using data for trade of goods in about 222 countries/territories. 
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the other hand, increased inter-linkages across trans-national financial markets make 
countries more vulnerable to the contagion effect of crises in other nations. Susceptibility to 
the Greek crisis started as a gross over-surplus of poorly invested funds from Russian 
oligarchs that spilled into Cyprus, then from Cyprus into Greece, and then into neighbouring 
European countries (in part) due to the increased structural fragility associated with interbank 
linkages such as interbank lending relationships, interbank credit lines and solvency 
(Financial Post, 2013; Gramlich & Oet, 2011; M. Miller, 2013). Financial globalization has 
developed a network that facilitates quick transmission of economic shocks from one country 
to another (Stiglitz, 2010). Paradoxically, the increased interconnectivity that facilitates 
multilateral trade exposes economies to the contagion effects of stress experienced by any 
trade partner (Lazarides, 2011) and can even create a ‘domino effect’.The dilemma that most 
countries find themselves in is to determine an optimum level of financial integration. 
 
Definitions of contagion can be grouped in to endogenous, exogenous, negative, and positive 
contagion (see, Figure 2.5). Endogenous definitions of contagion explain how problems 
originate from within a financial system due to shocks in a particular sector such as the 
banking or insurance sector. Allen and Gale (2000) state that contagion occurs when small 
shocks affecting a few financial institutions will (unless contained) spread to the financial 
sector and then to the rest of the economy. In the banking sector, a shock spreads from one 
bank to another as banks hold deposits in other banks. The impact of a shock on the banking 
sector depends on the nature and degree of interconnectedness of financial claims. If a shock 
affects the liquidity in the banking sector and banks are unable to satisfy the aggregate 
demand for liquidity, contagion of liquidity problems can spread as banks withdraw holdings 
in other banks to satisfy demand. The result is negative contagion that is characterised by 
reduced liquidity (a credit crunch) at the regional level and could potentially lead to national 
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crisis. If the regulatory authorities intervene at this point, the spread of the banking crisis 
could be forestalled. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) underscore the importance of collaboration 
between local and foreign institutions in the containment of a local crisis and suggest that this 
is why the 1999 Ecuador debt crisis did not spread to the global financial market. Conversely, 
if a shock does not affect the aggregate liquidity of banks, the interbank holdings could prove 
advantageous. In this regard, the impact of a shock that affects a few banks can be lessened as 
the shock spreads throughout the banking system.
14
 This is an example of positive contagion 
since the banks benefit from reduced risk associated with the reduced shock.  
           
 
Figure 2.5: Forms of Contagion 
 
There are varying definitions of exogenous contagion but most definitions focus on 
identifying the cause of a spill-over of crises from foreign countries to the local financial 
system. Australia is a dual economy that has experienced few episodes of stress originating 
from within Australia. Indeed most episodes of stress experienced in the Australian economy 
                                                 
14
 This is only possible if each bank has holdings in all other banks and vice versa, a situation Allen and Gale 
(2000) described as a complete market structure.  
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have been due to contagion-related stress. The recent GFC originated in the US and affected 
global markets. Increased co-movement of prices (Hettihewa & Mallik, 2005) in global 
financial markets due to the occurrence of a crisis in one country could be an indication of 
contagion. This is a plausible explanation for the steady decline in the US Dow Jones and the 
Australian All Ordinaries index during the 2007-09 GFC (Figure 2.6).
15
 This study shall 
explore whether a co-integrative relationship between the two stock indexes may explain why 
contagion of the crisis occurred.
16
 Also, an empirical evaluation of the degree of stress 
transmitted from US to Australia will be examined.  
 
     Figure 2.6: Monthly Stock Indexes for Australia and the US (1980-2011) 
      Data source: Wren Advisers 
17
 
Analysts suggest that Australia has dealt with contagion-related stress quite well, due to a 
number of factors. Specifically, Australia had stable financial institutions with prudent 
regulatory measures (often accused of being passé, pre-GFC) already in place before the 
                                                 
15
 The graph shows monthly averages of stock indexes at the level. 
16
 See Hettihewa and Mallik (2005) for details on co-integration 
17
 Data retrieved on 25 November, 2012 from: http://www.wrenadvisers.com.au/downloads 
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onset of the GFC. In addition, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
facilitated strong regulation, close supervision and effective risk management of Australian 
banks – this nurtured a relatively stable banking sector in Australia.18 Further, even after the 
crisis had begun to affect global markets, Australia was enjoying an economic boom owing to 
the export boom of the mining industries in Queensland and Western Australia (Perlich, 
2009). Moreover, the Australian government took pre-emptive measures to ensure Australian 
banks had sufficient foreign currency at their disposal and money to prevent bank runs and 
provided a substantial stimulus package to reinvigorate spending confidence by offsetting any 
declines in perceived wealth (Berg, 2014).  
 
Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2004) define contagion as the process by which “…financial 
difficulties spread from one economy to another in the same region and beyond…” via trade 
or financial linkages (p. 51). In this case, stress is not confined to the affected country; rather 
the impact of stress can affect all countries that trade with the affected country. Pericoli and 
Sbracia (2003) state that contagion occurs when there is “a significant increase in the 
probability of a crisis conditional on a crisis occurring in another country” – a definition that 
explains how the Thai crisis developed into the Asian crisis (p. 574). 
 
Calvo and Mendoza (1998) argue that financial contagion can occur even if linkages are 
absent or controlled (e.g., if the investment patterns reflect a herding behaviour that may or 
may not be rational) (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000). Unfortunately, irrational decisions made 
by key market players (e.g., financial institutions, analysts, or respected individuals) can 
trigger herd behaviour that could destabilize financial markets. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1992) suggest that, although individual investors may herd, it is unlikely they would 
                                                 
18 See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure Transport Regional Development & 
Local Government (2009).  
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influence the market unless a group of large investors acted in the same irrational manner, 
either buying or selling in bulk. From a regulator’s point of view, predicting such irrational 
herding among key market players is impossible. However, historical records of rational 
herding might be a useful tool for anticipating market imbalances and for planning corrective 
action (e.g. studies in the United States, by Lakonishok et al. (1992), indicate that fund 
managers were more likely to engage in herding behaviour when investing in small stocks,
19
 
due to the limited information in the public domain). Information asymmetry seems to 
motivate behaviour among fund managers with most managers assuming that competing fund 
managers have access to better information than they do. Consequently, managers mimic 
investment behaviour in order to benefit from the potential capital gains that competitor fund 
managers may receive. Essentially, the fact that herding behaviour exists is proof that 
financial markets are inefficient (at least in the short run). According to Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) rational herding by institutions could help counter irrational behaviour by investors 
and, thereby, stabilize stock prices. However, this does not rule out the possibility that 
institutions could also contribute to market instabilities if they engage in irrational behaviour. 
One could test for the overall herding behaviour among money managers in an industry by 
checking the correlation of trading patterns of different managers. While herding tests can be 
useful to identify industry specific investment trends and potential for contagion, the focus of 
this study is on contagion in Australia.  
 
It is difficult to determine whether contagion experienced at the regional level is due mostly 
to financial links or trade links because countries tend to concurrently establish regional trade 
agreements and the interbank linkages needed to facilitate the associated trade (Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 2000). Nevertheless, trade and/or financial links facilitate the transmission of a 
                                                 
 
19
 Small stocks include stocks of companies in the bottom two quintiles by market capitalisation (Lakonishok et 
al., 1992). 
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crisis from one country to another. An example of regional contagion is the 1997 Asian Crisis 
that originated in Thailand following the July 2, 1997 announcement that the government 
could no longer afford to service its foreign debt. The impact of this crisis was increased 
currency speculation that cost the Thai government $24 billion (USD) in reserve assets. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea also suffered the indirect effects of the crisis, spurred 
on by the speculative forces that convinced foreign lenders to cease all loans denominated in 
the rupiah, the ringgit and the won respectively – in order to minimize speculative losses. 
Ultimately, the affected countries were starved of foreign reserves and could not afford to 
service their foreign debt (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005).  
 
The vulnerability of a country to contagion of stress depends on, the:  
 Degree to which a country depends on trade with other countries,  
 Inherent strength of the economies of the trade-partners, 
 Nature of the trade and availability of substitutes (e.g. sellers tend to be more vulnerable 
to buyer problems than vice-versa), and  
 Flexibility of the trade (e.g. capacity to shift trade to nations with fewer problems).  
 
In an illustrative example of the above notions, consider a completely insular country that (by 
definition) has no trade linkages with the rest of the world. In such a country, there is little or 
no need for financial linkages; since by definition, they would be of little or no use. The 
government in power need only worry about developing and implementing sound macro-
prudential policies that are applicable to its country to avoid endogenous contagion of stress. 
While the absence of trade linkages in this utopian country would seem to make it safe from 
contagion of stress, it also foregoes the benefits of international trade (as highlighted by 
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several economists including Ricardo and Samuelson).
20
 Besides, in the real world, no 
country can be perfectly insular, as this would require the country to operate in isolation. 
Conversely, excessive dependence on other nations makes a country susceptible to events in 
those other nations. A more balanced approach is one of inter-dependence, where countries 
develop bilateral and multilateral trade agreements to the benefit of all, via mutual-need 
synergism. This does not suggest that countries with interdependent relationships are 
completely safe from contagion. Rather, it implies that there is a positive relationship 
between dependence and the degree of contagion experienced by a country; higher levels of 
dependence are associated with increased vulnerability to contagion and vice versa. 
Moreover, inter-dependent relationships are rooted in “mutual need”; in the absence of 
mutual need, it is impossible to establish an interdependent arrangement that would benefit 
both countries — in such a case, unilateral engagements would be more meaningful.  
 
2.9 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, this chapter discussed the definitions of financial stress that were applicable 
for this study. While financial stress can be experienced at the micro and macro level, the 
primary focus of this study is on understanding the macroeconomic kind of stress. 
Consequently, subsequent chapters focus on the impact of stress on the Australian economy 
and examine how market dynamics and investor behaviour could contribute to the spread of 
financial stress if irrational exuberance is left unchecked by regulators. The next chapter 
presents the conceptual framework, research methods and approaches that were used in this 
study. 
 
  
                                                 
20
 Moreover, the country is not safe from the (true) contagion that occurs even if linkages are absent. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is designed to explain why this study adopts certain research approaches and 
methods to answer the research questions outlined in Section 1.6 of Chapter 1. The 
conceptual framework for this study is outlined in Section 3.2 before exploring the best 
approaches and methods to conduct this study. Section 3.3 outlines the research process for 
this study. This is followed by a discussion of the research philosophy underpinning this 
study (Section 3.4), the research approaches (Section 3.5), research strategies (Section 3.6) 
and the choice of research methods (Section 3.7). The time horizon for this research and data 
frequency concerns are discussed in Sections 3.8 and 3.9 respectively. Section 3.10 focuses 
on the review of the literature on how to measure financial stress and financial contagion; the 
main focus will be on providing arguments for the methods which are applicable to the 
Australian case. Section 3.11 provides a brief discussion of the aggregation methods used in 
the design of composite financial stress indexes. Towards the end of this chapter, Section 
3.12 and 3.13 focus on: the justification of the research methodology employed in this study 
and the concluding remarks of this chapter respectively.  
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of this study is developed based on the literature from finance, 
econometrics and economics (see Figure 3.1). In this study the types of stress/crises, the 
theoretical aspects (EMH, asymmetric information, herd behaviour and trade theory) will be 
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considered in identifying the trade relationship and its influence and importance to the 
objectives of this study. Based on the literature, this study investigates the internal and 
external factors that contribute to financial stress. It is common for price movements of assets 
or securities of countries with financial or economic ties to follow a similar trend, but the 
reasons for the common trends are still a source of academic debate. Accordingly, market 
integration was examined and evaluated in order to identify the possible links between 
financial integration and stress/crises. There are two main arguments offered for increased 
market integration with the arguments based on either an explanation of 1) contagion or 2) 
interdependence. Both arguments are examined in order to identify suitable ways of 
measuring contagion of financial stress. Moreover, the impacts of stress/crises were discussed 
in order to identify possible indicators of stress in the Australian context.  
 
This study uses the variables identified in Chapters 4 to 8 and index building techniques in 
Chapter 9 to construct a composite index for stress in Australia. Specifically, variables that 
measure the level of stress in the Australian mining sector, banking industry and financial 
markets
21
 were subsumed into composite measures for stress using the principal component 
analysis and variance-equal weights methods.
22
 The estimated stress variables and stress 
indexes were assessed to determine if they were sufficient tools for monitoring and 
forecasting Australian financial stress. Moreover, the framework was used to test the 
following hypotheses: 
1. There exist bilateral short-term movements between Australia and its key trading 
partners that can be used to gauge the potential for stress in Australian financial 
markets, 
                                                 
21
 These include the Australian equity, bond, money, currency and  property markets 
22
 The researcher assessed four index aggregation methods before opting for the use of these two methods for 
index aggregation. Chapter 9 of this thesis provides a detailed discussion the aggregation methods which 
include the principal components analysis, variance-equal weights, transformation by cumulative distribution 
functions and the credit weights techniques. 
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2. The choice of index aggregation method affects the performance of the composite 
stress index, and 
3. A significant decline in exports of the mining industry for a prolonged period will 
translate to increased vulnerability to stress in the Australian mining sector. 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework  
 
While the conceptual framework outlines the theoretical requirements of this research, it does 
not explain how this research was conducted. An understanding of how this study was done is 
important not only for the purpose of this research but for future researchers who may wish 
replicate and extend the work in this study. To illustrate this point consider the case of an 
automobile manufacturer that has declining levels of revenue due to decreasing demand for 
the cars produced by the company. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the automobile 
company thinks that introducing a new car model to suit the customers’ changing needs 
combined with strategic marketing of the new model would result in increased demand for 
48 
 
the company’s cars. As a result, the CEO hires a marketing research consultant to conduct a 
research on the customer preferences when buying a car. At this point, the marketing 
researcher is aware of the problem at hand and can identify the information that must be 
obtained from potential car buyers in order to solve this problem. However, the manner in 
which the research will be conducted must be clearly outlined. In particular, the marketing 
researcher would need to develop a research design to specify, among other things: 1) how 
data will be collected (through phone interviews, questionnaires-posted versus face to face 
interviews), 2) what kind of data is required (quantitative versus qualitative or both), how 
long should the research take (the time line based on an anticipated completion time). This 
means that the researcher would need to come up with a detailed plan for the research before 
the study was conducted. This plan should detail the research process and explain the design 
of the whole research; ideally it should act as a ‘road map’ and provide guidelines to different 
parties involved in the research process from the start to finish. This plan can be used by the 
automobile company to replicate a similar research in future should the need arise. The 
research design proposed in this chapter aims to provide clear guidelines on how the 
researcher conducted this study, in the hope that this information will be a useful guide for 
future researchers who wish to extend the work done in this thesis. Accordingly, the 
discussion in the section that follows turns to the explanation of various aspects of the 
research process.  
3.3 Research Process 
This section of the study outlines the research process that was adopted. The research process 
used in this study draws from the concept of the ‘research onion’ as proposed by Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill (2009). In this approach to research design, the researcher starts from 
the outer layers of the research onion and progressively peels each layer away until reaching 
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the centre of the research ‘onion’. Each layer represents an aspect of research process that 
must be consider in order to set out a plan for how to conduct a research. In particular, the 
research ‘onion’ has five layers that represent important elements of research including the: 
1) Research philosophy; 2) Research approach; 3) Research strategies; 4) Choice of research 
method; and 5) Time horizon. Once the first five aspects of research have been addressed, the 
researcher can more effectively tackle the central component of the research ‘onion’ which is 
the identification of methods and procedures for collecting data. The subsequent sections give 
a more general discussion of the five aspects of the research design. Figure 3.2 shows the 
adapted version of research onion applied in this study. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Research Process for this study 
Source: Adapted from Saunders et al. (2009, p. 108)  
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3.4  Research Philosophy  
3.4.1 Brief Overview of Research Philosophies 
A research philosophy can be understood as how the researcher views the world around him 
or her (Saunders et al., 2009). Every researcher perceives the world around them differently 
depending on their individual: i) Upbringing; ii) Life experiences; iii) Education; iv) Personal 
beliefs or value-system; v) Customs; and vi) Societal values. The extent to which a research 
is or is not influenced by the researcher’s values depends on research philosophy adopted by 
the researcher. The selected research philosophy permeates the choice of research approaches 
and methodologies. Saunders et al. (2009) document four main research philosophies that 
explain different world views of researchers; these are: positivism, realism, interpretivism, 
and pragmatism. The following subsections discuss these four research philosophies and then 
highlight the research philosophy used in this study. 
 
3.4.1.1 Positivism 
Positivism refers to the world view that a researcher can examine the environment around 
them, collect some data and analyse the data to check for trends or patterns that can be 
generalized and used for forecasting (Saunders et al., 2009; Saunders & Tosey, 2012). This 
approach is more suited to the collection and analysis of quantitative data. Consider for 
example, a researcher who is interested in the effect of financial crises on stock prices. The 
researcher may hypothesize that the prices of shares decline at a faster rate during in-crisis 
periods as opposed to out-of-crisis periods. An assessment of the historical trends of end-of-
day prices of different shares in the pre-crisis, during crisis and after-crisis periods could help 
to test this theory. In particular, past episodes of financial crises in the US such as the 1987 
Black Monday and the 2007-2009 subprime mortgage crisis could be examined in order to 
test the researcher’s hypothesis. By examining data for US share prices in periods before, 
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during and immediately after these two episodes of crisis, the researcher could check whether 
the prices declined at a faster rate during crisis period than in non-crisis periods. Based on the 
findings of the research, a generalized conclusion can be made on the effect of a crisis on the 
prices of US stocks. This generalisation can be useful for designing models that explain the 
potential losses for investors during a crisis as opposed to out-of-crisis periods. Moreover, it 
can help investors to hedge against large losses during periods of crisis. While, positivism is 
the oldest research philosophy it is far from perfect. According to Cavana, Delahaye, and 
Sekaran (2001) the positivist approach fails to consider aspects that cannot be quantified such 
as nonmonetary motivations for human behaviour and it ignores the subjective influence of a 
researcher on a study. Due to these weaknesses, alternative philosophies such as the realism 
approach have been developed to address the weaknesses of the positivist approach. 
Accordingly, the subsection that follows provides a discussion of the realism approach to 
research philosophy. 
 
3.4.1.2 Realism 
Unlike the positivist approach which focuses on understanding objects (respondents or 
phenomenon) and ignores the interaction between the researcher and object being studied, the 
realism philosophies focus on understanding the interactive relationship between the 
researcher and the object of study. In particular, realism philosophies are based on the 
premise that the world exists independent of the researcher and that the researcher 
understands the world around them by what they perceive via their senses. Saunders et al. 
(2009) identifies two main categories of realism namely direct realism and critical realism. 
Direct realism argues that the senses provide the researcher with the most accurate 
understanding of the world. Conversely, critical realism argues that the researcher’s 
understanding of the world is subjective and that what is perceived by the senses must then be 
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interpreted or understood by the mind. Saunders and Tosey (2012) state that critical realism 
focuses on understanding what is experienced by the senses as well as the underlying factors 
such as the complex “structures and relationships that lie beneath” (p. 58). Cavana et al. 
(2001, p. 10) provides the following criticisms for the critical realist approach: “it assumes 
that laws of social order are out there waiting to be discovered, it may force change on people 
before they are ready” and “it focuses on destroying current reality without providing 
processes for building new reality.” Based on these criticisms the aforementioned author 
proposed the use of the interpretivist research philosophy. For this reason, the section that 
follows will now turn to the discussion of the interpretivism research philosophy.  
 
3.4.1.3 Interpretivism 
Cavana et al. (2001) asserts that the interpretivism philosophy is based on the idea that man’s 
experience of social and physical reality is subjective. This philosophy focuses on the 
understanding human behaviour which is influenced by a variety of factors such as emotions, 
intellect, education, experience, religion, social norms and customs. The focus on human 
attributes means that interpretivist researchers often collect qualitative data (Saunders et al., 
2009). It is important to note that even though a researcher may be interested in 
understanding a phenomenon or an object, the scope of his or her research will be limited to 
collecting information on human experiences in relation to the phenomenon or object of 
interest. In this case the focus is not on understanding the phenomenon or object in isolation 
but on understanding the respondent’s experience of phenomenon. Cavana et al. (2001) 
argues that a researcher adopting this philosophy is interested in understanding the 
environment of the people being studied.  
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3.4.1.4 Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is based on the idea that multiple realities may exist and adopting of a single 
viewpoint could mean that the researcher fails to understand the whole problem (Saunders & 
Tosey, 2012). This research philosophy is flexible in that it is structured in a manner that 
helps the researcher to answer the research questions asked and gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the problem at hand. Saunders et al. (2009, p. 119) suggest that researcher 
may adopt a mixed methods approach and examine qualitative and quantitative data in order 
to understand “observable phenomena and subjective meanings”. This approach to research 
aims to provide a holistic understanding of a problem using several techniques to examine the 
subparts (of the problem) as are deemed fit. 
 
3.4.2 The Research Philosophy used in this Study 
When deliberating on the research philosophy that is most suitable for a study, it is important 
for a researcher to bear in mind the overall objective of their study. The main objective of this 
study is to gain an understanding of factors that contribute to the occurrence of crisis and use 
that information to propose a quantifiable measure of financial stress or crisis in Australia. 
This study acknowledges that financial crises are complex and are caused by a combination 
of factors including social, financial and economic factors. The social aspect of a financial 
crisis is due to the fact that financial markets comprise of investors who are interested in 
buying or selling a commodity. Investor behaviour in financial markets has led to past crises 
characterised by bank runs or divestment by a large group of investors in financial markets. 
Financial aspects relate to the stability of major financial institutions operating in a country. 
For instance countries that suffer from poor management of the financial institutions, lax 
regulation and/ or excessive lending may be at higher risk of financial instability and crisis. 
Economic factors relates to prevailing economic policies that may have worsened the episode 
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of crisis. All these factors interact and combine in a manner that produces financial stress and 
ultimately financial crisis when financial systems are subjected to high levels of financial 
stress (Illing & Liu, 2006). Several studies have shown that the macroeconomic and financial 
impact of crises can be quantified and analysed in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon of financial crises (Corbet, 2014; Dahalan, Abdullah, & Umar, 2016; Ekinci, 
2013; Illing & Liu, 2006; Louzis & Vouldis, 2012; Oet et al., 2015; Siņenko, Titarenko, & 
Āriņš, 2013). Therefore, this study uses the positivist approach to identify and obtain 
numerical data for indicators for stress and/or crisis in Australia. The stress indicators are 
subsequently used to develop a composite stress index. 
 
3.5  Research Approaches 
Once the research philosophy has been identified, the researcher can proceed to identify the 
research approach that will address the research problem. A researcher can choose between 
two research approaches; the deductive versus the inductive approach to research. Cavana et 
al. (2001) consider deductive process as a top-down approach where the researcher: a) 
Develops a theory; b) Formulates hypotheses; c) Collects and analyses data; and d) Performs 
hypothesis tests in order to determine whether to accept or reject the hypotheses. Moreover, 
the same authors view the inductive process as a bottom-up approach where researchers: a) 
Examine objects, social behaviour or phenomena; b) Identify patterns or themes in the data; 
c) Suggest relationships based on what was observed in data; and d) Develop a theory about 
the object, nature of the phenomenon. Weathington, Cunningham, and Pittenger (2012) argue 
that the inductive approach is more suited to qualitative research as the researcher uses data 
as a starting point for analysis and ends by developing a theory based on the research 
findings. Conversely, the deductive approach is more suited for quantitative research as the 
researcher starts off with a hypothesis which is tested via the analysis of data collected. The 
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deductive approach focuses on performing research to confirm a predetermined hypothesis 
while the inductive approach leads to the development of a hypothesis or theory. This implies 
that the researcher’s choice of either approach depends on whether the researcher is interested 
in finding evidence to support a hypotheses or developing a theory about a phenomenon, 
object or human behaviour. Saunders et al. (2009) argue that a combination of the approaches 
could prove advantageous, if it enables the researcher to address the research questions asked 
and complete the research within a reasonable time frame.  
This research uses the inductive approach due to the sequence of research process followed in 
this study. First, the researcher identified two hypotheses of interest for this study; these 
hypotheses are discussed in Section 3.2. Second, economic and financial data was collected 
and analysed in order to determine whether Australian data supports the chosen hypotheses. 
Third, the data is used to construct stress variables. Last, the selected variables are used to 
construct a composite stress index which is used to formulate a theory as to when Australia is 
experiencing financial distress or is at risk of a financial crisis.  
 
3.6  Research Strategies  
The research strategy used in this study is the experimental strategy. Neuman (2014) states 
that the experimental strategy is suitable for research that use the positivist approach because 
it allows a researcher to hypothesize about relationships that may exist between variables, 
collect data and analyse it to see if the hypothesis is true quantitative evidence. Moreover, 
Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2015) argues that experimental design is useful for 
exploratory or explanatory research mainly because these research tend to focus on ‘what’, 
‘how’, and ‘why’ questions. The experimental research is suitable for this research because 
this study examines how past crises developed and spread with the aim of identifying relevant 
stress variables that signal the worsening of financial health in an economy to crisis levels. It 
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also explores how the variables can be combined to form an aggregate measure of stress in 
Australia. This study presents hypothesis on the conditions that could precipitate distress in 
the Australian mining sector and the potential effect of using different index aggregation 
techniques. Since Australia has had limited experience with financial crises, the study draws 
on the experience of other developed countries (that have suffered more financial crises) in 
order to determine Australia’s likelihood of crisis in future.  
 
3.7  Choice of Research Methods 
This research considered the use of a mono method versus a mixed methods technique for this 
study. The mono method techniques use either a predominantly quantitative or qualitative 
method. The quantitative methods focus on obtaining numerical data while qualitative 
methods focus on obtaining non-numerical data. The choice of either technique influences the 
data collection technique chosen in the final stage of the research design process. Proponents 
of the mixed methods approach often utilise quantitative and qualitative methods in data 
collection and analysis stages of their research design (Saunders et al., 2009, 2015). The 
procedure for data collection and analysis in this study is consistent with a mono method 
technique. In particular, this study mainly collected and analysed quantitative data before 
presenting a quantifiable measure of financial stress for Australia. Consequently, the 
quantitative aspects of this study are discussed in Section 3.7.1 of this chapter.  
 
3.7.1 Quantitative Approach 
The quantitative aspect of this research focused on providing quantitative measures of stress. 
This involved examining historical financial trauma events with the intent of identifying 
stress indicators that can contribute to designing a composite stress index for Australia. A 
good starting point for developing quantitative measures is an evaluation of financial and 
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economic variables that reflect the performance or health of the Australian economy over 
time. For the purposes of this study, variables were selected based on four main criteria: 
1) Desirability, as evidenced by use in similar studies (e.g., focused on other countries) or 
in theory papers from the literature review.
23
 
2) Availability, timing structure (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual), range (years 
covered), and nature (scope),  
3) Quantity; to ensure that statistical tests are robust and that the research findings are 
statistically significant/valid, this study uses variables with at least 100 data points, and 
4) Availability of appropriate proxies, where a variable is highly desirable but sufficient, 
reliable, and/or appropriate historical data is unavailable. 
Once suitable variables were identified, the researcher assessed the degree of variable 
responsiveness during past episodes of stress (i.e., the variables show statistically different 
behaviour during stressful periods, as compared to non-stressful periods). This implies that 
variables that exhibit the same kind of trending behaviour or movement regardless of the 
incidence or absence of a crisis provide insignificant information when measuring the level of 
stress. Variables that signal financially traumatic periods were deemed fit for index-
construction purposes.  
The index-construction phase of the study considers where, and as appropriate, incorporates 
extant-research methodologies and recommended index-building techniques. Section 3.11 
contains a brief discussion of the index aggregation methods used in this study. A detailed 
discussion of these methods and the index building procedure are provided in Chapter 9. The 
econometric packages to be used for variable analysis and index construction are Regression 
Analysis of Time Series (RATS), Eviews (7 and 8), and IBM SPSS Statistics 19 econometric 
                                                 
23 Studies indicate that changes in asset prices and credit measures could prove useful in designing early 
warning indicators of financial stress (Borio & Lowe, 2002; Misina & Tkacz, 2009; Sorge, 2004). 
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packages (Estima, 2017; IBM, 2015; Quantitative Micro Software, 2015). The estimated 
indexes were assessed to verify that they are suitable forecasting and monitoring tools. 
Forecasting of stress involved splitting the dataset into two halves and using historical values 
in one-half to forecast observations in the other half and robustness of the forecasting model 
will be checked. This study also explored how financial-and-trade networks that link the 
Australian market to other parts of the world might be potential conduits of stress (contagion) 
to Australia. The study concludes with a discussion of the limitations and policy implications 
of the stress index.  
 
3.8  Time Horizons 
The time horizon is an important aspect of research that should be specified before data is 
collected or analysed. There are two main categories of time horizons: The longitudinal; and 
cross-sectional time horizons (Saunders et al., 2009). The longitudinal studies examine a 
phenomenon over an extended period of time and data is collected from one observation. It is 
common for the extended period of time to be divided into a regular time interval such as 
weekly, monthly, quarterly or yearly. By examining the trends of data the researcher can 
identify weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual trends; or seasonality in quantitative data. 
Cross-sectional studies focus on the understanding a phenomenon at a specific point in time. 
Data is collected at a point in time across several observation points. The difference between 
the two categories of time horizon can be better understood if an example is considered. 
Therefore, consider inflation as a variable of interest for illustrative purposes. The quarterly 
inflation rate in Australia from 1980 to 2014 is an example of a longitudinal variable while 
the inflation rate of the G20 countries in the last quarter of 2014 is an example of a cross-
sectional variable. In the case of the longitudinal time horizon, Australia is the single 
observation and data relating to inflation is obtained in each quarter from 1980 to 2014. 
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Conversely, the cross sectional variable focuses on the rate of inflation at one point in time 
(the last quarter or 2014) and more than one observation is considered (e.g., Australia, Japan, 
the USA, and the UK). This study has a longitudinal time horizon—it is focused on designing 
an index for Australia using historical data for the economic and financial variables. Now that 
it has been established that a longitudinal time horizon is most applicable for this study, the 
next issue is the data frequency that is most suitable for this study. Therefore, the section that 
follows discusses the data frequency that was used in this study. 
 
3.9 Data Frequency 
For the purposes of this study, time series of monthly frequency is preferred to the daily 
frequency since data for macroeconomic variables is more readily available at the monthly 
frequency. Opting for data at the daily frequency would limit the choice of variables to those 
available on daily frequency only (Holló, Kremer, & Duca, 2012; Illing & Liu, 2006). In 
most cases, the daily frequency is suitable for financial data but it is not suitable for 
macroeconomic data. Moreover, due to non-synchronous trading it is difficult to generate a 
synchronous dataset using daily data especially when the economic or financial variables are 
obtained from different countries. Given that this study considers the inclusion of foreign 
variables in the composite stress index, obtaining a synchronous dataset is an issue of 
considerable concern. Often, security markets remain closed on public holidays and different 
countries often observe public holidays on different dates. As a result, there is no trading of 
securities and consequently there is no trading data on public holidays. For instance, daily 
data for Australian may not be available for Australia day, ANZAC day, and the Queen’s 
Birthday because the Australia Securities Exchange (ASX) remains closed on those days. It 
should be noted any of these holidays fall on a weekend, the trading calendar would not be 
affected; however, this is rarely the case. Even though the Australian markets remain closed 
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during Australian public holiday, other markets will continue trading and trading data would 
be available. This means that when comparing trading data for Australia and other countries, 
data will be available for trades in other countries and no trading data will be available for 
Australia. With regard to estimation of the composite financial stress index this means that, 
missing values of certain variables could lead to incorrect estimates of the level of financial 
stress. Brown and Warner (1985) highlight other problems with daily data as identified by 
Fama (1976). These include the tendency of daily data to deviate more from the normal 
distribution than monthly data would. This is an issue of concern as a common assumption 
for many statistical analysis techniques assume an approximately normal distribution in the 
data. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) prefer the use of monthly data when dealing with exchange 
rates indices instead of daily or weekly data because monthly data tends to be less noisy. This 
study also considered the use of either quarterly or annual data instead of data at a monthly 
frequency. However, the use of either quarterly or annual data presents two problems. Firstly, 
lowering the frequency of data reduces the number of data points available for performing 
empirical analysis. Secondly long periods will lapse (a year or a quarter) before the data 
necessary for estimating the financial stress index is available. As a result, there will be a 
delayed monitoring of the economic health, late detection of the onset of a crisis, and delayed 
implementation of the steps to curb a developing crisis in Australia. Since the focus of this 
research is to provide tools for timely intervention the use of annual data was altogether 
avoided; rather the use of variables that are available at the monthly frequency are preferred. 
As a last resort, when monthly data is unavailable, quarterly data is converted to monthly 
series via interpolation. 
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3.10  Measuring Financial Stress and Contagion 
The incidence of financial crises is an issue of global concern whether a country is directly 
affected by a crisis, indirectly affected by a crisis or not affected at all. Ideally, the scenario of 
a country that is unaffected by a crisis is most favourable. However, this is not a perfect 
world. It seems that somewhere on this planet market dynamics often culminate in countries 
suffering from either the direct or indirect impact of a crisis. In regards to the direct impact of 
a crisis, the post-crisis season is characterised by a sort of ‘clamour’ among regulators to be 
more vigilant, to introduce more stringent monetary or fiscal policies and to examine the 
anatomy of the crisis that led to financial disarray. The notion is that a better understanding of 
this crisis will aid in predicting and averting or ameliorating the effects of future crises. 
However, a plausible reason why economists fail to anticipate financial crises until it is too 
late is that for the most part, financial crises can only be anticipated if history repeats itself. 
By no means does this mean that economists should give up on the quest for early warning 
indicators of financial stress. Rather, it is an admonition to analysts to avoid making rush and 
simplistic conclusions.  
 
3.10.1 An analogy for financial crisis 
This study suggests that the reader consider an analogy between a financial stress and human 
cancer in order to understand the complex nature of financial crises. Suppose that the idea of 
the various stages of cancer is similar to the notion of development of a crisis along a 
continuum from financial stress to a crisis. In the case of cancer, a combination of factors 
including genetics and lifestyle choices such as alcohol consumption, smoking habits, an 
aversion to fruits and vegetables and a high body mass index predispose an individual to 
developing cancer (Danaei, Hoorn, Lopez, Murray, & Ezzati, 2005). Understanding the 
factors that increase one’s risk of developing a cancer can be useful in adopting preventative 
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healthcare. For instance, a non-smoker has less likely to develop lung cancer than a smoker. 
However, this does not mean that non-smokers will never develop lung cancer. Indeed, the 
phenomenon of rising lung cancer among non-smokers has been documented (Sagawa, 
Nakayama, Tanaka, Sakuma, & Sobue, 2012; Wise, 2008). While doctors continue their 
research on the combination of factors that predispose the non-smokers to develop cancer, it 
is apparent that the incidence of lung cancer does not develop solely due to the smoking of 
cigarettes. Moreover, in some cases genetics provides some smokers with some protection 
against cancer such that they never develop this terrible disease in their lifetime. If one was to 
take a simplistic view of cancer for instance and focus on addressing one risk factor such as a 
change in diet to include more fruits and vegetables but neglect the consideration of the other 
issues raised (i.e. drinking, and smoking), then the individual would be just as likely to 
develop cancer. Similarly, a combination of factors such as macroeconomic imbalances, 
structural fragilities and financial contagion lead to the onset and/or development of a crisis. 
Attributing the onset of a crisis to one factor alone would be considered as failing to 
appreciate the complex nature of financial crises. After all, if the answer were that simple, 
then analysts would not waste time mulling over each incident of a financial crisis. This study 
asserts that crises like cancer develop over time and can be dealt with if caught in the early 
stages. Consider the stress index as a screening or biopsy procedure that helps to assess the 
early stages stage of a crisis. By using the stress index, analysts are not saying financial crises 
will never occur. Rather that if a stress index indicates high levels of financial stress then 
intervention is advisable in order to manage effectively a potential crisis. 
 
Regarding the indirect impact of financial crisis, it is often said when a neighbour’s house is 
on fire, then you are prudent to help them put the fire out before it spreads to your house. 
When considering houses it is clear to see when the danger is nearby. However, with global 
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economies it is less evident. Researchers are concerned about the manner in which financial 
crises spread from one economy to another while other countries remain unaffected by the 
contagion of crisis. Scholars have varying opinions on factors that make countries vulnerable 
to contagion. Glick and Rose (1999) assert that currency crises are often experienced by 
countries within the same geographical area and spread via bilateral trade links. However, 
being in close proximity to another country does not guarantee that a country with suffer 
from contagion. Park and Song (2001) confirm the importance of trade links but stress that 
herding behaviour, speculative attacks among investors and common macroeconomic 
practices contributed to the contagion of the 1997 Asian Crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000) posit that in addition to trade links, financial links via banks or financial markets can 
help explain channels of contagion. From the literature, it is clear that the consideration of 
financial and trade links is equally important in explaining a country’s risk of contagion and 
that the consideration of either of the links in isolation is unwise. Consequently, this study 
considers the role that trade and financial links play in the contagion of financial stress to 
Australia.  
 
3.11 Aggregation Methods for Composite Indexes 
When developing a composite index for measuring stress, researchers try several aggregation 
methods before adopting a comprehensive measure of stress. Generally, the index should 
provide the best fit for the data, provide reasonable estimates for stress and be relatively easy 
to interpret. Common aggregation methods include the principal-components analysis (PCA), 
transformation to cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) and the variance-equal weights 
method. The subsections that follow provide a brief summary of what each aggregation 
technique involves. 
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3.11.1 Principal Component Analysis 
PCA is a well-accepted method of index construction that was implemented in the: Canadian 
stress index, Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI), St Louis Financial Stress Index 
(STLFSI), Greek Financial Stress Index, and European Central Bank’s Composite Indicator 
of Systemic Stress (CISS) (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2010; Hakkio & Keeton, 2009; 
Holló et al., 2012; Illing & Liu, 2006; Louzis & Vouldis, 2011). According to Vyas and 
Kumaranayake (2006), the PCA is a “... multivariate statistical technique used to reduce the 
number of variables in a data set into a smaller number of dimensions.” It uses a set of 
correlated variables to create uncorrelated indices/components. The resulting index is 
expressed in linear form, via the sum of each variable multiplied by its corresponding weight. 
Conversely, if the variables were standardized, the covariance matrix should be used to 
estimate the respective weights (Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). Critics of the PCA method 
argue that it lacks a clear technique for choosing the number of components and variables to 
include in empirical analysis (Oet, Eiben, Bianco, Gramlich, & Ong, 2011). Moreover, the 
computed index weights are vulnerable to peculiarities entrenched in the data, such as 
extreme values or outliers. The PCA methodology computes a fixed set of weights for all 
time periods that are applicable for the data, but have no real existence. This problem can be 
overcome by conducting expert surveys, as demonstrated by Illing and Liu (2006) to select 
alternative weighting schemes so as to adequately capture the episodes of stress as (and 
when) they occur.
24
 
                                                 
24
  Illing and Liu (2006) distributed 40 questionnaires to economists and analysts working in Canadian banks, 
financial institutions, and policymaking roles. The questionnaires highlighted perceived episodes of historical 
crisis from 1981-2001 and asked experts to give their professional opinion on whether they believed Canada 
experienced financial stress at a particular time. 
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3.11.2 Transformation to Cumulative Distribution Functions 
The transformation of variables to cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) method involves 
converting all variables to their sample CDFs before constructing the index (Illing & Liu, 
2006). Each variable is expressed in terms of a rank percentile that ranges from one to 100. 
The lowest values of a particular variable are assigned the value 1.0 and the highest the value 
100.0. This means that all variables range from 1.0-100.0. The composite index is computed 
by taking the arithmetic mean of the transformed variables. An intuitive interpretation of this 
index is that lower values of the stress index indicate lower levels of stress and vice versa. 
 
3.11.3 Variance-Equal Weights  
The variance-equal weights technique converts all stress indicators to a standardized normal 
variable that can be positive, negative, or zero. This is done using the mean and standard 
deviation to calculate the standardized a variable in the following manner: First the mean and 
sample standard deviation of a variable are calculated; Then standardised values of the 
variable are obtained by subtracting the mean from the value of a variable at a given time; 
and Then dividing the difference by the standard deviation of the variable. It is important to 
note that in the variance-equal-weights approach, variables being considered for the index are 
assumed to be normally distributed with equal variances such that no variable dominates the 
others in the designed stress index. The equal-weight approach is flawed as it penalizes 
variables with high volatility or better indicators of stress by assigning smaller weights to 
them and assigns larger weights to variables with lower volatility and less crisis predictive 
power higher weights (Das, Iossifov, Podpiera, & Rozhkov, 2005; Sachs, Tornell, & Velasco, 
1995, p. 159). This implies that a consideration of variable weights would be more applicable 
as it apportions higher weights to variables that are more volatile or better indicators of stress 
and apportion lower weights to variables which are less accurate predictors of stress or crises.  
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3.12 Justification of Research Approach and Methods 
This research uses a mono methods approach (i.e. a quantitative approach). Proponents of 
quantitative methods argue that findings of a quantitative study can easily be replicated and 
verified using the same data set and techniques employed by a researcher; something that is 
often difficult to achieve with qualitative techniques (Gray, Williamson, Karp, & Dalphin, 
2007). From a policy perspective, estimation of stress indices for several countries using the 
same quantitative method can help in setting benchmarks of optimal stress levels (e.g. those 
that best foster economic development). Moreover, standard measures of financial contagion 
can be developed to assess the presence and intensity of contagion. Quantitative methods are 
useful for identifying what caused stress and evaluating whether stress contagion has 
occurred and/or its intensity. An example of a quantitative study by Hanschel and Monnin 
(2005) adopted the variance-equal weight technique after the PCA technique failed to yield 
meaningful results. Different variable combinations were used to evaluate the robustness of 
the resulting stress index and the forecasting ability of index was assessed using data from 
1987 to 2003. Although the variance-equal-weight-stress index is easy to estimate, that 
estimation technique assumes that variables included in the index are normally distributed, 
something that is not always the case with stock index data which exhibit a fat tailed 
distribution.
25
  
Key limitations of quantitative techniques include the inability to identify and explain policy 
implications of the stress index and/or to explain why stress contagion occurs in some 
situations and not in other often seemingly identical ones. Such insights can often be gained 
by using qualitative methods, which are more suited to selecting, and answering why 
questions. According to Gray et al. (2007), qualitative methods can contribute to the 
                                                 
25
  Please note: There are well-accepted techniques for normalizing many types of non-normal-data distributions 
(e.g., use of log functions for lognormal distributions). 
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understanding of important aspects of stress that are not conveyed in the stress index. Thus, 
theoretical models may explain why contagion occurs and suggest policy implications of 
measuring and acting on stress indicators. For instance, using theoretical explanations Allen 
and Gale (2000) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) offer models of contagion and propose 
containment strategies based on those employed in other countries. Given that theories are 
developed based on a combination of a researcher’s convictions and the review of literature, 
it is possible for several researchers to arrive at different explanations for the same 
phenomenon. Hence, replication of qualitative research can prove problematic. 
This study chose to use a quantitative methods approach because, in the researcher’s opinion, 
it would facilitate the design of a stress index that could be replicated by various stakeholders 
in order to assess the level of stress. For example, policy makers could make use of the stress 
index to evaluate the prevailing level of stress and recommend policy measures in response to 
current conditions in Australian financial markets. A possible limitation of this research is 
that the indicators of stress will be developed using historical data. Specifically, such data 
reflects causes of stress/crisis in the past and will only forecast stress if the future (that it 
seeks to forecast) mimics the pattern of past economic imbalances. In economics, that 
assumption is highlighted with the ceteris paribus phrase and accounting recognises with the 
adage that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the best predictor of the future is the 
past. In any event, use of the index to provide insights into potential stress or contagion must 
come with the caveat that it must be adjusted to take into consideration financial innovations 
and trade agreements that did not exist at the time of the index was created. Future research 
will need to continuously update the indices to incorporate new risks posed by recent 
financial innovation and trade relationships. 
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3.13 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provides the conceptual foundation for designing the Australian financial stress 
index and assessing its effectiveness for policy implementation and prediction of future crises 
in Australia. This chapter also outlined the research process used in this study. Overall, the 
researcher found that a positivist philosophy, deductive strategy and an experimental research 
method were most suited for this study. The justification for the research approach proposed 
was also discussed in this chapter. This chapter deliberated on the data frequency that was 
most appropriate for this research. It was decided that obtaining data at a monthly frequency 
was most desirable as it would allow for close and regular monitoring of the level of stress in 
Australian financial markets. It was not possible to contain a discussion of the data and 
variables in one chapter because this research is data intensive. Therefore, a detailed 
discussion the data collected and the stress variables constructed in this study are provided in 
Chapters 4 to 8. Ultimately the variables presented in these chapters and the aggregation 
methods discussed Chapter 9 was used to construct the stress index for Australia. The 
following chapter discusses the stress variables that indicate financial stress in the Australian 
equity markets. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FINANCIAL STRESS IN EQUITY MARKETS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to propose indicators of financial stress or crisis in the 
Australian equity market. The chapter commences with a brief overview of the importance of 
equity markets. It then proceeds to delve into the subject matter of the characteristics of an 
equity market crisis. At this point, four indicators of equity market stress are discussed and 
subsequently estimated. The warning indicators proposed in this chapter are subsequently 
incorporated into the composite financial stress index in order to measure financial stress in 
the Australian market as a whole.  
 
4.2 Indicators of stress in equity markets 
An understanding of what equity markets are and how they function during in-crisis periods 
and out-of-crisis periods could prove useful in identifying the indicators of stress. Equity 
markets facilitate the transfer of funds from investors with surplus funds to investors with a 
shortage of funds (Petty et al., 2012). Usually, the transfer occurs via the trading of shares 
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Once a public company is listed on the 
ASX, it can issue and sell shares in order to raise equity for business operations. Investors 
purchase a company’s shares in the hope that the shares will appreciate in future and 
subsequent resale of shares will result in a capital gain. It is common for share prices to move 
upwards or downwards as shares continue to trade on a stock exchange. During out-of-crisis 
periods, it is expected that equity markets are tranquil exhibiting low volatility and less 
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fluctuations in share prices. Conversely, during in-crisis periods, there is higher volatility and 
oscillation of share prices. More specifically, stock market crashes are characterised by rapid 
drops in share prices and a general decline in the prices of shares traded in an equity market, 
which may signal problems in the financial system. For instance, during the 1987 Black 
Monday share prices in the New York Stock exchange fell by about 33.33 percent over five 
trading days in October (Patel & Sarkar, 1998). Generally, speculative forces intensify during 
financial crises suggesting that a country can never be immune to large drops in the share 
prices regardless of whether a country is an emerging economy or developed country such as 
Australia. Nonetheless, share prices in emerging markets tend to be more fragile and bound to 
experience larger share price losses compared to developed countries. 
 
Most scholars recognize increased volatility in stock markets as an indicator of stress in 
equity markets. Accordingly, indicators that measure volatility in equity markets have been 
incorporated in many financial stress indexes. A popular approach to estimating time varying 
volatility in equity markets is based on the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticty (GARCH) approach developed by Bollerslev (1986). In most cases a 
GARCH (1, 1) process is applied to returns of the composite stock index of a country; this 
process has been deemed sufficient by many researchers. Nonetheless, some authors estimate 
more than one GARCH model to assess the suitability of the model. Although, Illing and Liu 
(2003) explored the use of other GARCH models such as the GARCH (2, 1) and GARCH (1, 
2) models. It was found that the other models provided similar results to the GARCH (1, 1) 
model. This study shall explore the use of the other GARCH models if the GARCH(1,1) is 
found to be inadequate. 
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 GARCH models have been used in studies of emerging and advanced countries and for 
different time frequencies. The following are a few examples of the studies that utilize this 
approach. Illing and Liu (2006) use this approach to estimate volatility in daily returns on the 
Canadian stock market. Vermeulen et al. ( 2015) uses this approach in a study of 28 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to estimate 
equity market volatility using quarterly data from 1980 to 2010. Using data of the same 
frequency and quarterly data from the first quarter of 1992 to the last quarter of 2012, Park 
and Mercado (2014) estimate volatility measures for 25 emerging and 15 advanced countries. 
Balakrishnan et al. (2011) also use a similar approach for estimating volatility for 26 
emerging countries using monthly returns on composite stock indexes. The time span for the 
study by the aforementioned authors varied from country to country with the earliest starting 
date being January 1997 and the latest ending date being January 2009. Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009) proposed an alternative measure of implied volatility that attempts to forecast 
volatility in S&P 500 by checking monthly movements in the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange volatility index (VIX). These authors argue that this is a good indicator of stress as 
it gauges uncertainty about investor behaviour and about asset values. 
 
With regard to large drops in stock prices, four measures are often incorporated in stress 
indexes. First, Duca and Peltonen (2013) and Balakrishnan et al. (2011) propose the use of a 
negative equity returns variable using quarterly and monthly data respectively. This variable 
is estimated using returns of a composite stock index. The equity returns are transformed to 
signal stress in the following manner. Zero replaces positive returns in the final variable. 
Negative returns are then converted to positive values by multiplying the values by negative 
one. As a result, large drops in equity prices result in higher values in the negative returns 
variable and indicate higher values of stress in the equity market and vice versa. Second, 
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simpler indicators of stress focus on the use of returns on a composite stock index. Park and 
Mercado (2014) use returns on composite stock indexes to measure stress. Although, the 
aforementioned authors fail to provide criteria for identifying in-crisis periods, it is likely that 
a long period of successive negative returns on shares could signal an equity market crash. 
Third, percentage changes in the returns of an equity index have been used to signal periods 
of equity market stress. Edison (2003) used the percentage change in a stock index from a 
year ago to measure stress in 20 countries in developed and emerging markets. In this case, 
large declines in value of the variable would indicate episodes of stress or crises. Last, the 
CMAX variable which was developed by Patel and Sarkar (1998) has been utilized in several 
studies some of which include research by Holló et al. (2012), Illing and Liu (2006) and Park 
and Mercado (2014). Illing and Liu (2003, p. 6) refer to this as a “hybrid volatility-loss 
measure” that can be used to identify large drops in share prices.  
 
This study estimates four viable variables to measure equity stress in the Australian market. 
All variables are constructed using monthly data for the All Ordinaries index since this data is 
readily available from Wren Advisers (2015). The variables of interest for measuring equity 
market stress are: 1) an inverted CMAX equity variable 2) percentage change from a year 
ago, 3) a negative equity returns variable and 4) a GARCH volatility model. Sections 4.2.1 to 
4.2.5 discuss the procedure used to estimate each variable. 
4.2.1 Inverted CMAX Equity Index 
Illing and Liu (2006) propose the use of a CMAX variable to measure share volatility in a 
financial market. The CMAX was originally designed by Patel and Sarkar (1998) and it 
compares the level of a share index to the maximum value over a historical time window 
which could be expressed in terms of years. Following Illing and Liu (2006), this research 
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adopts a CMAX measure for a period of 2 years (24 months) since it is not expected that the 
share price of stock indexes in developed countries would vary by much during a two-year 
period. The CMAX calculation can be expressed as shown in Equation 4.1.  
𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑡 =
𝐼𝑡
max[𝐼 ∈(𝐼𝑡−𝑗|𝑗=0,1,2…𝑇)]
       (4.1) 
 
Where 𝐼𝑡 is the value of the share index at time t. T defines the moving time window being 
considered and was set to 2 years. When dealing with monthly data, the CMAX calculation 
for the All Ordinaries index would compare the value of the index at time t with to the 
maximum value over the past 24 months. The researcher is of the opinion that the 12 month 
window would be as sufficient in the estimation of the CMAX variable. Consequently, a 12-
month window is considered in addition to the 24-month window. Historical data of monthly 
averages of the Australian All Ordinaries index from January 1980 to December 2014 was 
used to estimate the CMAX variable using a 1 year and 2 year window. A graphical 
representation of the resultant CMAX series is shown in Figure 4.1. 
  
Figure 4.1: The 12-month and 24-month CMAX Graphs for All Ordinaries Index 
Source: Authors calculations based on Wren Advisers (2015) data 
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It appears that the use of either the 12-month or 24-month window is sufficient as there is not 
much difference in the estimated CMAX series, with both indicating that Australian equity 
markets experienced high levels of financial stress in 1982-1983, 1988-1989 and 2008-2009. 
The indicated periods of stress correspond to periods of financial stress or crisis in Australia. 
Notably, the CMAX series correctly highlight the 1982-1983 recessions, 1989-1992 
Australian Banking Crises
26
 (ABC) and the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crises (GFC).  
Australia experienced an economic recession from 1982 to 1983. Siriwardana (1998) argues 
that the recession was particularly made worse because of a number of factors including an 
oil shock, rising real wages, a severe drought and contractionary monetary policy. Moreover, 
this author states that Australia’s recession had probably originated in the US and/or Europe 
which experienced recessions before Australia. Given a consideration of two episodes of 
stress, the 1982-1983 recession and 2007-2009 GFC, it could well be argued that Australia is 
particularly vulnerable to financial contagion from the American financial markets.  
In the lead up to the 1989-1992 Australian Banking Crises, there was extensive deregulation 
of the financial sector. From December 1980 to September 1988 comprising of floatation of 
the Australian dollar in December 1983, elimination of controls on bank deposits in August 
1984, elimination of interest rate ceilings on bank deposits in December 1980 and house 
loans in April 1986 and reduced restriction of foreign banks entry into the Australian market 
(Kriesler, 1995). Naturally, banks made some mistakes when trying to operate in the new yet 
unfamiliar financial system. In anticipation of increased competition from foreign banks, 
Australian banks engaged in risky lending practices while requiring less collateral. This 
strategy was unsustainable in the long-run as it negatively impacted the banks’ profitability. 
As a result, Australian banks that engaged in rapid expansion or increased lending of risky 
                                                 
26
 Kovzanadze (2010) identifies this as the only systemic banking crisis in Australia from the 1970s to 1990s. 
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loans subsequently required bailouts or mergers. In particular, the South Australian 
government bailed out the Bank of South Australia when it failed in 1991 while in Victoria 
the state had to merge Tricon with Commonwealth bank when it ran out of funds to bail it out 
(Stanford, 2010, p. 23). Overall, it would appear that Australia learned from the 1989-1992 
banking crisis, as the banking industry fared much better during the 2007-2009 GFC. 
Nonetheless, Australia like other developed countries, suffered the contagious impact of the 
GFC, albeit to a lesser degree.  
4.2.1.1 Transformations to the CMAX index 
In order to include the CMAX index in the composite financial stress index, this study 
proposes the use of the inverse form of the CMAX index. The inverse CMAX differs from 
the CMAX measure developed by Patel and Sarkar (1998) with respect to the interpretation 
of the index. With respect to the CMAX index, an increase in the index indicates a lower 
stress in the equity market while a decrease in the index indicates higher levels of stress in the 
equity market. Conversely, the rationale for the transforming the CMAX index is based on 
the notion that rising levels of the inverted CMAX would signal rising levels of financial 
stress and vice versa. Therefore, a mathematical representation of the inverted CMAX is as 
shown in Equation 4.2. 
Inverted 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑡 =
max[𝐼 ∈(𝐼𝑡−𝑗|𝑗=0,1,2…𝑇)]
𝐼𝑡
     (4.2) 
 
While, either CMAX index is suitable for use in the final index, the 24-month CMAX index 
used in the final index. Figure 4.2 is a graphical representation of the transformed CMAX 
index. The highest spikes in the inverted CMAX series in February 1988 and March 2009 
correspond to periods of the Australian banking and the Global financial crises. Therefore, 
the inverted CMAX index is deemed an adequate indicator of equity market stress, which 
results in large drops in the value of the All Ordinaries index. However, a shortcoming of the 
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inverted CMAX index is that it fails capture changes in volatility of the All Ordinaries index, 
which is also an important measure of equity markets stress. In order to address this 
shortcoming of the variable, an alternative measure is proposed in Section 4.2.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Inverted 24-month CMAX index  
Source: Authors calculations based on Wren Advisers (2015) data 
 
4.2.2 Percentage change in the equity index from a year ago 
The percentage change in the value of the All Ordinaries index from a year ago is estimated 
using the formula shown in Equation 4.3. Where 𝑌𝑡 represents the value of the stock index 
today and 𝑌𝑡−12 represents the value of the stock index 12 months ago. The values of the 
index from January 1979 to December 2014 were used to obtain a series of values from 
January 1980 to December 2014. A graphical representation of the resulting series is 
provided in Figure 4.3. 
%∆ 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑜 = 100 ∗ (𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−12)/𝑌𝑡−12      (4.3) 
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      Figure 4.3: Percentage Change in the All Ordinaries Index from a year ago 
       Source: Authors calculations based on Wren Advisers (2015) data 
 
Negative values of the series are indicative of stress in the Australian stock market. The 
largest drop in the index (in comparison to previous year) occurred in April 1982 (-33%), 
June 1982 (-32%), September 1988 (-31%) and December 2008 (-46%). Coincidentally, the 
last two points in Figure 4.3 correspond to times of financial crises namely the 1989-1992 
Australian Banking Crises (ABC) and the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
Therefore, it can be deduced that smaller negative values indicate the presence of stress.  
 
4.2.3 Transformations to percentage change in equity index  
An examination of Figure 4.3 shows that the lowest points in the graph are signalling the 
presence of stress. For ease of interpretation, this study aims to design a stress index where 
rising levels in the stress variables indicate rising levels of stress. Therefore, a modified 
expression of the percentage change in the All Ordinaries index is estimated as shown in 
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
78 
 
Equation 4.4 before incorporating it into the composite stress index. The resulting series is 
shown in Figure 4.4. 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 %∆ 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑜 = 100 ∗ (1 −
(𝑌𝑡−𝑌𝑡−12)
𝑌𝑡−12
 )     (4.4) 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Modified Percentage Change in the All Ordinaries Index from a year ago 
Source: Authors calculations based on Wren Advisers (2015) data 
 
4.2.4 Negative equity returns variable 
The negative equity returns variable is estimated using the procedure outlined by Duca and 
Peltonen (2013) and Balakrishnan et al. (2011). The variable was estimated using four steps. 
First, the monthly averages of the index from December 1979 to December 2014 were 
expressed in natural logarithmic terms. Second, the logarithmic values of the index were used 
to calculate the continuously compounded return on the index as shown in Equation 4.5, 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the logarithmic return on the All Ordinaries index at time t, 𝑃𝑡 is the value of the 
All Ordinaries at in month t and 𝑃𝑡−1 is the value of the index in month t-1. Therefore, the 
return is estimated by comparing the value of an index in a particular month with the value of 
the index in the previous month. 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡−1)       (4.5) 
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Third, the returns of the index were examined to check for negative returns on the index. 
Since it is a requirement that positive returns on the index be ignored and negative returns be 
transformed to positive numbers, a dummy variable(𝐷𝑡) was created that takes on the value of 
negative one when the returns on the index are negative and zero when the returns on the 
index are positive. More formally, the mathematical expression for this binary variable would 
be as shown in Equation 4.6. 
𝐷𝑡 = {
−1  𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡 < 0
  0    𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡 ≥ 0
      (4.6) 
 
Fourth, the negative equity returns series was obtained by multiplying the dummy variable at 
time t by the corresponding returns on the All Ordinaries index at time t. The formula for 
estimating the series can, therefore, be written as shown in Equation 4.7 and the graph of the 
final series is shown in Figure 4.5. The most prominent spikes in the series occur in 
November 1987 and October 2008, which corresponds to the approximate timing of two US 
crises, namely the 1987 Black Monday and 2007-2009 GFC. 
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡     (4.7) 
 
Figure 4.5: Negative equity returns (January 1980 to December 2014) 
Source: Authors calculations based on Wren Advisers (2015) data 
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4.2.5 Volatility in the equity markets 
Volatility in share prices is an inherent aspect in the operations of global financial markets. 
When examining trading of stocks over long periods, it is common to observe that certain 
periods are characterized by small fluctuations in the price of shares while others are 
characterized by large fluctuations in share prices. Small fluctuations in the share price 
indicate low volatility while large fluctuations indicate high volatility in the price of a share. 
Brooks (2008, p. 380) argues that “volatility clustering” is a common phenomenon in 
financial markets that is characterized by periods of high volatility whereby large increases 
(or decreases) in share returns are followed by large changes in share returns and vice versa. 
With respect to financial crises, stock prices and exchange rates tend to fluctuate more during 
periods of crisis compared to out-of-crisis periods. For instance, in 2008, Gujarati (2011) 
asserted that the US Dow Jones Index oscillated due to rising oil prices and the 2007 
subprime mortgage crisis. More specifically, on 29 September 2008, the Dow Jones lost 
777.7 points and subsequently swung upwards and downwards by more than 300 points for 
most of October 2008 (p. 238). Such volatility in stock prices can be incorporated into a 
financial-stress index using a GARCH process (Bollerslev, 1986). In this study, GARCH
27
 
models are used to capture volatility clustering exhibited in equity and foreign exchange 
markets. Therefore, the formulas and procedure for estimating GARCH models discussed in 
this chapter were applied to subsequent measures of volatility used in this study. 
Time series data of the All Ordinaries for the months of December 1983 to December 2014
28
 
was sourced from Wren Advisers (2015). Figure 4.6 graphs the values of the All Ordinaries 
                                                 
27
 An ARCH test was performed on the All Ordinaries index. The F-statistic and the LM statistic for this test is 
9271.06 and 357.72 respectively. Both statistics have a p-value of 0. Thus, the null hypothesis for no ARCH 
effect in the series is rejected at any level of significance. The estimation of the GARCH models is justified. 
28
  In order to ensure that all GARCH models have the same number of data points, the starting date of data used 
in all GARCH volatility models is set to the last starting point of all data collected for stock indexes and 
exchange rates. The starting date is set to December 1983 because the Reserve Bank of Australia only reports 
data for the exchange rates of the Australian Dollar to the Chinese Yuan Renminbi from December 2013 
onwards.  
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expressed in natural logarithmic terms and Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
sampled range of the All Ordinaries index. The index is negatively skewed and the test 
statistic for Jarque-Bera test indicates that the null hypothesis for normality can be rejected 
even at the 1% level of significance. This suggests that the data is not normally distributed.  
 
Figure 4.6: All Ordinaries index (December 1983 to December 2014)  
Source: Wren Advisers (2015) 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the All Ordinaries  
Mean  Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation  
 Skewness Kurtosis    Jarque-
Bera  
Observations  
7.867 8.810 6.495 0.561 -0.417 2.332 17.765*** 373 
Note: *** indicates that Jarque-Bera test statistic is significant at the 1% *** level. 
 
Figure 4.7: Returns on the All Ordinaries index (January 1984 to December 2014) 
Source: Authors calculations based on Wren Advisers (2015) data  
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The logarithmic values of the index are used to estimate the returns of the series using the 
procedure discussed in Section 4.2.4 and Equation 4.5. The estimated series of logarithmic 
returns series is presented in Figure 4.7. Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 gives the visual 
representation of the logarithmic All Ordinaries index which appears to be non-stationary 
while the logarithmic returns on the All Ordinaries seems to be is stationary. To confirm this 
suspicion, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests developed by David Dickey and Wayne 
Fuller were performed on both series (Dickey & Fuller, 1979, 1981). Because the All 
Ordinaries index series trend upwards, a trend term is included in the ADF tests for these 
series. Therefore, the estimating regression for the ADF test
29
 is as shown in Equation 4.8. 
∆yt = α + βt + ρyt−1 + γ1∆yt−1 + ⋯ + γp∆yt−p + et                                      (4.8) 
Where: ∆yt = the 1st difference of the stock index (or returns of the stock index), 
α = a constant term,  
β = coefficient of the trend term,  
 t = trend term,  
ρ = coefficient of the lagged stock index (or lagged returns on the stock index),  
γ1= coefficient of the 1st difference of the first lag of the stock index, 
γp = coefficient of the 1st difference of the p
th
 lag of the stock index, 
 et = error term. 
A trend component appears to be lacking in the returns on the All Ordinaries index. 
Therefore, the equation for conduction the ADF tests for the returns series excludes the trend 
term in Equation 4.8, the modified equation is as shown in Equation 4.9: 
∆yt = α + ρyt−1 + γ1∆yt−1 + ⋯ + γp∆yt−p + et      (4.9) 
The number of lags (p) in Equations 4.8 and 4.9 were determined using the Modified Akaike 
Information Criterion (MAIC) as proposed by Ng and Perron (2001). Table 4.2 contains the 
results of the ADF tests. As expected, ADF test results confirm that the All Ordinaries series 
is non-stationary at the level as the series contains a unit root. By contrast, the return on the 
                                                 
29
 The null hypothesis for the ADF test is that 𝑦𝑡 has a unit root. In which case 𝜌 would be equal to 
zero. The null is rejected if the series does not contain a unit root or is stationary. 
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All Ordinaries series that is equivalent first difference of series proves stationary at any level 
of significance. Therefore, the return on the All Ordinaries series was used to estimate the 
GARCH models using the GARCH process developed by Bollerslev (1986). 
Table 4.2: Unit root tests using ADF tests for the All Ordinaries  
Variables Level First difference 
All Ordinaries Index   -3.056 -14.686*** 
Returns on the All Ordinaries index -14.686*** -26.398*** 
Note: * indicates that the Dickey-Fuller tau statistic is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
To initiate the GARCH process, a simple AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) model is estimated before 
considering alternative GARCH models. The estimated AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) model can be 
written in equation form as shown in Equation 4.10 a and 4.10 b. 
𝑦𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑦𝑡−1 + ?̂?𝑡                  (4.10 a) 
?̂?𝑡
2 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1 ?̂?𝑡−1
2 + ?̂?1?̂?𝑡−1
2             (4.10 b) 
Table 4.3 shows the estimated coefficients for the AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) models for returns 
on the All Ordinaries index using the maximum likelihood technique. The AR (1)-GARCH 
(1, 1) model proves sufficient as indicated by the highly significant GARCH parameter 
estimates.
30
 Moreover, the estimated coefficients satisfy the two criteria outlined by 
Bollerslev (1986). The first criteria is that 𝛼0 > 0, 𝛼1 ≥ 0 and  𝛽1 ≥ 0. This requirement is 
met as all values of the coefficients are non-negative. The second requirement is that the sum 
of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients must be less than unity (𝛼1 + 𝛽1 < 1) so that the 
unconditional variance is well defined and constant; when 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 > 1 the unconditional 
variance is defined (Brooks, 2008). If the sum of the coefficients is equal to one (𝛼1 + 𝛽1 =
1) then the use of an integrated GARCH (IGARCH) model is often utilized instead of a 
GARCH model. In practice, researchers often estimate an IGARCH model if the sum of 𝛼1 
and 𝛽1 is close to one. In this case, the sum of the coefficients is 0.9548 which is relatively 
                                                 
30
 The ARCH Lagrange Multiplier test for the series indicates that no ARCH left in the standardized residuals. 
Hence there is no need to estimate a GARCH(1,2) or GARCH(2,1) model. 
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high and indicative of highly persistent volatility in the Australian stock markets. For this 
reason, an AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) model was estimated by excluding the constant term (𝛼0) 
from Equation 4.10 b and restricting the sum of 𝛼1 and 𝛽1 to one. The estimated model is 
reported in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3: GARCH and IGARCH models for the All Ordinaries index 
 AR(1)-GARCH (1, 1) AR(1)-IGARCH (1, 1) 
𝜙0 
      0.0051***      0.0044*** 
(0.0017) (0.0012) 
𝜙1 
      0.1811***       0.1854*** 
(0.0475) (0.0409) 
𝛼0 
    0.0001** n.a 
  (0.00004) n.a 
𝛼1 
     0.1960***       0.1362*** 
(0.0309) (0.0173) 
𝛽1 
      0.7588***       0.8638*** 
(0.0453) (0.0173) 
        Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficient is significant at the  
                  10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level. All estimated values are reported to 4 decimal places. 
Figure 4.8 plots the time varying variance for the AR (1)-IGARCH (1, 1) process which was 
utilized in the composite stress index. There are two noticeable peaks in the conditional 
variance which indicate two periods of high volatility in the Australian financial markets; one 
in December 1987 and the other in November 2008. As expected the periods of high 
volatility coincide with the periods of past global financial crises; namely the 1987 stock 
market crises and the 2007-2009 GFC. 
 
             Figure 4.8: Estimated AR (1)-IGARCH (1, 1) model for All Ordinaries index 
 Source: Authors calculations based on Wren Advisers (2015) data 
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4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the use of four indicators of equity markets stress over approximately 
three decades (1980 to 2014). The four variables are used to gauge two characteristics of 
equity market stress which included increased volatility in stock prices and larger than usual 
drops in the stock prices. The inverted CMAX, percentage change in the All Ordinaries from 
a year ago and the negative equity returns variables proved useful in measuring very large 
drops in stock prices in the Australian Market. While increased volatility in the Australian 
markets was measured using a GARCH volatility model. At this juncture, it is worth noting 
that these variables are suitable for measuring the specified characteristics of equity market 
stress (volatility and large price drops). Hence, it is possible that a symptom of equity market 
stress that is not measured by the four variables may be overlooked. While this study deemed 
the four variables as good indicators of stress in the equity markets, the variables identified in 
this chapter are not exhaustive and there is potential for future research to address this 
limitation by proposing variables that gauge other symptoms of equity market stress. Indeed 
it would be prudent of analysts to incorporate the additional measures of equity stress; should 
future researchers reveal other important precursors of equity market crash other than the 
ones discussed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FINANCIAL STRESS IN BOND AND MONEY MARKETS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to propose indicators of financial stress in the Australian 
bond and money markets. In order to understand how a crisis develops in the bond and 
money markets, it is important to consider the risks associated with the instruments that are 
traded in those markets. Thus, it was deemed necessary to explain the risks associated with 
purchasing of debt securities such as bonds. This chapter commences with an overview of 
default and credit risks before discussing the role of credit ratings as a means of assessing the 
riskiness of debt securities such as bonds—of particular interest is the role that credit ratings, 
credit rating agencies and moral hazard played in the nurturing and development of past 
crises. It is against this backdrop that this study examines the usefulness of yield spreads with 
different maturities and credit rating as indicators for stress in bond and money markets. The 
yield spreads that were identified as the most suitable indicators of stress in bond and money 
markets are later incorporated into the composite stress index measure for Australia.  
 
5.2 Default or Credit Risk 
Generally, an investor assesses the riskiness of an investment before investing in any 
security. As a rule of thumb, investors expect to be compensated for higher levels of risk via 
higher returns on an investment. The notion of receiving high returns is particularly 
appealing. However, higher levels of risk are often linked to higher uncertainty and increased 
risk of default especially when a borrower has liquidity problems. Financial crises can 
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increase the likelihood of default on loan repayments especially when a borrower’s liquidity 
is adversely affected by a crisis as it unfolds. Therefore, global investors often consider the 
creditworthiness of the borrower
31
 and the state of economy of the borrower’s country when 
assessing the riskiness of an investment. In bond markets, investors may prefer to use of 
credit ratings to assess a country’s probability of default. This is primarily because credit 
ratings are easy to understand and readily available for different countries. There are three 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) that dominate the global financial market (i.e. Fitch, 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor). CRAs provide ratings for countries, insurance companies, 
funds, stocks, bonds and money market securities. The credit rating criteria for long-term 
securities such as corporate bonds is shown in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Credit Agency Ratings for long-term securities  
Moody’s Fitch Standard & Poor Credit Quality Default or credit risk 
Aaa AAA AAA Highest Unlikely 
Aa AA AA   
A A A   
Baa BBB BBB  
 
Ba BB BB  
 
B B B  
 
Caa CCC CCC  
 
Ca CC CC  
 
C C C  
 
 D D Extremely low Very likely 
Data source: Fitch Ratings (2014), Moody’s Investors Service (2015) and Standard & Poor (2012) 
Table 5.1 shows that Moody’s credit rating system differs from those of Fitch and Standard & 
Poor; however, the latter two rating agencies have a similar rating system. Corporate bonds of 
high quality and a low probability of default receive an A rating; these include all bonds rated 
as AAA, AA, A, Aaa or Aa. The top quality bonds are the triple A rated bonds, which have 
the lowest probability of default. The risk of default increases as one moves down Table 5.1 
from A rated bonds to C or D rated bonds. C or D rated corporate bonds have the highest 
                                                 
31
 The term borrower refers to the case of an individual, company or a government. 
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default and credit risk with little prospects of recovering the initial investment. A corporate 
bond is rated D if the bond issuer defaults on bond repayments and it is unlikely that any 
payments will be forthcoming in the near future. For example if the bond issuer files for 
bankruptcy, it is expected that the issuer is more likely to default. Consequently, the rating of 
the bonds issued by a bankrupt bond issuer will be downgraded from a higher rating to a D 
rating in the case of Standard & Poor and a C rating in the case of Fitch and Moody’s. In this 
case, there is little hope of an investor recovering the funds invested in bonds that receive this 
rating (Fitch Ratings, 2014; Moody’s Investors Service, 2015; Standard & Poor, 2012). It is 
important to note that ratings for junk bonds range from Baa to C based on Moody’s rating 
system and BBB to D based on Fitch and Standard and Poor rating systems (Ross, 
Westerfield, & Jaffe, 1996). In this case, the risk of default among junk bonds would be 
lowest for the Baa or BBB rated bonds and increase as one moves further down Table 5.1 to 
lower rated bonds; whereby C or D rated junk bonds would have the highest risk of default. 
CRAs may downgrade corporate bonds from a higher to a lower class if the ability of bond 
issuer to service the debt is in doubt. From an investors point of view, bond buyers who are 
risk averse prefer higher ranked (A or B rated corporate bonds) to lower ranked bonds (C or 
D rated corporate bonds) when making investment decisions. Large changes in the rating of a 
corporate bond may signal increased likelihood of default and could cause panic among 
investors holding assets that are perceived to be of lower value or worthless. For example, 
investors would be more concerned about a B rated bond being downgraded to a C or D rated 
bond than a review in a corporate bond’s rating from A to BBB. The former case indicates 
increased likelihood of default on future payments or loss of the invested funds. Conversely, 
the latter indicates a slight increase in credit risk; default on payments is less probable. 
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So far, this section has discussed the credit ratings and not the credit ratings agencies. 
Moreover, the reliability of the credit ratings and their usefulness in predicting crisis has not 
been questioned. A failure to address these issues would make this study incomplete. 
Therefore, this discussion now focuses on the role that credit rating agencies have played in 
past crises. Ideally, credit rating agencies should be objective, providing an accurate and 
unbiased assessment of the risk associated with investing in a particular asset or security. 
Risk averse investors could then rely on credit ratings in order to safeguard investments and 
minimize the risk on a portfolio of investment. Theoretically, inaccurate ratings would expose 
investors to higher levels of risk than they would be willing to bear. Studies show that in the 
lead up to the 2007-09 GFC, American financial institutions, regulators and rating agencies 
operated in a manner that nurtured moral hazard and facilitated the transfer to ‘toxic assets’ to 
unsuspecting investors (Crotty, 2009; Edgar, 2009).  
Kotowitz (1989, p. 207) provides a comprehensive definition of moral hazard that is relevant 
for this study:  
“Moral hazard may be defined as actions of economic agents in maximizing their 
own utility to the detriment of others, in situations where they do not bear the full 
consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to 
uncertainty and incomplete information or restricted contracts which prevent the 
assignment of full damages (benefits) to the agent responsible.” 
Figure 5.1 illustrates how the different agents facilitated the creation and flow of ‘toxic 
assets’ from financial institutions to investors. During the GFC, ‘toxic assets’ mainly 
consisted of mortgage backed securities (MBSs) and collaterised debt obligations (CDOs). 
MBSs and CDOs are financially engineered securities that are derived from loans via a 
securitisation process. An explanation of the sequence of the securitisation process of both 
assets follows. Mortgage and commercial banks loaned money to homeowners and 
individuals respectively. The banks sold loans to investment bankers and mortgage 
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financiers, thereby transferring the risks and rewards of the transacted loans to these parties. 
With regard to risk, investment banks (or mortgage financiers) would incur a loss if the 
homeowner (or borrower) failed to make payments on their mortgage loan (or bank loan), 
thereby defaulting. If however, the loan payments were made by the due dates, investment 
banks would be rewarded with a steady stream of cash flows. The investment banks and 
mortgage financiers repackaged portfolios of loans into securities; this part of the process is 
commonly referred to as securitisation.  
 
Figure 5.1: The Securitization process for MBSs and CDOs 
A MBS was created by pooling together mortgage repayments from a group of mortgage 
holders (homeowners). The pooled mortgage repayments were repackaged and issued in the 
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form of MBSs. CRAs rated the MBSs and investment banks and mortgage financiers 
subsequently sold the MBSs to investors. Consequently, a buyer of a MBS expected to 
receive a stream of mortgage loan repayments when they fall due and bore the risk of default. 
Similarly, a CDO pools a portfolio of different kinds of loans. The pooled loans are then 
issued in the form of CDOs that are rated by rating agencies and subsequently sold to 
investors. Investors in CDOs were paid in a sequential manner depending on the investor’s 
risk preference. The risk preference was reflected via credit rating and/or a ‘tranch system’ 
such that the owners of CDOs in the top tranch bore the least risk and owned A-rated 
securities. Conversely, buyers of CDOs in the third tranch bore the most risk, no rating was 
provided for these securities. There was a preferential system of payment for CDO holders. 
Holders in the first (top) tranch are paid before the holders of CDOs in the second and third 
(or equity) tranch; thereafter the second tranch holders are paid before the third tranch 
holders. Hence, if there were insufficient funds to make payment to owners of all tranches, 
holders of CDOs in the third tranch risked receiving no payment (Kolb, 2011). Buyers of 
CDOs were paid different yields such that owners of CDOs in the equity tranch bore the 
higher risk and received the highest yield compared to the other tranches. 
MBSs and CDOs proved particularly beneficial for three reasons. First, these securities were 
easier to trade than the individual mortgages or loans. Second, the pooling of repayments 
ensured that a default risk was spread among a group of investors. Third, both types of 
securities were theoretically designed to ensure that if some mortgage or loan holders failed 
to make payments while others did, the investor would receive some income. However, 
Crotty (2009, p. 566) argues that the manner in which the securities were designed rendered 
them “complex and opaque”. Due to the involvement of several intermediaries such as 
investment bankers, mortgage financiers, commercial bankers, mortgage brokers and rating 
agencies the problem of information asymmetry was amplified. It was more difficult for 
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investors to know the true value of the MBSs and CDOs, since the information relating to the 
creditworthiness of homeowners and borrowers was more readily available to intermediaries 
(e.g. commercial banks and mortgage brokers) than it was to investors. This made the 
involvement of the credit rating agencies in the risk assessment process necessary.  
Crotty (2009) argues that the GFC resulted from a combination of factors that weakened the 
American financial system. Notable factors included lax regulation of intermediaries, 
excessive risk-taking behaviour among intermediaries, loss of objectivity among credit rating 
agencies and excessive leverage in financial institutions. There was inadequate regulation of 
banks especially large banks that were allowed to perform internal risk assessments and 
determine minimum capital requirements. Moreover, financial institutions were allowed to 
keep off-balance-sheet records of financially engineered securities such as CDOs. Since, off-
balance-sheet assets and liabilities were unregulated; there was no need for banks to set aside 
any capital against these securities. These conditions allowed banks to acquire high levels of 
liabilities in the form of CDOs, thereby becoming highly leveraged. Moreover, because 
CDOs were off-balance-sheet liabilities the true extent of leveraging was often understated, 
especially if banks held a large portions of liabilities in the form of CDOs.  
Treatment of moral hazard among the different intermediaries stems from the notion that the 
risk associated with loans or mortgages can always be passed on to the next party. While 
Mortgage brokers were aware of increased possibility of default (especially when selling 
mortgages to homeowners that would struggle to make loan repayments—subprime 
mortgages), the credit worthiness of homeowners was disregarded and brokers were paid 
higher commissions for selling more subprime mortgages. Similarly, investment bankers 
were encouraged to participate in more risky investments and rewarded for doing so via 
bonuses or commissions. CRAs received a large portion of revenue from the institutions that 
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issued MBSs and CDOs. According to Crotty (2009), these securities accounted for over two 
fifths of Moody’s revenue in 2005. CRAs strove to satisfy the most valued customers that 
mainly consisted of large investment banks (Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns) and 
mortgage loan financiers (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Consequently, MBSs and CDOs 
issued by these key customers were rated favourably in order to maximise customer 
satisfaction, retain customers and maximise revenue of the rating agencies. It was feared that 
an unfavourable rating would result in customer dissatisfaction, loss of a customer to a 
competitor-rating agency and loss of revenue. With this in mind, it is unlikely that any rating 
agency was acting in the best interest of the investor in the lead up to the GFC. The 
objectivity of the rating agencies was compromised and it was only a matter of time before 
the credit bubble in the housing market would implode affecting several sectors of the 
American financial system.  
The events of the GFC showed how a reliance on the ratings provided by credit rating 
agencies could expose an investor to credit and/or default risk, especially when financially 
engineered securities are involved. This is because engineered securities tend to be more 
‘opaque’ than other financial securities and the increased information associated with these 
securities makes investors especially reliant on the ratings issued by CRAs. Hence, prudent 
investors should consider the use of the ratings in conjunction with other tools for assessing a 
country’s risk. This study explores the use of yield spreads as a viable alternative to the use of 
credit ratings.  
 
5.3 Yield Spreads 
A yield spread is calculated by taking the difference between the yields of two debt securities. 
The higher the yield spread, the greater the difference between the yields offered by each 
instrument. Klepsch and Wollmershäuser (2011) posit that yield spread, theoretically, mainly 
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gauges two things: an investor’s risk aversion and the borrower’s risk of default (credit risk). 
Lenders or investors tend to be more risk averse and prefer to be compensated for additional 
risk with higher yields on traded securities during financial crises periods than they would be 
in out-of-crisis periods (pre- or post-crisis periods). From an anticipatory point of view, the 
credit rating of a country proves inefficient in anticipating a crisis. Rather a downward credit 
rating is often the provided after a country is already experiencing negative effects of a 
financial crisis; Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) provide three evidential examples from 
1997 to 1998 in the cases of Thailand, Korea, and Russia. Furthermore, the same authors 
assert that in a transparent market, most investors would expect a downgrade rating in light of 
weakening economic fundamentals, reduced liquidity among key financial institutions or 
governments and slow or lax regulation. However if investors are in the dark about 
deteriorating fundamentals and information is not readily available the downgrade would 
result in more pronounced financial instability.
32
  
 
The consensus is that yield spreads can provide valuable insights into the financial health of 
the borrower’s country; where a widening of yield spreads may signal a developing crisis and 
serve as an early indicator of a financial crisis. For example, Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda 
(2012) noted that mutual fund owners were the primary holders of corporate bonds in the lead 
up to the 2007-2009 GFC. In the early stages of the crisis, mutual fund holders with MBSs 
opted to sell off corporate bonds (especially junk or lower rated bonds) in order to cater for 
their rising liquidity needs as it became apparent that bonds which received a high rating in 
the pre-crisis period were actually low quality bonds with a higher risk of default. As a result, 
the widening of spreads was more pronounced in lower-rated bonds compared to higher rated 
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  For purposes of this thesis, Australia is considered as more of a transparent than opaque economy. Thus, 
credit ratings would simply reflect prevailing investors’ sentiments of an impending downgrade in rating of 
Australian securities should Australia experience a crisis or contagion of a crisis. 
95 
 
bonds during the GFC. Candelon et al. (2012) argue that yield spreads could aid in early 
detection of currency crises which are often preceded by credit growth, since rising yield 
spreads indicate rising levels of credit and higher probability of balance of payment problems 
in the near future. To assess the importance of yield spreads in forecasting financial stress, 
the aforementioned authors used data for six South-Asian countries and six Latin-American 
countries to construct two kinds of early warning system (EWS) models;
33
 one model 
included a yield-spread variable while the other excluded it. The results of this experiment 
found that yield spreads improved EWS measures for about 83.33 percent of the South Asian 
countries studied. Unfortunately, no benefits were obtained from the inclusion of yield 
spreads in the Latin-American cohort. Nevertheless, it is clear that general trending of yield 
spreads differs in pre-crisis, in-crisis, and post-crisis periods and generally affects the level of 
a country’s indebtedness. For instance, the 10-year government bond spreads for 11 European 
countries were found to be identical prior to the GFC. In July 2007, spreads begun to diverge 
with the highest spreads recorded in September 2008. Moreover, the yield spreads of heavily 
indebted countries such as Greece and Ireland were about 300 basis points greater than those 
Germany (Klepsch & Wollmershäuser, 2011, p. 171). The findings of past studies suggest 
that yield spreads possess some predictive power. Accordingly, Section 5.3.1 focuses on the 
behaviour of various Australian yields spreads during the GFC; since the 2007-2009 GFC 
negatively affected global financial markets including the Australian one.  
5.3.1 Corporate, Government and Corporate to Government spreads 
This section discusses the use of interest rates on government and/or corporate bonds in 
estimating viable yield spreads for different combinations of government and/or corporate 
                                                 
33
  Both types of EWS models included a common set of economic variables that were deemed important for 
early detection of financial crisis, namely the first difference of the ratio of lending to deposits, the first 
difference of the industrial production index and growth rates for: a) international reserves, b) exports, and c) 
domestic credit over Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
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bonds of different durations. As a starting point for this analysis, the A-rated and BBB-rated 
corporate bond spreads from January 2005 to December 2014 as reported by the Reserve 
Bank of Australia (RBA)
34
 were examined. The RBA provide two kinds of yield spreads at 
monthly frequency, namely credit spreads to Australian Dollar swap rates and credit spreads 
to commonwealth government securities of similar time to maturity and credit-rating. The 
graphical representations of the reported spreads are provided in Figures 5.2 to 5.5, where the 
shaded region corresponds to the United States recession as a result in the GFC. As expected, 
there is a general rise in all spreads especially after the Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy 
in September 2009. 
   
 
Figure 5.2: A-rated Credit Spread to A-rated Australian Dollar Swaps  
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) 
                                                 
34
 The yield spreads are sourced from the F3 spreadsheet for Aggregate Measures of Australian Corporate Bond 
Spreads and Yields: Non-financial Corporate (NFC) Bonds. Data is provided from 2005 onwards. 
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Figure 5.3: A-rated Credit Spread to Commonwealth Government Securities 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) 
 
Figure 5.4: BBB-rated Credit Spread to BBB-Australian Dollar Swap 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) 
   
Figure 5.5: BBB-rated Credit Spread to Commonwealth Government Securities Spread 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) 
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Using the yields for Australian resident non-financial corporate bonds as provided by the 
RBA, the BBB to A yield spread was estimated as the difference between the yields on the 
BBB and A corporate bonds for similar times to maturity; 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. The graphical 
representation of the resulting spreads in Figure 5.6 shows that all estimated spreads peak in 
November 2008 during the GFC. The BBB to A yield spreads seem to provide an earlier 
warning of financial distress in the Australian financial system than the RBA yield spreads. 
  
 
Figure 5.6: BBB to A Corporate Bond Yield Spreads 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2017), Authors calculations based on RBA data 
The study seeks to estimate various combinations of yield spreads of different ratings and 
different levels to maturity. These included 3 to 10 year spreads, the 5 to 10 year spreads and 
7 to 10 year spreads for A-rated securities and BBB-rated securities. With the exception of 
the 7 to 10 year spread for the A-rated bonds, all other spreads performed poorly in detecting 
the incidence of the 2007 crisis via a spike in the spreads during the crisis period. Figure 5.7 
shows that the A-rated 7 to 10 year yield spread has similar trending behaviour to the other 
spreads; therefore, the study opted to exclude this yield spread from the final stress index as it 
does not provide any additional information. In summary, the final index will include the 
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estimated BBB to A yield spreads; these yield spreads appear to be the most useful from an 
anticipatory perspective. 
 
Figure 5.7: 10 to 7 Year Corporate Bond Yield Spread for A-rated securities  
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2017), Authors calculations based on RBA data 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the use of yield spreads as a proxy for measuring stress in bond and 
money markets over nine years (2005 to 2014). The RBA does not provide data prior to 2005. 
Therefore, the dataset range used in this chapter is smaller (under a decade), compared to the 
range of datasets used to estimate the equity stress variables (where over three decades of 
data was available). Overall, the BBB to A yield spreads were found to provide the earliest 
indication of stress in the Australian debt and money markets; especially in the lead up to the 
2007-09 GFC. Unfortunately, due to data limitations it was not possible to evaluate the 
performance of this variable during the 1989-1992 Australian Banking Crises. To this end, 
future researchers could propose variables with more historical data that can be used to 
provide early indications of distress in the Australian bond and money markets. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
FINANCIAL STRESS IN CURRENCY MARKETS AND THE 
BANKING SECTOR 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on developing early indicators of stress in the banking sector and the 
currency market based on the experiences of other countries that have suffered either or both 
crises. Several studies on past financial crises have found that currency and banking crises 
can occur concurrently with more devastating effects than either crisis in isolation (Ariccia, 
Detragiache, & Rajan, 2008; Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Soledad Martinez Peria, & 
Rose, 2001; Hutchison & Noy, 2005; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999, 2000). The fact that both 
crises can occur at the same time suggests that there may be a relationship between the two 
kinds of crisis and that this relationship should be considered when developing measures of 
stress in either the currency market or banking sector. For this reason, this chapter focusses 
on the indicators for three forms of financial crises (i.e. currency crises, banking crisis and 
twin crises—the incidence of both crises).  
This study posits that a greater understanding of how currency markets operate could provide 
valuable insight as to why currency crises occur and how to prevent future currency-market 
crashes. Similarly, it is important to understand the role that banks play in the Australian 
economy and how weaknesses in the banking sector may lead to a banking crisis. Moreover, 
factors that make a country more vulnerable to the incidence of both crises are of interest. 
This chapter is structured as follows. To begin with, a brief overview of the role that the 
currency markets play in the Australian economy is provided in Section 6.2. Thereafter, 
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Section 6.3 explores the extant literature on currency crises. This sets the stage for a 
discussion of the empirical measures of crises in the currency markets in Section 6.4. The 
chapter then turns its attention to the subject matter of the potential for a crisis in the 
Australian banking sector. In this regard, a brief overview of the Australian banking sector in 
Section 6.5 is followed by a discussion of banking crises in Section 6.6. Thereafter, Section 
6.7 proposes empirical measures of banking crises. The chapter comes to a close with a 
discussion of the twin crises in Section 6.8. The indicators of currency and banking stress 
developed in this chapter are eventually incorporated into the composite financial stress index 
for Australia. 
 
6.2 The Currency Market 
Currency (or the foreign exchange) markets mainly facilitate the conversion of a domestic 
currency to foreign currencies at a rate referred to as an exchange rate. According to Rose 
(2000), there are three main markets that exist in the foreign exchange markets, the: 1) Spot 
market; 2) Forward market; and 3) Currency-futures-and-options market. In spot markets, 
dealers buy and sell foreign currencies at a spot rate and the transaction is finalised within 
two trading days. Because Australia has had a floating exchange rate system in operation 
since the 1983, the spot rate is determined by forces of demand and supply in the currency 
market (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2015a). In the forward market, dealers enter into forward 
currency contracts, which require a seller to exchange foreign currency at a predetermined 
exchange rate at a future date. Common durations for forward currency contracts are 30, 90, 
and 180 days. The futures market is similar to the forward market in that both markets 
provide a means for hedging against unfavourable changes in the exchange rate. There are 
three main differences between the two markets. First, the futures market offers more 
standardized contracts for the exchange of currencies while the forward currency contract 
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tend to be customized to suit the buyer’s needs. Second, while futures currency contracts are 
traded on the ASX, forward currency contracts need not be transacted via the ASX. Third, an 
initial payment is required for futures currency contract while none is required for forward 
currency contracts. In general, futures contracts tend to be more standardised and less risky 
than forward contracts. As a result, futures are often preferred to forward currency contracts 
(Petty et al., 2012; Rose, 2000).  
In options markets, dealers pay a fee in order to obtain a currency-option contract that gives 
them the right, but not the obligation, to buy/sell a foreign currency at a given exchange rate 
within a certain time. Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2011) state that options are often used to 
hedge against downside risk; buyers of currency options hedge against unfavourable changes 
in the currency that would lead to loss of investment or revenue. A dealer is said to have 
exercised an option if he or she chooses to buy/sell a foreign currency at the specified 
exchange rate. Dealers usually exercise an option if currency option offers a better exchange 
rate than the spot rate. Otherwise, the dealer would choose not to exercise the option because 
the spot exchange rate is better than the option exchange rate; in this case the option would 
lapse and the dealer would only lose the fee paid to obtain the currency option. In summary, 
the spot markets cater for a dealer’s immediate foreign currency needs while the forward, 
futures and option markets cater for a dealer’s future foreign currency needs. 
By and large, global currency markets are dominated by large commercial and investment 
bankers who use futures, forward, and option contracts to hedge against currency risk 
(Brealey et al., 2011). Currency risk is defined as the likelihood that a lender to a foreign 
country or an investor in assets in foreign country will suffer a loss because of changes in 
currency prices (Rose, 2000). Countries affected by currency crises are often perceived to 
have higher levels of currency risk in comparison with countries that are not experiencing a 
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currency or financial crisis. This is because currency crises generally result from successful 
speculative attacks on the value of a currency. In the event of a currency crash, the affected 
countries may resort to currency devaluation or default on foreign loans. For example, 
Chiodo and Owyang (2002) cite the case of the 1998 Russian crises that resulted from a 
combination of factors. Rising levels of foreign reserves and debt against a backdrop of 
declining revenue and a fixed exchange rate regime made the Russian rouble vulnerable to 
speculative attacks. The rouble begun to falter in November 1997 soon after the speculative 
attacks that followed the 1997-1999 Asian crisis; consequently, Russia’s foreign reserves 
were depleted to the tune of six billion US dollars. Moreover, fears of possible devaluation of 
the rouble drove foreign investors to enter into forward and futures currency contracts with 
the Russian central bank and commercial banks. By May 1998, the global prices of oil (a key 
export of Russia) were on a steady decline and participants in the oil industry begun to 
advocate for the rouble to be devalued. Ultimately, the weakening of bond, currency and 
stock markets forced the government to bow to pressure to float the Russian rouble. 
Floatation of the rouble caused the currency to lose value. At the same time the Russian 
government defaulted on loans to foreign countries while commercial banks were unable to 
meet financial obligations to foreign banks (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002). 
The 1998 Russian crisis was similar to the 1997 Thailand crisis, which subsequently led to 
the 1997-1999 Asian crises. Much like Russia, the Thailand government implemented a fixed 
exchange rate regime with the Thai baht prior to the currency crisis. Corsetti, Pesenti, and 
Roubini (1999) state that from 1990 to 1997, the fixed rates of the Thai baht to the American 
dollar ranged from 25.2 to 25.6. Currency speculation forced the Thai government to use 
about 93 percent of its foreign reserves
35
 in forward contracts in defence of the Thai baht. 
Foreign reserves were dwindling fast, speculative attacks finally took their toll and the Thai 
                                                 
35
 Corsetti et al. (1999, p. 349) state that 28 out of 30 billion US dollars in Thai foreign reserves were used to 
defend the Thai baht against speculative attacks. 
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government was forced to float the baht on 2 July 1997. What ensued was the contagion of 
the Thai crisis to neighbouring countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea.  
Because currency markets are dominated by banks, speculative attacks from banks are bound 
to have a more devastating impact on the value of a currency especially if most of the bankers 
anticipate a major devaluation in a foreign currency. Since, bankers form a large proportion 
of the dealers in the foreign exchange markets, increased speculation of the value of a 
currency is accompanied by reduced or immediate cessation of lending to the country 
experiencing a currency crash. This would result in depletion of the affected country’s 
foreign reserves as was seen in case of Thailand. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) argue that 
foreign banks play a crucial role in the exacerbation and the spread of currency crisis. The 
aforementioned authors explain a mechanism for the spread of the 1997 Thailand crisis via 
common lender banks located in Japan. In this case, Japanese banks had extended loans to 
five countries affected by the crisis including Thailand. Some 54 percent of Thailand’s 
foreign debt was sourced from Japan and when Thailand banks begun to go bankrupt, it 
seemed like a domino effect ensued in the banks of other Asian countries, including 
Philippines, Malaysia, Korea and Indonesia. Sadly, the Asian banks could have prevented the 
Asian crises if adequate steps had been taken to hedge against currency risk (Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 1999, 2000). 
 
6.3 Currency Crises 
Several authors have proposed theoretically and empirically definitions of currency crises. 
Mainly, theoretical definitions focus on designing models to explain why and when currency 
crises occur. There are generally three categories of models used to explain currency crises 
(i.e. first, second, and third generation models).  
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First generational models of currency crises are an extension of work by Salant and 
Henderson (1978) that focus on the impact that government policy and speculative attacks 
have on the pricing of gold and the level of gold reserves held by the government. Instead of 
focusing on the pricing of gold, first generation models focus on the price of a currency that 
is expressed in the form of an exchange rate. Kaminsky (2006) argues that first generation 
models were developed in response to the Latin America crises of 1960s and 1970s. These 
models explain how the prevailing government policy and the level of foreign reserves held 
by the central bank can make a currency vulnerable to speculative attacks and possible 
currency collapse. These models focus on how a crisis can occur in a country that has a 
pegged exchange rate regime.
36
  
An example of a first generation model is the one proposed by Krugman (1979) which 
focusses on the role that government reserves and investor sentiment play in incidence of a 
balance-of-payments (or currency) crisis. The main premise of the model is that investors 
have a self-maximising behaviour that influences their investment decisions and would 
change the composition of holdings in foreign currencies or assets in order to achieve 
maximum yield on investments. If investors begin to question the validity of the exchange 
rate regime they may speculate that the regime will soon become obsolete and need to be 
replaced. Consequently, the currency will suffer a speculative attack. If a country experiences 
successful speculative attacks, investors expect that the government to use its foreign reserves 
to defend the value of its currency.  
Krugman (1979) argues that government actions to defend the currency only temporarily 
restore confidence in the value of the local currency. Eventually, increased uncertainty about 
                                                 
36
  The pegged exchange rate system replaced the Bretton Woods system where the value of a country’s 
currency was determined by the amount of gold reserves a country had. In the case of the pegged exchange 
rate system the value of a country’s currency was linked to the value of another country’s currency or a 
basket of other currencies. For instance, the value of the Australian dollar was pegged to the UK pound for 40 
years until 1971 when it was pegged to the US dollar (Blundell-Wignall, Fahrer, & Heath, 1993). 
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the government’s commitment to the fixed exchange rate regime would contribute to more 
investor speculation and increased potential of a currency crisis. A series of subsequent 
speculative attacks on a country’s currency will lead to the progressive erosion of foreign 
assets. After several speculative attacks on the currency, the government will have used a 
large portion of its foreign reserves to defend its currency. Ultimately, it is expected that the 
government will runout of resources to defend the pegged currency, even if a government 
resorted to borrowing from other countries or purchasing currency forward contracts. Besides 
a country can only borrow so much and buy so many contracts before the pegged exchange 
rate regime becomes unsustainable. Rising levels of debt, depleted foreign reserves and the 
emergence of a fiscal deficit would limit the options that the government has available. It is 
against this backdrop that a government will have to abandon a pegged system in favour of a 
floating exchange rate system. In an effort to minimise future losses from the change in 
exchange rate regimes, investors begin incorporating foreign currency-denominated assets or 
securities in lieu of local currency-denominated assets and currencies in their portfolios or 
shift to physical assets (land, buildings, heavy equipment, etc.). If the reserves are severely 
depleted, this would place additional pressure on the limited resources of foreign currency 
and lead to the collapse of the currency. Another example of a first generation model is the 
one designed by Flood and Garber (1984) who extended the work by Krugman (1979). The 
alternative model estimates the timing of the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime by 
examining factors such as market fundamentals, levels of foreign reserves, investor 
speculation and the level of domestic debt. These authors use linear and stochastic models to 
assess the likelihood and timing of currency crises. Overall, the first generational models 
seem to provide an explanation of how speculative attacks are necessary as they facilitate the 
transition from a fixed to floating exchange rate regime.  
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Second generation currency-crisis models are mainly influenced by the work of Obstfeld 
(1986), who agrees with Krugman (1979) in that a crisis may be necessary if a country is 
forcibly transitioned out of a fixed exchange regime. While, first generation models are based 
on the notion of an unsustainable exchange rate regime, second generation models consider 
the collapse of a sustainable exchange rate regime due to successful speculative attacks on a 
currency. Obstfeld (1986) argues that there exist several equilibria that influence investor 
expectations that a currency will collapse (e.g. prevailing level of foreign reserves and 
domestic debt held by the government). Growing levels of domestic debt are seen as another 
indicator that a fixed exchange rate regime will soon be abandoned. Future expectations of a 
collapse in a currency would cause investors to switch the composition of a portfolio from 
domestic to foreign currency-denominated assets. If many investors become pessimistic and 
engage in this behaviour, there will be a run on a country’s foreign reserves and a self-
fulfilling crisis is likely to ensue. It is important to note that second generation models 
primarily focus on investor speculation, thus, adverse herding behaviour among investors can 
still result even in countries with sound economic policies. Chiodo and Owyang (2002) state 
that spread of a second generation currency crises is best explained in a study by 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1997). According to Eichengreen et al. (1997), trade links 
are a better indicator, than macroeconomic similarities, of the likelihood that a country will 
suffer speculative attacks on its currency. Therefore, if a country suffered a speculative attack 
on the value of its currency, it is likely that its key trading partners will suffer a similar fate. 
However, it is important to note that trade links only explain in part the manner in which 
currency crises spread to other countries. Other country specific factors such as high levels of 
inflation, government debt and unemployment can render a country more vulnerable to a 
speculative attack (Eichengreen et al., 1997). In fact, the Glick and Rose (1999) assertion that 
currency crises affect countries in the same region with similar macroeconomic features lends 
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credence to the argument that a combination of factors predispose a country to speculative 
attacks and eventually currency crises.  
 
Third generational models were developed to explain the factors that led to the 1994 Tequila 
Crisis and the 1997-1999 Asian Crisis (Eichengreen, 2003; Kaminsky, 2006). Proponents of 
third generational models are motivated by the idea that the first and second generational 
models provide inadequate explanations for the dynamics of these crises. Scholars provide 
diverse hypotheses and models in order to explain how and why the two (and other similar) 
crises occurred. Nonetheless, followers of this school of thought argue that third generation 
currency crises result from a combination of problems in the banking sector and financial 
markets (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002; Eichengreen, 2003; Glick & Hutchinson, 2011; 
Kaminsky, 2006). A combination of factors precedes and leads to the incidence of a third 
generational currency crisis. These include large declines in foreign direct investment, high 
levels of domestic debt, government revenue that is declining, depleted foreign reserves, an 
overvalued currency and rising expectations that a currency will be devalued in the near 
future (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002; Frankel & Rose, 1996). Kaminsky (2006) states that these 
crises mainly result from moral hazard and information asymmetry in both sectors that 
nurture excessive borrowing by various market participants in the financial market. In 
particular, this author highlights the dangers of excess; countries that enjoy economic booms 
and the corresponding asset bubbles are doomed to suffer when the bubbles eventually burst 
and lending reaches unsustainable levels. A recent example of a third generation currency 
crises is the Eurozone crises that have affected countries like Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain since 2009. Kaminsky (2006) measures third generation currency crises 
by assessing the level of borrowing in an economy at a given time; these include the ratio of 
domestic credit to GDP, the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves, the M2 multiplier, the level of 
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bank deposits, the stock prices and the incidence of banking crises. According to this study, 
countries that suffer a banking crisis have a higher chance of also suffering a currency crisis; 
a twin crisis. Overall, it is important to note that even though third generation models offer 
good explanations for how currency crises can result from a combination of factors, there is a 
need for policy makers to monitor financial systems in order to identify new factors that 
could potentially cause currency crisis. By doing so, policy makers would ensure that 
problems that are not identified by the third generation models are still addressed.    
Besides the theoretically definitions for currency crises, scholars have proposed empirical 
definitions of currency crises. Here are a few examples of empirical definitions of currency 
crises. Frankel and Rose (1996) identify a currency crisis using two criteria. The first 
criterion is the depreciation of a country’s exchange rate by 25 percent or more in a particular 
year. The second criterion is an increase in the rate of depreciation by 10 percent or more. 
Stanford (2010) argues that the fulfilment of the first criterion is sufficient to conclude that a 
currency crisis has occurred. Consequently, this author offers a more lenient definition of a 
currency crisis based on the first criterion only. Some authors recommend the use of an index 
to identify episodes of currency crisis. For example, Eichengreen et al. (1997) developed an 
exchange market pressure index (EMPI) which measures the weighted average changes in 
three variables, namely a country’s exchange rate relative to a reference country, interest rate 
and foreign reserves. The mean value and standard deviation of the EMPI are calculated and 
extreme values of the EMPI are used to identify crisis periods. These authors define a crisis 
as a period when the estimated EMPI is more than 1.5 standard deviations above the mean. 
Other researchers modified the EMPI measure proposed by Eichengreen et al. (1997) by 
omitting the interest rate variable from the index. Consequently, the modified EMPIs are a 
function of a country’s exchange rate and the foreign reserves only. Two authors who modify 
the EMPI in this manner are Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999; 
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2000). Balakrishnan et al. (2011) found the modified version of the EMPI performed well 
since it failed to identify past episodes of currency crises only 20 percent of the time. This 
author follows the approach of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) who propose a different way 
of interpreting the modified EMPI. According to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) the measure 
of 1.5 standard deviations above the mean would result in several warnings that a crisis has 
occurred even if there was actually no currency crisis. In order to avoid such false positives, 
these authors argue that two standard deviations from the mean value of the EMPI should be 
interpreted as currency turbulence and only three standard deviations of the EMPI above the 
mean should be classified as a currency crisis.  
 
6.4  Indicators of Stress in Currency Markets 
This section discusses the indicators of stress in currency markets. A review of literature 
suggests that the collapse of a currency is associated with high levels of government debt, 
low foreign reserves, increased expectation of a currency devaluation, currency speculation, 
depleted foreign direct investment, and the incidence of a banking crisis (Chiodo & Owyang, 
2002; Frankel & Rose, 1996; Kaminsky, 2006; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999, 2000). 
Accordingly, the empirical measures of stress discussed in this section consist of variables 
that assess the level of debt, foreign reserves, exchange rates and foreign direct investment 
reserves. In addition, this study posits that increased volatility in an exchange rate is a 
suitable proxy for currency speculation. The reasoning for this is based on the work by Black 
(1976) on volatility of stock prices. According to this study, poor performance of a publicly 
listed company is generally followed by a drop in stock prices and increased volatility of the 
prices of the shares. Conversely, good performance of the company would result in a rise in 
the company’s share prices and less volatility in the prices. The same logic can be extended 
to currency markets such that increased uncertainty in the foreign exchange markets causes 
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more currency speculation and increased fluctuation in an exchange rate. Volatility in the 
foreign exchange markets can be measured using a GARCH (1, 1) model of the nominal 
effective exchange rate, this approach is similar to those adopted in other studies (Cardarelli 
et al., 2011; Illing & Liu, 2006; Vermeulen et al., 2015). This study explored the suitability of 
the GARCH (1, 1) model to measure volatility in Australian exchange markets. A detailed 
discussion of this analysis is included in Section 6.4.1. Besides exchange market volatility, 
distress in the foreign exchange market is also measured using an EMPI and an inverse 
CMAX variable of the Australian trade weighted index; a discussion of these variables is 
included in sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 respectively. 
 
6.4.1 Volatility in currency markets 
This study uses four GARCH models to measure exchange market volatility in the Australian 
market. Following Illing and Liu (2003, 2006), one GARCH model is based on a trade 
weighted index (TWI) of exchange rates of the Australian dollar to currencies of Australia’s 
leading trading partners as reported by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). The TWI 
incorporates exchange rates of 90 percent or more of Australia’s bilateral traders and the 
weight of currencies in the TWI are reviewed every year in October (Baker, 2004). The TWI 
is a useful indicator of Australia’s competitiveness internationally. Moreover, when the 
bilateral exchange rates of the Australian dollar to other currencies show diverging trends, the 
TWI can help to assess whether the Australian dollar is on average weaker or stronger than 
currencies of the leading bilateral partners (RBA, 2002). The other three variables are 
selected based on data of Australia’s top three bilateral trading partners for the past five years 
as indicated by Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
In order of rank, the top three bilateral traders are China, Japan and the USA. Accordingly, 
three GARCH models were estimated using exchange rates for China, Japan and the USA. 
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Monthly data was sourced for all four variables from the Reserve Bank of Australia website. 
Figure 6.1 plots the four sampled series from December 1983 to December 2014 and as 
expressed in natural logarithmic terms. The GARCH (1, 1) model could capture the volatility 
clustering that is exhibited in all series. The descriptive statistics for the sampled data is 
shown in Table 6.1 and the distributions of the four series are plotted in Figure 6.2.  
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for the TWI and exchange rates 
 AUD to CNY AUD to JPY AUD to USD TWI 
Mean  1.534 4.494 -0.284 4.108 
Maximum 1.957 5.394 0.091 4.433 
Minimum 0.580 4.027 -0.715 3.850 
Standard deviation  0.363 0.262 0.173 0.138 
 Skewness  -1.011 1.362 -0.117 0.414 
Kurtosis  2.881 5.595 2.889 2.327 
 Jarque-Bera  63.746*** 220.065*** 1.0400 17.696*** 
Observations  373 373 373 373 
 Note: * indicates that the Jarque-Bera test statistic is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
TWI, AUD to CNY, AUD to JPY and AUD to USD stand for the Trade Weighted Index, the exchange 
rate of the Australian dollar to the Chinese Yuan Renminbi, the exchange rate of the Australian dollar to 
the Japanese Yen and the Australian dollar to the US dollar respectively. 
 
It is customary to perform an ARCH test before estimating an ARCH or GARCH model. 
Therefore, hypotheses tests are performed on the level of each series. The null (Ho) and 
alternative hypothesis (Ha) for each ARCH test are as follows: Ho: there is no ARCH effect in 
the series and Ha: there is an ARCH effect. Table 6.2 provides a summary of the results of the 
ARCH-LM tests. The null hypothesis was rejected at all levels of significance for all series. 
Consequently, the estimation of GARCH models is justified. 
Table 6.2: The test results for the presence of ARCH 
 LM statistic Probability of LM-statistic 
TWI 329.139 0 
AUD to CNY 358.789 0 
AUD to USD 334.923 0 
AUD to JPY 364.773 0 
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Figure 6.1: Exchange Rates & Trade-Weighted Index (Dec/83-Dec/14)  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Distribution of Exchange Rates & Trade-Weighted Index (Dec/83-Dec/14)  
 
The histograms in Figure 6.2 show that the distribution of the four series is skewed and the 
descriptive statistics in Table 6.1 confirmed this observation. Specifically, the descriptive 
statistics indicate that the exchange rates for the Australian dollar to the Chinese Yuan and 
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the Australian dollar to the US dollar is negatively skewed. Conversely, the exchange rate of 
the Australian dollar to the Japanese Yen and the TWI is positively skewed. The Jarque-Bera 
test statistics indicate that the null hypothesis for normality can be rejected at a 5% level of 
significance in three cases. This indicates that with the exception of the exchange rate of the 
Australian dollar to the US dollar, the distributions of the other series are non-normal. The 
bilateral exchange rate between Australian dollars to the US dollars is normally distributed.  
Continuously compounded monthly returns for each series were estimated using Equation 4.5 
(in chapter 4), in which 𝑅𝑡 is the logarithmic return of each series at time t, 𝑃𝑡 is the value of 
each series in month t and 𝑃𝑡−1 is the value of each series in month t-1. By definition, 
GARCH models require the use of stationary series in the estimation models. The level of 
each series as plotted in Figure 6.1 appears to be non-stationary. Conversely, Figure 6.3 
shows the plots the estimated returns for the four series that appear to be stationary. Formal 
unit root tests were used to check for a stationary process in the level of each series and the 
first difference (or returns) of each series. A detailed discussion of the ADF unit root testing 
procedure is contained in Section 4.2.4 of chapter 4. Unit root tests for the level and the first 
difference were performed using Equations 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. Table 6.3 shows the unit 
root test results for all the series. The level of all series was found to be non-stationary while 
the returns of all series were found to be stationary at a 5% level of significance. As a result, 
the returns of each series were used to estimate the GARCH model of each series. 
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Figure 6.3: Monthly Returns Exchange Rates & Trade-Weighted Index (Jan/84-Dec/14)  
 
Table 6.3: ADF Unit root tests for the TWI and exchange rates 
Variables Level First difference 
TWI -3.223* -18.021*** 
AUD to CNY -2.006 -9.967*** 
AUD to JPY -2.632 -11.967*** 
AUD to USD -2.393 -9.820*** 
 Note: * indicates that the Dickey-Fuller tau statistic is significant at a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level. 
TWI, AUD to CNY, AUD to JPY and AUD to USD stand for the Trade Weighted Index, the exchange 
rate of the Australian dollar to the Chinese Yuan Renminbi, the exchange rate of the Australian dollar to 
the Japanese Yen and the Australian dollar to the US dollar respectively 
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Table 6.4: AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) models for the TWI and exchange rates 
  TWI AUD to CNY AUD to JPY AUD to USD 
𝝓𝟎 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
(0.0016)  (0.0036)  (0.0023)   (0.0017) 
𝝓𝟏 0.0301  0.0259  0.0204   0.0745 
(0.0695)  (0.0907)  (0.0656)   (0.0583) 
𝜶𝟎       0.0006***  0.0010        0.0008***       0.0001** 
(0.0001)  (0.0015)  (0.0002)     (0.00003) 
𝜶𝟏       0.2500*** -0.0120        0.2883***         0.1083*** 
(0.0538)  (0.0151)  (0.0586)   (0.0254) 
𝜷𝟏 0.0251  0.6119    0.2795*         0.8382*** 
(0.1609)  (0.5958)  (0.1480)   (0.0392) 
𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏 0.2751  0.6112  0.5678   0.9465 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * indicates that a coefficient is significant at a 10% (*), 5% (**), 
or 1% (***) level. TWI, AUD to CNY, AUD to JPY and AUD to USD stand for the Trade Weighted 
Index, the exchange rate of the Australian dollar to the Chinese Yuan Renminbi, the exchange rate of the 
Australian dollar to the Japanese Yen and the Australian dollar to the US dollar respectively. 
Table 6.4 shows the four AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) models that were estimated using monthly 
returns. The equations for estimated GARCH process are as specified in Equations 4.10a and 
4.10b (in chapter 4). The highly significant GARCH parameters indicate that the AR (1)-
GARCH (1, 1) model adequately models the volatility of monthly returns in the exchange 
rate of the Australian dollar (AUD) to the US dollar (USD). Moreover, the coefficient for the 
lagged squared residual (𝛼1) and the lagged conditional variance (𝛽1) are both positive and 
the sum of the coefficients is less than unity. The constant term (𝛼0) of the GARCH model is 
relatively small (0.0001) compared to the other GARCH coefficients; this indicates that an 
IGARCH model would be a better model volatility in the exchange rate of the AUD to the 
USD. Accordingly, an IGARCH model was fitted to the data and the estimated model is 
reported in Table 6.5. As expected, the results of the IGARCH model are similar to the 
results of the GARCH model. The IGARCH model reports highly significant coefficients for 
the ARCH (𝛼1) and GARCH (𝛽1) coefficients.  
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Table 6.5: AR (1)-IGARCH (1, 1) model for the AUD to USD exchange rate 
 Coefficient Standard error 
𝜙0 -0.0005 (0.0014) 
𝜙1 0.0619 (0.0506) 
𝛼1 0.0862*** (0.0143) 
𝛽1 0.9138*** (0.0143) 
 Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates a coefficient is significant at a 10% (*), 
5% (**), or 1% (***) level. All estimated values are reported to 4 decimal places. 
 
With respect to the GARCH model for monthly returns of the Australian dollar (AUD) to the 
Chinese Yuan (CYN), the model appears to be a poor fit for two reasons. First, the GARCH 
model coefficients are insignificant. Second, the ARCH coefficient (𝛼1) of the model is 
negative which violates the non-negative requirements as specified by Bollerslev (1986). 
According to Brooks (2008) a negative ARCH coefficient could result in a negative 
conditional variance which cannot be meaningfully interpreted. This is because by definition 
a variance measure is calculated by squaring a standard deviation. Regardless of whether the 
estimated standard deviation is positive or negative, the squared value of the standard 
deviation (the variance) would results in a positive value. For these reasons, the estimated 
GARCH (1, 1) model is deficient and should not be used to measure volatility in the AUD to 
CNY exchange rate. The other two models proved inadequate because even though the 
ARCH coefficients are highly significant in the case of the TWI and the exchange rate of the 
Australian dollar (AUD) to Japanese Yen (JPY), the GARCH coefficients are insignificant in 
the former case and weakly significant in the latter. The GARCH coefficients for these two 
models (TWI and AUD to JPY) were found to be insignificant at a 5% level of significance. 
In conclusion, the GARCH (1, 1) process fails to adequately model the conditional volatility. 
Therefore, three GARCH models were estimated for the TWI and exchange rates of 
Australian dollar to Chinese Yuan and Australian dollar to Japanese Yen. These included an 
AR (1)-GARCH (1, 2), an AR (1)-GARCH (2, 1) and an AR (1)-EGARCH (1, 1) model. The 
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estimated AR (1)-GARCH (1, 2) model can be expressed in mathematical form as shown in 
Equation 6.1 a and 6.1 b. The estimated model coefficients are reported in Table 6.6. 
   𝑦𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑦𝑡−1 + ?̂?𝑡                         (6.1a)  
?̂?𝑡
2 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1 ?̂?𝑡−1
2 + ?̂?1?̂?𝑡−1
2 + ?̂?2 ?̂?𝑡−2
2      (6.1b) 
 
Table 6.6: AR (1)-GARCH (1, 2) models for TWI, AUD/CNY, and AUD/JPY exchange 
rates 
 TWI AUD to CNY AUD to JPY 
𝝓𝟎 0.0002 0.0022 -0.0008 
(0.0016) (0.0029)  (0.0023) 
𝝓𝟏 0.0290 0.0209  0.0179 
(0.0696) (0.0707)  (0.0661) 
𝜶𝟎       0.0006*** 0.0002       0.0009*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
𝜶𝟏       0.2501***    -0.0104**       0.2964*** 
(0.0537) (0.0049) (0.0606) 
𝜷1  0.0224 0.6521 0.1729 
(0.1585) (1.0930) (0.1674) 
𝜷𝟐 0.0230 0.2416 0.0723 
(0.1639) (1.0237) (0.1391) 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * indicates a coefficient is significant at a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% 
(***) level. 
 
Unfortunately the GARCH (1, 2) models failed to provide better results with all models 
reporting weakly insignificant GARCH coefficients for 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. Once again ARCH 
coefficient for the AUD to CNY model violates the non-negative requirement. This study 
now considers the GARCH (2, 1) model. The estimated AR (1)-GARCH (2, 1) model can be 
expressed in mathematical form as shown in Equation 6.2 a and 6.2 b. The estimated model 
coefficients are reported in Table 6.7. The results provide some highly significant coefficients 
but also yield model coefficients that violate the non-negativity requirement.  
𝑦𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑦𝑡−1 + ?̂?𝑡                       (6.2a)  
?̂?𝑡
2 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1 ?̂?𝑡−1
2 + ?̂?2 ?̂?𝑡−2
2 + 𝛽1?̂?𝑡−1
2     (6.2b) 
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Table 6.7: AR (1)-GARCH (2, 1) Models for TWI, AUD/CNY & AUD/JPY exchange rates 
  TWI AUD to CNY AUD to JPY 
𝝓𝟎 
  0.00003  0.0025 -0.0013 
(0.0016)  (0.0031)  (0.0023) 
𝝓𝟏 
0.0312  0.0216  0.0154 
(0.0691)  (0.0809)  (0.0652) 
𝜶𝟎 
0.0002  0.0004  0.0001 
(0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
𝜶𝟏 
      0.2440*** -0.0108        0.2884*** 
(0.0538)  (0.0123)  (0.0601) 
𝜶2  
   -0.1792** -0.0005       -0.2262*** 
(0.0895)  (0.0108)  (0.0668) 
𝜷𝟏 
      0.7656***        0.8487***        0.8628*** 
(0.2778)  (0.1077)  (0.0902) 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates that a coefficient is significant at a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 
1% (***) level. 
The GARCH models, that have been estimated thus far, have yielded unsatisfactory results. 
Of utmost concern is the violation of the non-negativity constraint that is required for the 
GARCH models to provide meaningfully estimates of the conditional variance or volatility in 
the variables. In order to address this drawback of the estimated GARCH models this study 
employed the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model which was originally proposed by 
Nelson (1991). The expression of the EGARCH model used in this study is derived from the 
estimation procedure used in Eviews7. The mathematical expression of an AR-EGARCH 
model is as shown in Equations 6.3a and 6.3b.  
𝑦𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑦𝑡−1 + ?̂?𝑡                          (6.3a)     
𝑙𝑛(𝜎𝑡
2) = 𝜔 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛(𝜎𝑡−1
2 ) + 𝛾
𝑒𝑡−1
√𝜎𝑡−1
2
+ 𝛼
|𝑒𝑡−1|
√𝜎𝑡−1
2
     (6.3b) 
Where 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡−1 is the value of the series at time t and t-1 respectively. ?̂?0 is the estimated 
constant term, ?̂?1 is the estimated coefficient for the lagged series and ?̂?𝑡 is the error term of 
the estimated autoregressive (AR) model. For the EGARCH part of the model, 𝜎𝑡
2 and 𝜎𝑡−1
2  is 
the conditional variance and the lagged conditional variance respectively; alternatively, this 
can be interpreted as the GARCH term and the lagged GARCH term. 𝑒𝑡−1 is the lagged error 
term and 𝜔 is a constant term. 𝛽 is the coefficient of the natural logarithm of the lagged 
conditional variance; high values of this coefficient are indicative of persistent conditional 
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volatility. The 𝛾 coefficient captures the asymmetric or leverage effect in a series. The 
leverage effect occurs because bad news seems to have a greater effect on financial markets 
than good news. Thus, there is increased volatility in the financial markets following a bad 
announcement and lower volatility in the markets following good announcement (Black, 
1976). The 𝛼 coefficient represents the symmetric effect of the estimated model. 
There are two advantages to using the EGARCH model specification. Firstly, the model is 
designed to estimate coefficients for the logged variance instead of the variance itself. This 
allows for the meaningful interpretation of positive and negative values of the estimated 
coefficients. Specifically, the estimated variance would always be positive but the logged 
value of the variance could be positive or negative. For example, consider two variance 
values of 100 and 0.25; the natural logarithm of these two values is approximately 4.605 and 
-1.386 respectively. Here, both variance measures are positive but the logged variance 
provides a negative value in one case and positive value in the other; both can be 
meaningfully interpreted. Secondly, the EGARCH model includes a leverage term that is 
missing in the GARCH model. Table 6.8 shows the three estimated models. With the 
exception of the AR (1) model coefficients, the other coefficients are significant to a 5% level 
of significance. As before, the estimated models for the three series include some negative 
coefficients but this is permissible in the case of EGARCH models. 
Using a 5% level of significance, the intercept terms are significant for all three models. The 
exchange rate of the AUD to CNY (0.8483) exhibits more persistent volatility than the 
exchange rate of the AUD to JPY (0.5921) or the TWI (0.5183). The leverage coefficient (𝛾 ) 
is significant and negative in all cases. This is indicative of the leverage effect in the 
Australian exchange market with bad news having a greater impact than good news. The 
symmetric effect coefficient is significant at a 5% level of significance in all models. The 
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exchange rate of the AUD to the JPY has a greater symmetric effect while the lowest 
symmetric effect is noticed in the AUD to the CNY. Overall, the EGARCH models appear to 
be a better fit. Consequently, the estimated EGARCH models are incorporated in the final 
financial stress index of this study. 
Table 6.8: AR (1)-EGARCH (1, 1) models for the TWI, AUD/CNY and AUD/JPY  
 
TWI AUD to CNY AUD to JPY 
𝜙0 
-0.0003 0.0023 -0.0019 
 (0.0016) (0.0023)  0.0023 
𝜙1 
 0.0310 0.0054  0.0219 
 (0.0684) (0.0402)  0.0677 
𝜔 
    -3.6339**      -0.8949***       -2.9212*** 
 (1.4993) (0.2039)  0.7954 
𝛽 
     0.5183**       0.8483***        0.5921*** 
 (0.2082) (0.0364)  0.1217 
𝛾 
    -0.1105**      -0.1434***     -0.1255** 
 (0.0484) (0.0340)  0.0567 
𝛼 
       0.2876***    -0.1009**        0.4247*** 
 (0.0698) (0.0473)  0.0823 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * indicates a coefficient is significant at a 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% 
(***) level. 
Figure 6.4 provides a visual representation of the conditional variance as estimated by 
EGARCH models. 
 
Figure 6.4: EGARCH Models for Exchange Rates & Trade-Weighted Index (Feb/84 to Dec/14)  
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6.4.2 Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) 
This study follows Balakrishnan et al. (2011) approach to estimate the EMPI. This method of 
estimating exchange market pressure considers changes in the level of foreign reserves and 
the prevailing exchange rate the most important indicators of distress in the exchange market. 
The monthly data for the exchange rate of the AUD to the USD was sourced from the RBA 
website and ranges from December 1983 to December 2014. Monthly foreign reserves data is 
sourced from the A4 spreadsheet from the RBA website and ranges from July 1969 to 
December 2014. Therefore, the EMPI was estimated for the time spanning from January 
1984 to December 2014. The EMPI mathematical expression is as shown in Equation 6.4.  
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡 =
(∆𝑒𝑡−𝜇∆𝑒)
𝜎∆𝑒
−
(∆𝑅𝑡−𝜇∆𝑅)
𝜎∆𝑅
     (6.4) 
Where ∆𝑒𝑡 is the month-over-month percentage change in the exchange rate of the Australian 
dollar to the USD. ∆𝑅𝑡 is the month-over-month percentage change in the total foreign 
reserves at time t minus the gold component of reserves at time t. The mean and standard 
deviation of the sampled data are denoted as 𝜇 and 𝜎 respectively. This study employs the 
definition of crisis as outlined by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). A successful speculative 
attack is signalled when the value of the EMPI is more than three standard deviations above 
its mean value. The standard deviation of the estimated EMPI was found to be 1.562794. 
Hence, three standard deviations above the mean is equal to about 4.6884. Using this 
criterion, one episode of distress in the Australian currency markets was indicated in 
September 2007 (5.8). A graphical representation of the distress is shown in Figure 6.5 where 
there is only one spike in the EMPI (in the unshaded region); this is indicative of a currency 
crisis. This is as expected since the reference country for the exchange rate is the US that 
suffered the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crises. It is worth noting at this point that the EMPI 
provides an earlier warning signal of crisis as opposed to the GARCH models, which 
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signalled the 2007-2009 GFC in November 2008. Therefore, the EMPI would facilitate 
earlier detection and policy intervention than the GARCH models. 
 
Figure 6.5: The Australian EMP Index (January 1984 to December 2014) 
The EMPI variable is explanatory to the extent that the American currency markets are in 
distress or have suffered contagion of a crisis from other markets or the Australian currency 
market is itself in crisis. However, it is possible that this variable could fail to highlight 
currency crises that originate from countries, other than the US or Australia. If the crisis 
spreads from these countries to Australia and not the US, it may not be reflected in the 
exchange rate of the AUD to the USD. In order to address this weakness of this variable, it 
would be prudent to consider a variable that gauges the overall depreciation of the AUD 
relative to other countries’ currencies such as the TWI. Accordingly, the inverted CMAX 
variable of the TWI was also estimated in order to assess the likelihood that a country had 
suffered a currency crisis. Section 6.4.3 discusses this variable in detail. 
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6.4.3 Inverted CMAX variable of the TWI 
The TWI gauges the average appreciation or depreciation of the AUD relative to the 
currencies of Australia’s key trading partners. Generally, a depreciating AUD37 causes 
imports to decline and exports to rise because imports to Australia would be more expensive 
while Australian exports would become more competitive but earn less revenue. A loss of 
confidence in the AUD would increase currency speculation and cause large depreciations of 
the AUD relative to other currencies. Investors would change the composition of their 
portfolios by selling off the AUD in order to minimise their losses from the depreciation of 
the dollar (Krugman, 1979). With decreased demand for the Australian dollar, few investors 
would want to purchase dollars and the overall value of the Australian dollar relative to other 
currencies would drop; this would also cause the TWI to drop. Illing and Liu (2006) argue 
that the CMAX measure of a basket of currencies is a suitable for measuring stress in 
countries with a floating exchange rate regime. This study uses an inverted CMAX measure 
of the TWI to measure stress in the currency market. The estimation procedure is similar to 
the one discussed inn Section 4.2.1 of chapter 4. Instead of using a moving window of 24 
months, this study uses a 12 month window as recommended by Illing and Liu (2006). The 
estimated variable shown in Figure 6.6, the highest peaks are observed in July 1986 (1.084) 
and January 2009 (1.081). While the second peak coincides with the 2007-2009 GFC, the 
inverted CMAX variable lags the EMPI variable in signalling the onset of the GFC.  
                                                 
37
 This study uses the Australian dollar to explain the concept of Australian TWI. However, it should be noted, 
that Australian commodities are usually priced in US dollars (Cole & Nightingale, 2016) 
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      Figure 6.6: Inverted CMAX for TWI variable 
 
6.5  Banking sector 
For purposes of this study, the banking sector is comprised of Australian owned financial 
institutions that act as ‘custodians’ of deposits received from the public and provide long-
term and short-term lending facilities in the form of mortgages, loans or credit card facilities. 
Thus, the banking sector consists of Australian commercial banks and excludes the central or 
Reserve bank of Australia. In relation to bank deposits, bank customers can access deposited 
funds through various means including the use of a chequebook, debit card, internet banking 
facilities or making a withdrawal at an automated teller machine (ATM).  
Generally, a bank’s customers believe that money is safer in the bank than it would be in the 
customers’ homes or businesses where money could be lost, stolen or destroyed by fire. It is 
unlikely that customers will withdraw all the money deposited at the bank at any given time. 
This is because customers hold money for three main motives; John Maynard Keynes 
identified these as transaction, speculative and precautionary motives (Keynes, 1936b). 
According to Lipsey and Chrystal (1999), transaction motivations for holding money arise 
because the time that money is received differs from the time that payments need to be made. 
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For instance, a business could predict the time when payments for utilities such as electricity 
and water may fall due. However, the timing of receipts fluctuate, depending on the sales are 
made within a given period. Speculative motives for holding money relate to investment 
opportunities. Firms and individuals hold money in order to take advantage of investment 
opportunities that may arise in the near future. An investment in interest earning securities, 
under-priced assets or mispriced currencies could earn the investor a return on money 
invested. Precautionary motives relate to holding money for emergencies or unforeseen 
expenditure. Prachowny (1985) argues most businesses and individuals hold money for 
transaction or speculative motives. This is because access to credit facilities such as credit 
cards can be used to finance the precautionary demand for money. Given that a bank’s 
customers are unlikely to withdraw all deposits at any given time, banks can invest the 
deposited funds in financial markets or use deposits to finance loans or credit facilities 
offered to customers. In this way, a mutually beneficial relationship exists between the banks 
and customers. On one hand, customers who make deposits at the bank are assured that the 
money deposited is safe. Moreover, if the customer wishes to access additional funds they 
can apply for a loan or another credit facility. On the other hand, banks make a profit by 
charging interest or bank fees on funds loaned to customers. This relationship is heavily 
reliant on the belief that the bank is able to play its role as a custodian of deposited funds. If 
people begin to doubt, a bank’s ability to safeguard the deposits, due to for instance liquidity 
problems, a bank’s customers would speculate that the bank could soon be under receivership 
or liquidated. Customers would soon begin to act in line with their suspicions by withdrawing 
funds from the bank and depositing them in another bank or investing them in assets or 
securities. A bank run occurs when several customers withdraw money from their bank 
accounts. If a crisis originates from the banking sector, bank runs tend to occur in the several 
banks especially if customers become convinced that their money is no longer safe in bank 
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accounts. In this case, a banking crisis is associated with panic and the rapid decline in the 
deposits held by commercial banks. This is perhaps why studies on banking crises use the 
level of deposits as an early indicator of a developing crisis in the banking sector.  
It is important to note that certain factors can determine how vulnerable a banking sector is to 
bank runs. This study discusses two main factors. The first factor is depositor behaviour. Iyer 
and Puri (2012) suggest that depositors would be less inclined to participate in a bank run if 
they have been banking with a bank for a long time or the depositor is heavily dependent on 
the bank for a number of banking services such as investment services. These depositors are 
more likely to decide to stay loyal to the bank even during a crisis period. The second factor 
is the deposit insurance. Several studies suggest that deposit insurance in the form of 
government guarantees of financial institutions, can help to reduce the likelihood of bank 
runs especially if the guarantee was obtained during a pre-crisis or tranquil period (Anginer, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Zhu, 2014; Boyle, Stover, Tiwana, & Zhylyevskyy, 2015; Iyer & Puri, 
2012). However, obtaining deposit insurance during a crisis was found to be less effective in 
preventing the panic that often leads to bank runs (Boyle et al., 2015). This is because it is 
possible that the bank runs would already have begun before the government guarantees are 
introduced or are implemented. While government guarantees of bank deposits can help to 
encourage bank stability during a financial crisis, Anginer et al. (2014) suggests that it can 
encourage moral hazard among banks and depositors, in the form of increased risk taking 
behaviour. For this reason, countries that implement government guarantees also improve 
bank supervisory practices, thereby discouraging excessive risk taking within the banking 
sector. Because this study focuses on possible indicators of banking crisis in the Australian 
market, a brief discussion of the Australian banking sector was deemed necessary. Thus, 
Section 6.5.1 discusses the Australian banking sector. 
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6.5.1 The Australian Banking sector 
The main objective of this section is to provide a brief overview of the current nature of the 
Australian banking sector in order to determine the potential for risk of a banking crisis in the 
near future. For this reason, discussions in this section are centred on the Australian banks 
that are locally owned and have a major influence on the operations of the financial system. 
In this respect, this study considers the Australian banking sector to comprise of all local 
banks operating in Australia. Information regarding the banks operating in Australia is 
maintained by the regulatory body known as Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA). APRA regulates and monitors the operations of local and foreign banks operating in 
Australia. In particular, it maintains a monthly record of the assets, deposits and loans of 
banks operating in Australia. As at August 2015, APRA recorded that there were 73 local and 
foreign-owned banks operating in Australia (APRA, 2015). The presence of foreign and local 
banks points toward two possible sources of a crisis in the Australian banking sector; these 
are mainly internal and external origins of a crisis. An internal origin of a crisis refers to an 
Australian banking crisis that is caused by lax regulatory of banks, moral hazard practices 
among banks or other weaknesses in the banking sector, which would render local banks 
more susceptible to the onset of a crisis. An external origin of a banking crisis results from 
shocks to a foreign banking system that culminates in a banking crisis. If many Australian 
banks extended loans to foreign banks that are based in the ‘crisis country’, such that 
Australia can be deemed a major lender, then it is more likely that problems would spill over 
from the foreign banking sector into the Australian banking sector. It is more likely that 
liquidity problems experienced by the foreign banks due to the banking crisis will affect the 
foreign banks’ ability to service loan repayments. Consequently, Australian banks would 
probably suffer losses in the form of bad debts. This study argues that the contagion of 
foreign banking crises to Australia is only relevant if it adversely affects operations in 
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Australian banks. After all, foreign governments may intervene to prevent the banking crisis 
from spilling over into other sectors of the economy or across borders. This intervention may 
curb the spread of the crisis and minimise the threat of cross-border contagion. Besides, in the 
event that there was contagion of a banking crisis to Australia, a resilient Australian banking 
sector would be able to withstand shocks to the Australian banks and it would be unlikely that 
a foreign banking crisis would translate to a local banking crisis.  
 
At this point, it is worth mentioning that a combination of external and internal factors could 
further exacerbate a crisis of local origin. For instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) 
explains how foreign banks could further exacerbate a developing crisis; by limiting credit to 
a country experiencing a crisis or requesting for earlier payment of loans to the afflicted 
country. However, this would only occur if there were already weaknesses in the banking 
sector. In this case, regulation and policy implementation may prove inadequate in combating 
pre-existing systemic problems. For example, Dabrowski (2010) states that, during the global 
financial crisis (GFC), even though policy response was delayed and poorly co-ordinated, 
systemic weaknesses were prevalent in European banks that were overleveraged. These 
weaknesses made the European banks more vulnerable to the spread of the GFC to European 
markets. In the absence of systemic weaknesses, adaptive policies could help to minimise the 
effects of a crisis on an economy. For example, strict regulation and supervisory practices by 
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s (APRA) is a major reason why Australian 
banks fared well compared to banks in other developed countries during the GFC (Pais & 
Stork, 2011). Edwards (2010) argues that unlike the USA and the UK, Australian financial 
institutions had not exposed themselves to the similar levels of risk. Specifically, there only 
existed non-conforming loans in the Australian market that were less risky than subprime 
mortgages, and even if lenders had riskier loans, they bore the risk of default instead of 
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passing it on to investors. In addition, the Australian government took pre-emptive measures 
to ensure Australian banks had sufficient foreign currency at their disposal to prevent bank 
runs. Further, even after the GFC was well established, Australia enjoyed an extended 
economic boom, due (in large part) to the exports of its mining industries (Perlich, 2009). 
So far, this discussion has centred on the two origins of a banking crisis. External origins that 
are linked to problems in foreign countries banks while internal origins are linked to 
problems in Australian banks. Regardless of the origin of the crisis, this part of the study is 
mainly concerned with the adverse impact of a crisis on the Australian banking sector. The 
notion is that local banks tend to hold a larger proportion of deposits than foreign banks; 
therefore, Australian banks would give a more representative measure of the health of the 
Australian banking sector than foreign banks would. In this study, the health of domestic 
banks is used as an indirect measure of cross-border contagion to Australian banks, whereby 
negative effects of contagion are of primary interest. Consequently, the discussion shall 
proceed with an emphasis on Australian owned banks.  
The August 2015, APRA (2015) report is used to identify the top 10 Australian banks, based 
on the total residential assets held by each bank. Table 6.9 shows the rank of the top 10 banks 
based on total assets and the corresponding market capitalisation. A graphical representation 
of the market capitalisation for the top 10 banks is provided in Figure 6.7. The information in 
Table 6.9 and Figure 6.7 shows that four banks dominate the Australian banking sector; in 
order of market capitalisation, the ‘big four’ comprise of the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia, Westpac Banking Corporation, National Australia Bank and Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Limited. It can be argued that the impact of a shock to the banking 
sector would be more pronounced if the big four were negatively affected than if smaller 
banks were affected. This is because the four banks hold most of the assets of customers 
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including individuals, businesses and other banks (in case of interbank lending). Thus, a 
banking crisis and liquidity problems among the big four could negatively affect the 
Australian economy. 
Table 6.9: The top 10 banks in the Australian banking sector 
 
Bank 
Total Assets 
($ millions) 
Rank  (based 
on total assets) 
Market capitalisation 
($ millions) 
Westpac Banking Corporation 752,868   1   96,154.00 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 715,525   2 121,421.00 
National Australia Bank Limited 627,826   3   79,819.30 
Australia and NZ Banking Group 
Limited 550,230   4   77,838.20 
Macquarie Bank Limited 74,394   5    24,831.50
d 
Suncorp-Metway Limited 58,607   6    16,108.20
d 
Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Limited 58,740   7     4,771.83 
Bank of Queensland Limited 45,270   8     4,553.04 
Members Equity Bank Limited 16,905   9   n/a
c
 
AMP Bank Limited 14,169 10    16,740.80
d 
Note:  
a. Banks are ranked based on the total resident assets for the end of August 2015, as reported by APRA.  
b. Market capitalisations are for the trading day ended 1 September 2015. Data for market capitalisations is 
sourced from the Market index website (http://www.marketindex.com.au/all-ordinaries).  
c. There is no market capitalisation reported for Members Equity Bank Limited because it is a privately 
owned company.  
d. Macquarie Bank Limited, Suncorp-Metway Limited and AMP Bank Limited are listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange as Macquarie Group Limited, Suncorp Group Limited and AMP Limited, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Market capitalisation of the top 10 Australian banks 
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6.6  Banking crises 
Generally, banking crises are an indication that something went wrong in the banking 
industry, possibly due to: poor regulation, systemic weaknesses, or cross-border interbank 
contagion. Laeven and Valencia (2008) argue that a systemic banking crisis may be caused 
by contagion of stress or crises in other sectors of the economy. In particular, these authors 
focus on the case of a crisis that is caused by large defaults by major financial institutions and 
companies. This is indicative of problems in the business or financial sector of an economy 
that have spilled over into the banking sector. The banks would have to write-off outstanding 
loans as bad debts and work on surviving on dwindling levels of capital and rising reserves 
requirements. It is only when a country’s banks liquidity is severely hampered that the early 
signs of a crisis begin to emerge in the banking sector. While Claessens and Kose (2013) cite 
bank runs as one cause of banking crises, Laeven and Valencia (2008) argue that bank runs 
are experienced in the latter stages of a banking crisis when the public are already aware of 
the weaknesses in the banking sector. It is possible that both studies are correct. On one hand, 
a banking crisis may have resulted from a bank run; On the other hand, other factors may 
have caused the onset of the banking crisis that culminated in a bank run in the latter stages of 
a banking crisis. It is important to note that it is possible for a banking crisis to occur in the 
absence of a bank run (especially if the government guarantees all deposits under a relatively 
large limit). Claessens and Kose (2013) provide two examples of this; the first are the 
banking crises experienced by Sweden, Finland and Norway in late 1980s to early 1990s, the 
second is the Japanese banking crisis of the late 1990s; both crises were not accompanied by 
bank runs. These examples indicate that other factors played a key role in the development 
and onset of these crises. Claessens and Kose (2013) cite work by Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal 
(1996) and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) who identify large defaults loans, under-
capitalization of banks, ownership of several complex and opaque securities such as 
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mortgage-backed securities of the GFC, moral hazard among financial market players and 
failures by regulators as other possible causes of banking crises.  
Hutchison and Noy (2005) state, from an empirical perspective, that the measurement of 
certain aspects of banking crises such as bank runs has proved challenging due to data 
limitations. Several authors suggest that large drops in equity or asset prices such as real 
estate prices and large increases in the non-performing loans are an indication that a banking 
crisis is imminent (Claessens & Kose, 2013; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky 
& Reinhart, 1999; Laeven & Valencia, 2008). Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 
2009b) find that banking crises are often preceded by credit booms and asset-price bubbles. 
By examining financial crises and the movements and duration of economic variables, they 
also find that, on average: a 35 percent real drop in housing prices spread over a period of 6 
years, an equity prices fall of 55 percent over 3½ years, an output fall of 9 percent over two 
years, an unemployment rise of 7 percent over 4 years, and a rise in central government debt 
of 86 percent as compared to its pre-crisis level make it difficult to reverse.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2005) also state that low GDP growth rates, high real 
interest rates and high inflation indicate increased vulnerability of an economy to a banking 
crisis. Furthermore, it is asserted that increased interbank linkages can help a developed 
countries hedge against credit risk associated with operating in a country. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998) argue that increased integration of banks may be key to strengthening 
banks worldwide since entry of foreign banks encourages healthy competition and adoption 
of better banking regulation practices. However, setting up these linkages will also increase 
the vulnerability of a country to financial-stress contagion, so countries should be careful 
when encouraging increased financial integration across borders.  
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Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) explored the use of banking sector and economic indicators 
in 50 different countries with the aim of identifying suitable banking-stress indicators. 
Banking sector variables mainly comprised of banks liabilities to foreign countries, to the 
private sector and other liabilities against deposited funds. All variables were expressed as a 
ratio to GDP. Apart from GDP, the performance of domestic consumption, inflation, 
exchange rates and investments was also examined. Consistent with other studies, Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu (1999) found that countries with declining GDP growth rates and higher 
interest and inflation rates were more likely to suffer a crisis. A notable finding was that 
exchange rate variables provided leading signals of a banking crisis in comparison to GDP 
ratio variables. This suggests that policy makers could risk delayed policy intervention if they 
solely relied on information from GDP ratios. This problem could be remedied by also 
examining exchange rate variables in addition to GDP ratio variables; this is the approach 
that is adopted in this study. In a study of 40 developed countries from 1970 to 2010, 
Babecký et al. (2012), examined the performance of the credit to GDP ratio and found it to be 
the most reliable and leading indicator of a banking crisis. Moreover, these authors provide a 
criteria for identifying possible distress in the banking sector, specifically this related to if the 
ratio “deviates by more than 2% from its trend value” (Babecký et al., 2012, p. 34). For this 
reason, this study shall focus on the domestic credit to GDP ratio as a possible indicator of 
banking crises.  
 
6.7  Indicators of stress in the banking sector 
This section discusses the indicators of distress in the banking sector in Australia. The 
motivation for the choice of variables is based on literature. It should be noted that in the case 
of the domestic credit to GDP ratio, that the data for the domestic credit variables and GDP 
variable are only available at annual or quarterly frequency. This study follows the use of an 
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interpolation method as recommended by Edison (2003) to transform the quarterly estimates 
to monthly estimates of the ratio. The following section discuss the banking beta (Section 
6.7.1), the inverted yield spread (Section 6.7.2) and the domestic credit to GDP ratio (Section 
6.7.3).  
 
6.7.1 Banking beta 
Many researchers have used the beta coefficient of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
to measure the level of stress in the banking sector (Apostolakis & Papadopoulos, 2014; 
Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Cardarelli et al., 2011; Illing & Liu, 2006; Melvin & Taylor, 2009). 
Perold (2004) suggests that the theoretical principles of the CAPM were mainly developed by 
several scholars in the 1960s (Lintner, 1965a, 1965b; Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1964; Treynor, 
1965). The principles proposed by these authors formed the basis for a model that can be 
expressed as shown in Equation 6.5.  
𝑅𝑗 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑗(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)     (6.5) 
Where 𝑅𝑗 represents the expected return of an asset j based on the CAPM, 𝑅𝑓 represents the 
risk free rate which is usually represented by the rate of return on a government issued 
security, 𝛽𝑗 represents the beta of security j, and 𝑅𝑚 represents the return on a market index. 
The beta coefficient in Equation 6.5 measures the risk of asset j relative to the risk of the 
overall market. It is estimated using returns on an asset and returns on a composite market 
index. The procedure for estimating the beta of asset j involves a three-step process. Step one 
involves calculating the covariance of asset j’s returns to the returns on the market index. 
Step two finds the variance of the returns of the composite market index is calculated. The 
third and last step involves dividing the covariance measure from step one by the variance 
measure from step two. The mathematical formula for estimating the beta of an asset can, 
therefore, be expressed as shown in Equation 6.6.  
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𝛽𝑗 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑅𝑗,𝑅𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑅𝑚)
      (6.6) 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) method can also be used to estimate the value of beta. The 
returns of a specific company are usually regressed on the returns of a composite market 
index in order to find the value of beta. For stocks, the estimated value of beta compares the 
performance of a publicly listed company to the overall performance of stocks traded in a 
market. The estimated beta can be interpreted in three ways. First, if the estimated beta value 
is less than one, a firm is said to be less risky compared to the market. Second, a beta measure 
of one indicates that a firm is as risk as the market. Third, when beta is greater than one, this 
indicates that a firm is more risky than the overall market (Brealey et al., 2011).  
One way to measure, the level of stress in the banking sector would be to estimate betas of 
the publicly listed banks in Australia. The estimated betas can then be included in a portfolio 
in order to calculate the beta of the banking industry. In the case of Australia, the S&P/ASX 
200 banks accumulation index can be viewed as a portfolio of Australian banks. This index is 
a subindex of the S&P/ASX 200, which is a weighted index of 200 companies that are traded 
on the ASX. The weights of the index are based on the prevailing market capitalisation of the 
traded company. This study estimates beta using the returns
38
 of the S&P/ASX 200 and 
S&P/ASX 200 banks index.
39
 Consequently, the S&P/ASX 200 banks will be considered as 
the asset j and the estimated beta will be measuring risk of the banking sector relative to the 
risk in the market. Therefore, when the level of beta exceeds one, this is indicative of a 
banking sector that is distress. Since the beta values that are greater than one are of greater 
interest than the values which are less or equal to one, most scholars modify the beta measure 
                                                 
38
 Returns are calculated based on the value of the index in a particular month compared to the value of the 
index in the same month a year ago. The end-of-day data was sourced from SIRCA and used to estimate 
monthly average values for the S&P/ASX200 and S&P/ASX 200 banks indexes (SIRCA, 2015). 
39
 There are two main accumulation market indexes for the Australian market, namely the S&P/ASX200 and the 
All Ordinaries index. While a subindex for the banking sector is reported for S&P/ASX200, there is no 
subindex for the All Ordinaries index. This study focuses on the S&P/ASX200. 
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to reflect the values that indicate distress. The refined measure of beta reflects the values of 
beta that are greater than one only and sets the values that are less than or equal to one to 
zero. A dummy variable can be used to transform the estimated beta to the refined beta. As 
shown in Equation 6.7a the dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the estimated beta is 
greater than one and zero otherwise. The formula for estimating the refined beta is the 
calculated as shown in Equation 6.7b. 
𝐷𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑗 ≤ 1
1 𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑗 > 1
        (6.7a) 
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 = 𝐷𝑖𝛽𝑗      (6.7b) 
Generally, financial analysts and scholars use a longer period to estimate the value of beta. In 
the case of monthly data, a banking beta is usually estimated using four to five years of data, 
which is the equivalent of a 48 or 60-month window. 
 
Figure 6.8: 12-month beta and refined beta for Australian banking sector 
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While, it is common practice to use longer time horizons to estimate beta, Peterson and 
Fabozzi (1999) argue that a valid estimate of beta can be obtained using at least 12 months. 
Several studies have successfully used a 12-month window to gauge the level of stress in the 
banking sector (Apostolakis & Papadopoulos, 2014; Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Illing & Liu, 
2006). Consequently, this study chose to estimate a banking beta using a 12-month window. 
Figure 6.8 shows the estimated banking beta and refined banking beta for Australia. The final 
index shall incorporate the refined beta. 
6.7.2 Inverted Yield Spread 
The inverted yield spread is also referred to as the inverted term spread or the slope of the 
yield curve and is estimated by taking the difference between a long-term security and a 
short-term security. Illing and Liu (2006) argue that the inverted yield spread can be used to 
measure interest rate shocks. Several studies suggest that it can provide early indications of 
problems in a country’s banking sector (Apostolakis & Papadopoulos, 2014; Cardarelli et al., 
2011; Melvin & Taylor, 2009; Vermeulen et al., 2015). Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) 
argue that the inverted term spread can help predict the recessions that often precede financial 
crises. However, Tsuji (2005) found that the spread had no predictive power in the case of 
Japan. Alles (1995) explored the usefulness of this variable in the case of Australia and found 
it had predictive power for economic recessions. For this reason, this study deems the 
inverted yield spread as a relevant predictor of crises for Australia. 
Theoretically, the yield curve slopes upwards because short-term securities earn less interest 
than long-term securities. Lenders expect to receive higher yields when they forego the use of 
funds for a longer period. This can be shown by examining the yields of Australian issued 
government securities of different maturities. Table 6.10 shows the yields on commonwealth 
government and treasury corporation bonds for the month of November 2014 as reported by 
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the RBA in sheet F 2.1 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2017).The yields on the bonds increases 
as the time to maturity increases, for example a 2 year government bond has a lower yield 
than a 3 year government bond. The yield curve of government bonds in November would be 
upward sloping as shown in Figure 6.9. 
Table 6.10: Yields for Australian Bonds of different maturities (November 2014)  
 Yields on bonds (in percentage) 
Maturity Government bond Treasury Corporation bond 
2 2.51 
 
3 2.55 2.77 
5 2.77 3.08 
10 3.26 3.67 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Yield Curve for Australian Government bonds (November 2014) 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) 
Banks take advantage of the difference in rates of securities of different maturities in order to 
make profit. Banks use deposits to finance loans to other customers and profit from the 
interest charged on loans. However, if the yield curve becomes inverted (a downward sloping 
yield curve) it could result in the bank receiving lower rates on long-term loans and 
diminished profitability on loans (Cardarelli et al.). In this case, an inverted yield curve may 
signal distress in the banking sector. 
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This study estimates the inverted yield spread for Australia using the interest rates on a 10-
year government bond and a 3-month treasury bill to represent a long-term security and a 
short-term security respectively. The inverted spread was estimated by deducting the interest 
rate of the long-term security from the interest rate of the shorter-term security. The logic 
being long-term rates are the equilibrium rate and stress is experienced when the short-term 
rate surpasses the long-term ones. Figure 6.10 shows the inverted yield spread from January 
1970 to December 2014. This variable indicates episodes of distress in the banking sector in 
the May 1974, April 1982, December 1985 and August 1989. The last episode of distress 
corresponds to the 1989-1992 Australian Banking Crisis. 
 
Figure 6.10: Inverted Yield Spread for Australia (January 1970 to December 2014) 
Source: Authors calculations based on Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) data 
6.7.3 Domestic Credit to GDP 
The domestic credit to GDP ratio is estimated by dividing the domestic credit by the real 
GDP. Different researchers tailor the definition of domestic credit to suit the aims and 
objectives of their research. Here are three examples of different interpretations of the term 
domestic credit: i) Domestic credit is the total credit including credit to households, 
businesses, banks and non-financial institutions; ii) Domestic credit consists of the private 
credit provided to households and businesses; and iii) domestic credit is the total credit to 
banks and non-financial institutions. Since this study seeks to estimate the domestic credit to 
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GDP ratio as an early warning indicator of problems in the Australian banking sector, the 
third interpretation of domestic credit is deemed suitable. Consequently, the domestic credit 
to GDP ratio is estimated using the total credit extended to banks and non-bank financial 
institutions and real GDP. Data was obtained from the RBA website.
40
 While the domestic 
credit is provided at a monthly interval, the real GDP is only available at the quarterly 
frequency. The quarterly GDP is converted to monthly frequency via interpolation such that 
the monthly GDP trend coincides with the quarterly GDP trend. Figure 6.11 shows a 
graphical representation the estimated monthly GDP as compared to the quarterly GDP. 
 
Figure 6.11: Monthly and Quarterly GDP (September 1976 to December 2014) 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) and authors calculations 
The monthly GDP is used to estimate the credit to GDP ratio, which is computed by dividing 
the monthly credit by the monthly estimate for real GDP. A graphical representation of the 
estimated credit to GDP ratio is provided in Figure 6.12. The estimated ratio is trending 
upwards and does not seem to provide any useful information for predicting crises. Perhaps a 
refined measure of the credit to GDP ratio would have more predictive power. Section 6.7.3.1 
this study explores the use of the credit to GDP gap which is a modified measure of the credit 
to GDP ratio as proposed by Borio and Lowe (2002).  
                                                 
40
 Historical data for real GDP was obtained from the H1 spreadsheet while credit to banks and non-banking 
financial institutions was obtained from the D2 spreadsheet on the RBA website. 
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      Figure 6.12: Credit to GDP ratio (September 1976 to December 2014) 
      Source: Authors calculations based on Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) data 
6.7.3.1 Credit to GDP gap 
Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that the credit to GDP gap is useful in identifying the credit 
booms that precede financial crises. Moreover, a large gap is indicative of rapid rises in credit 
levels and increased likelihood of financial crisis in the near future. Drehmann and 
Tsatsaronis (2014) arrived at a similar conclusion and argues that this variable is a robust 
measure for increased vulnerabilities in developed and developing countries. The credit to 
GDP gap is estimated using the credit to GDP ratio and the trend of the credit to GDP ratio. 
The trend component of the ratio is deducted from the credit to GDP ratio in order to obtain 
the gap. The trend of the credit to GDP ratio is estimated using the one-sided Hodrick 
Prescott filter add-in of Eviews. Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014) recommend that this 
variable be estimated using a minimum of at least 10 years of data. Therefore, this study uses 
data for approximately 38 years (for months from September 1976 to December 2014); this 
satisfies the ten-year requirement. Figure 6.13 shows the estimated credit to GDP gap for 
Australia. The highest peak in the variable is recorded in December of 2007 which 
corresponds to the timing of the 2007-2009 GFC. 
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Figure 6.13: Credit to GDP for Australia (September 1976 to December 2014) 
Source: Authors calculations based on Reserve Bank of Australia (2017) data 
6.8  Twin Crises 
A currency crisis may be more severe if it is accompanied by a banking crisis, a phenomenon 
that is commonly referred to as “twin crises”. In a detailed study of the twin crisis 
phenomenon, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) examined 26, 76 and 19 incidents of banking, 
currency and twin crises respectively. There are four noteworthy findings of this study. First, 
a bidirectional relationship exists between the two types of crises especially after the 
liberalization of financial markets. On one hand, the authors argued that currency devaluation 
could trigger a banking crisis or worsen a developing banking crisis. On the other hand, 
weaknesses in the banking industry could trigger a bank run that makes a country more 
susceptible to a currency crisis. Hence, the incidence of a banking crisis could help predict a 
future currency crisis and vice versa. Second, either crisis was less severe in isolation in 
comparison to a twin crisis. This is because in a twin crisis there is a feedback pathway 
whereby one crisis exacerbates the other crisis. Ideally, it would be preferable if a country 
experienced no crisis. However, if a country suffered a financial crisis either a currency or 
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banking crisis would be much ‘kinder’ than twin crisis. Third, weakened or deteriorating 
economic fundamentals predisposed a country to either or both crises such that it is only a 
matter of when a crisis will occur and not if a crisis will occur. Fourth, both types of crises 
were often preceded by a recession. However, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) noted that the 
severity of the recession could vary. Bordo et al. (2001) found that recessions accompanied 
by financial crises were much worse and lasted longer than recessions in out-of-crisis periods.  
With regard to empirical measurement of twin crises, this study explored the notion of 
variables that signal twin crises. However, a review of literature found that no studies seem to 
have developed a measure for the twin crises. Instead, most studies focus on examining the 
incidence of either the banking or currency crisis. Moreover, the occurrence of either crisis is 
often regarded as an early indicator of a potential twin crisis in the near future. This is one 
limitation of this study and a possible avenue for future research. 
6.9  Conclusion 
This chapter proposed measures of currency market stress based on increased volatility in 
exchange markets, the prevailing exchange rate and the level of foreign reserves. Volatility in 
Australian currency markets was assessed using GARCH volatility models and data for 
approximately three decades (from 1983 to 2014). Distress in the currency markets was also 
gauged using an exchange market pressure index and data over the same time frame. Three 
variables were used to measure distress in the banking sector; the refined banking beta, 
inverted yield spread and domestic credit to GDP. The inverted yield spread and the ratio of 
credit to GDP were estimated from 1970 to 2014 and 1976 to 2014, respectively, to provide 
ample data in order to evaluate the performance of the variable during past episodes of 
distress. However, in the case of the credit to GDP variable it should be noted that the real 
GDP is reported at the quarterly level and an interpolation method was used to derive the 
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monthly values from the quarterly data. This study imposes a linear trend on the interpolated 
values. However, it is possible that the estimated level of the trend is incorrect and that the 
interpolated or estimated value of GDP may differ from the actual value of GDP; the 
prevailing value may be above or below the estimated value of GDP. It is not possible to 
know the degree of the estimation error without access to monthly estimates for GDP, which 
are not publicly available. This is one limitation of the interpolation method that was used. It 
is worth noting that this limitation is only applicable to the estimated levels of stress for 
interpolated months. Future studies could make use of variables that have monthly data 
available in order to reduce the estimation error. Moreover, due to restrictions on data 
available from SIRCA, this study could only estimate the refined banking beta from 2002 to 
2014. Due to this data limitation, it is only possible for the performance of this variable over 
the 2007-09 GFC. Future research could possibly address this shortcoming by identifying 
alternative proxies for the banking beta measure which have a larger range of data. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY AUSTRALIAN-BASED INDICATORS 
OF FINANCIAL STRESS 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight and discuss other Australian-based indicators of 
stress that were not identified in Chapters 4, 5, or 6, but are still relevant measures of distress 
in the Australian financial markets. Section 7.2 of this chapter is dedicated to exploring the 
feasibility of using LIBOR spreads as measures of financial stress in Australia. The sub-
sections of Section 7.2 are organised as follows. Subsection 7.2.1 provides a definition of the 
LIBOR which is a commonly used interest rate in the global banking sector. Factors that 
determine the interest rate charged by banks are also discussed in this subsection. The use the 
LIBOR and LIBOR spread as indicators of financial stress is explored in Subsections 7.2.2 
and 7.2.3 respectively. Subsection 7.2.4 deliberates on whether the LIBOR is relevant in the 
Australian financial markets. Subsection 7.2.4 and 7.2.5 discusses whether the LIBOR and 
LIBOR spreads are suitable measures of financial stress in Australian markets. In Subsection 
7.2.5, this study explains why the LIBOR was found to be an unsuitable measure of banking 
risk in Australia. Accordingly, the subsection that follows (Subsection 7.2.6) contains a 
discussion of alternatives to the LIBOR and LIBOR spreads. In Sections 7.3 and 7.4 this 
study presents the case for the use of an inverted CMAX property index the inverted CMAX 
metals and mining index as barometer of stress in the Australian property market and mining 
sector respectively. The variables developed in Subsection 7.26 and Sections 7.3 and 7.4 are 
subsequently used in the construction of composite stress indexes in Chapter 9. 
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7.2 LIBOR Spreads 
7.2.1 What is the LIBOR? 
LIBOR is an acronym that stands for the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The 
LIBOR was originally formulated by the British Bankers Association (BBA) in 1986. 
Following its introduction, the LIBOR was widely used to determine the rates on swaps, 
forward contracts, futures contracts, bonds, syndicated loans, and interbank loans (Abrantes-
Metz, Kraten, Metz, & Seow, 2012; Bryan & Rafferty, 2016 ; Fouquau & Spieser, 2015). 
When the LIBOR is used in cross-border transactions it reflects a country’s willingness to 
lend money to another country. Moreover, it reflects the rate at which local banks are willing 
to lend money to foreign banks. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012) state that the BBA used 
information from eight out of a panel of 16 banks to estimate daily quotes of the LIBOR for 
10 currencies
41
 in the following manner. Sixteen banks were polled regarding the cost of 
funding in order to determine the interest rate each bank would be willing to charge for 
interbank transactions. The rates of the sampled banks are ranked in order before selecting 
the rates of the middle eight banks. The mean of the rates quoted by the middle eight banks is 
calculated and reported as the LIBOR (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012). This procedure for 
estimating the LIBOR is based on the notion that the local banks are trustworthy and will 
provide honest quotes. In practice two scenarios can occur when estimating the LIBOR in 
this manner. In the first scenario, all the banks surveyed for the estimating the LIBOR are 
actually trustworthy and the integrity of the LIBOR as a reference rate for global transactions 
is upheld. In the second scenario, some of the banks surveyed could provide false quotes 
which are used to estimate the LIBOR. In this case the estimated LIBOR would be mis-
specified and the legitimacy of the LIBOR can be called into question. Fouquau and Spieser 
                                                 
41
  These currencies were the Danish krone, Swiss Franc, European euro, Swedish krona, Japanese yen, US 
dollar, British pound, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and New Zealand dollar. 
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(2015) suggest that one reason that banks may provide false quotes is to give other banks the 
false impression that they were safe to lend money to even if they were not.  
Recent investigations of banks suggest that the second scenario may have prevailed in 
financial markets since 1991 and it was only in 2012 that it became apparent that major banks 
like Citigroup, HSBC, JPMorgan, Barclays, and Chase were fixing rates in order to earn 
profits on transactions in financial markets (Fouquau & Spieser, 2015). Following these 
revelations, regulators, and market players began to call for a review of the LIBOR. This was 
the main motivation for the Wheatley report which offered several recommendations to the 
manner in which the LIBOR was estimated and reported (Wheatley, 2012). There are three 
notable recommendations
 
from the Wheatley report. Firstly, the report recommended that 
surveyed banks should be able to provide data of regular interbank transactions in order to 
demonstrate that the estimated LIBOR is a reliable benchmark for interbank transactions. 
This report found that 50 percent of the reported LIBORs satisfied this requirement. On one 
hand it was found that there was sufficient transactional data to justify the estimation of the 
LIBORs for the US dollar, British pound, Japanese yen, European euro and the Swiss franc. 
On the other hand there was insufficient data to support the estimation of the LIBORs for the 
Canadian dollar, New Zealand dollar, Australian dollar, Danish kroner, and Swedish krona. It 
can, therefore, be concluded that it was not ideal to continue to estimate the ten LIBORs as 
LIBORs for five currencies failed to provide a suitable reference rate for interbank 
transactions. Accordingly, the second recommendation was that the LIBORs of the five 
currencies with insufficient transaction data be discontinued. A third notable recommendation 
was that a new administrator for the LIBOR be appointed. In response to these 
recommendations, a new administrator, The Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Benchmark 
Administration, now determines the LIBOR based on information collected from a panel of 
banks eleven to seventeen in a particular country. The new administrator reports LIBORS for 
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the five currencies that have sufficient interbank transactional data; these are the US dollar, 
the Japanese yen, the British pound, the European euro, and the Swiss Franc. According to 
the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) website the quoted LIBOR rate is estimated by ordering 
the submitted rates in descending order before using the rates for the middle 50 percent of the 
data values to obtain the average interest rate of the rates charged by different banks in a 
given country (Intercontinental Exchange, 2017a, 2017b). It is necessary to estimate an 
average rate since it is unlikely that several local banks would have the same risk preferences 
and charge the same rate of interest on funds loaned to foreign banks. For instance, consider 
the leading local banks in Australia.
42
 The local banks would demand different levels of 
return on money loaned to foreign banks depending on the perceived level of risk. It is 
common for banks to perform a risk assessment in order to identify the different kinds of risk 
associated with a loan and estimate the probability of loss of the money loaned. The level of 
risk and desired return on the loaned funds determine the rate of interest charged on the 
loaned funds. The sections that follow highlight some of the factors that may influence the 
LIBOR (the short-term interest rate charged by a bank when extending credit to another bank; 
Sections 7.2.1.1 to 7.2.1.4).  
7.2.1.1 The risk preference of the bank 
Some banks are more willing to accept comparatively higher levels of risk in exchange for 
higher return while other banks may be more conservative (i.e. risk averse). Blenman (2010) 
states that the specific details of a bank’s risk preference are confidential; only the bank’s 
employees have access to this information. This author argues that the following factors 
influence the risk preference of bank managers: i) Capital available for investment; ii) Extent 
of control available to bank management; iii) Prevailing concerns about the bank’s 
reputation; and iv) Executive compensation schemes.  
                                                 
42
 The top four banks in Australia are Westpac, Commonwealth Bank, Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group, and National Australia Bank. 
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(i) Capital Availability 
Sengupta and Hogue (2014) assert that regulators impose minimum capital requirements on 
banks in order to ensure that the banks can bear unexpected losses and continue as a going 
concern. The recent incidence of financial crises has renewed regulators concern about the 
banking sectors ability to withstand economic shocks and not succumb to a crisis. In 
Australia, the minimum capital requirements are determined by APRA. For example, Letts 
(2015) states that APRA (in July 2015) reviewed the minimum capital requirements for the 
four main Australian banks upwards by 30 billion dollars in order to bolster the banks for 
future financial stress or crises. More recently, APRA has further increased minimum capital 
requirements for Australian banks to 1.5 percent points in the case of the four major banks 
and 0.5 percent points in the case of smaller banks. All banks were given until 31 December 
2019 to satisfy the new capital requirements (APRA, 2017; Janda, 2017). Once a bank 
satisfies the minimum capital requirements specified by APRA, it is expected that banks with 
access to more capital are more likely to be risk takers as opposed to banks with less capital.  
(ii) Management Control 
Blenman (2010) argues that in public listed companies shareholders are more likely to dictate 
the risk preference of managers; in this case the shareholders control the decisions relating to 
risk. Conversely, in private companies management are more likely to influence the risk 
decisions. It is possible for managers in public companies to have more control if the 
shareholders vote for the manager to determine the preferable level or risk. Shareholder 
controlled
43
 banks tend to be more inclined to taking risk while management controlled banks 
tend to be more risk averse (Faccio et al., 2011; García-Kuhnert et al., 2015). Managers of 
banks with higher reputation would require higher compensation and would be more risk 
averse. Banks that design executive compensation schemes, which reward risk-taking 
                                                 
43
 This is true of shareholders with a diversified portfolio, as opposed to shareholders with a non-diversified 
portfolio as shown by Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011) and García-Kuhnert, Marchica, and Mura (2015). 
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behaviour via bonuses, are more likely to nurture managers that are more inclined to taking 
risk. Up to this point, most arguments presented favour the tendency to either risk taking or 
risk averseness among bankers. However, Benston (2010) presents a convincing argument 
that it is possible for banks to be risk neutral especially if a bank manager has diversified into 
a portfolio of assets or securities. The same idea could be extended to a portfolio of loans, 
such that a bank manager could incorporate different loans with different levels of risk in 
order to diversify the overall risk borne by the bank. In summary, it should be noted that the 
list of factors is that determine risk preference is not exhaustive; indeed prevailing economic 
conditions may cause bank managers to change previous risk preference in order to ensure 
that the bank survives an episode of economic distress.  
(iii) Bank’s Reputation 
A bank’s reputation can determine the rate of interest that a lending bank is willing to charge 
the borrowing bank for interbank transactions. Specifically, banks that have a track record for 
honouring their financial obligation as and/or when they fall due have a good reputation 
while banks that frequently fail to meet their financial obligations when they fall due are 
regarded as having a bad reputation and in some cases could even be blacklisted. The lending 
bank would prefer to lend money to a borrowing bank with the borrowing bank with good 
reputation and would be reluctant to offer funds to a borrowing bank with a bad reputation. 
This is because the bank with a good reputation is more likely to honour loan repayments 
when they fall due than the bank with bad reputation. Sadly financial crises can cause a quick 
shift in the perceived reputation of a bank. In particular, lending banks may be reluctant to 
lend to a borrowing bank with good reputation if it is located in a country that is affected by 
the crisis. This is true about local and foreign lending banks. For instance, Kidwell, 
Blackwell, Whidbee, and Sias (2016) found that soon following the collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers investment bank, American banks were more reluctant to offer loans to other 
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American banks. During the 2007-2009 GFC many American banks became exposed to 
losses from subprime mortgage loans. Because of this it is likely that American banks were 
more reluctant to extend credit during the crisis period for fear of exposing themselves to 
increased risk of default and future bad debts if they opted to provide loans to other American 
banks (Gertler & Kiyotaki, 2015). The general perception in financial markets was that 
American banks which otherwise had a good reputation in the pre-crisis period could 
potentially be in possessing of “toxic assets” in the form of subprime mortgage loans. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that during and following the GFC there was a shift in the 
perceived reputation of American banks which otherwise had a good reputation, with the 
general assumption being that American banks were more likely to default and could, 
therefore, be regarded as being banks with a bad reputation. Because of this, the cost of 
funding to American banks was higher during the GFC that it would be in tranquil periods 
(Gertler & Kiyotaki, 2015). It should also be noted that relationships between banks may 
factor into the assessment of a banks reputation. If a bank has a proven track record of 
honouring their financial obligations, a bank manager may be willing to overlook the general 
perception of increased risk of default during a crisis period. In this case the relationship 
between the bank managers has factored into the overall assessment of the borrowing banks 
reputation. 
(iv) Executive Compensation Schemes 
The means by which executives are remunerated can indirectly influence the risk taking 
behaviour of executives in the banking sector. According to Guo, Jalal, and Khaksari (2015) 
bank managers that were paid more were more motivated and were less likely to mismanage 
the banks resources for; this was found to be true regardless of the presence of absence of a 
financial crisis. If a bank manager’s compensation is linked to his/her performance, it is 
possible that lending decisions that reflect improved performance are preferred to lending 
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decisions that could give the impression of poor managerial performance. In this case, the 
interbank lending will only be offered to other banks if it is likely that the banks will honour 
the repayments of the loan thereby resulting in a reflection of good performance on the bank 
manager of the lending bank. In most cases, this would involve only lending to banks with 
good reputation and credit rating. Usually banks encourage managers to acquire more stock 
in a bank so as to motivate the bank managers to maximise shareholder wealth. However, in a 
study of sixty eight banks and seventy CEOs, Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) found that 
there was growing popularity of the use of stock options in the American banking sector and 
that as managers acquired stock through stock options were more likely to be risk takers 
when making managerial decisions. Moreover, there is no proof that share options contribute 
to increased shareholder wealth. This risk preference is likely to affect the bank manager’s 
decision to lend funds to certain banks. It could also influence the lending rate that the 
manager is willing to set for the interbank loan. 
7.2.1.2 Duration of the loan 
Ceteris paribus, banks tend to require higher rates of return on longer-term loans as compared 
to shorter-term loans. Higher interest rates compensate the bank for foregoing the use of 
funds over a longer period and the potential risk that the borrower may not be able to repay 
the loan in future. This is consistent with the financial theory of the term structure of interest 
rates, which explains the relationship between interest on short and long-term loans. 
McEachern (2012, p. 204) argues that based on this theory, “the interest rate usually increases 
with the duration of the loan other things constant”. 
7.2.1.3 Exchange rate risk 
 Australian banks may loan funds to a foreign banks in the local currency as well as in 
currencies other than the Australian dollar, depending on the foreign banks financing needs. 
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Loans denominated in foreign currency expose Australian banks to exchange rate risk, since 
it is not known whether the foreign currency will appreciate or depreciate (Ross, Westerfield, 
& Jaffe, 1996). If the Australian dollar appreciates relative to the value of a foreign currency, 
Australian banks will make a loss on the loan repayments received in the foreign currency. 
This is because once the foreign currency is converted to Australian dollars the banks will 
receive less money than they would have had the Australian dollar not depreciated. For 
example, consider a nominal loan of 1000 US dollars from an Australian bank to an 
American bank in the United States (US). At the time of the loan agreement, each Australian 
dollar (AUD) was worth 70 US cents and the Australian dollar appreciates to a value of 78 
US cents for every AUD at the time of repayment. At the time of the loan agreement, the 
repayment of the principal would be worth approximately AUD 1,428.57 (1000/0.7) and after 
the AUD appreciated the Australian bank would expect a repayment of the principal amount 
of approximately AUD 1,282.05 (1000/0.78). In the end, the bank would have made a loss 
due to the exchange of currency back to Australian dollars. Brealey et al. (2011) argue that it 
is possible for Australian banks to hedge against this kind of risk by entering into currency 
forward or currency futures contracts with the American bank.  
7.2.1.4 Default risk 
Default risk is the risk that a bank that has borrowed funds will be unable to pay back the full 
amount of the principal plus the interest as and when they fall due (Rose, 2000). Some 
countries may pose higher risk of default than others, due to a waning economic environment 
or a poor economic outlook of that country. Banks with significant operations in countries 
experiencing financial stress or a crisis may be viewed as having a higher risk of default. 
Depending on the extent of financial distress suffered by the country, banks may refuse to 
offer any credit to the banks based in the ‘afflicted’ country especially if financial institutions 
in that country have been negatively affected by the crisis. Australian banks would be more 
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reluctant to lend to countries affected by a crisis for fear that interbank lending would expose 
the banks to cross-border contagion. Alternatively, a local bank may decide to lend money to 
a foreign bank if the bank demonstrates that it will be able to make the repayments at the 
agreed upon times. It should be noted however, that the banks may choose to charge a higher 
than usual rate of interest on the funds loaned. 
Banks may also use a foreign bank’s credit rating to assess the probability of it defaulting.44 
Banks with higher ratings
45
 (As) are regarded as having the lowest risk of default, while 
banks with lower ratings (Cs or Ds) are believed to have higher default risks. Consequently, 
local banks would be more reluctant to lend money to foreign banks with lower credit ratings 
and vice versa. Also, local banks will charge higher interest rates on loans to foreign banks 
with lower rating while lower interest will be charged on loans to those with higher ratings. 
It is important to note that the four risks discussed above are not the only risks that a bank 
may consider when determining the rate of interest to charge on interbank loans. Other risks 
may arise due to political or economic factors that are unique to the foreign country in which 
the borrowing bank is situated. This means that an interbank lending rate could also reflect a 
bank manager’s judgement of several risks and the perceived creditworthiness of a foreign 
bank. During times of financial crises, the LIBOR can be viewed as barometer for the 
perceived risk of default by banks located in the country that is, or countries that are, in the 
epicentre of a financial crisis. Moreover it can be seen as an indicator of the prevailing 
sentiment among lending banks at different stages of a crisis; these stages are the pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis stages. During financial crisis, lending banks may be more reluctant to 
extend credit to banks that are based in the affected country and would demand a higher 
interest rate to compensate for the increased risk in terms of default, liquidity and exchange 
                                                 
44
 A detailed discussion of the credit ratings is provided in section 6.2 for chapter 6. 
45
 The major rating agencies for Australian banks are Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. 
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rate risk; this list is not exhaustive. The affected country will report rising levels of the 
LIBOR during crisis periods as compared to ‘tranquil’ or out-of-crisis periods. The market 
sentiment shall gradually change as a country transitions out of a crisis. As the affected 
country begins to recover from the financial losses caused by the crisis, lending banks will 
begin to charge lower levels of the LIBOR from banks in the affected countries. In this 
manner, the LIBOR will reflect current and changing perceptions of the risk associated with 
loans to a foreign country.  
 
7.2.2 The LIBOR as an indicator of financial stress  
The LIBOR’s ability to reflect changing perceptions of risk is particularly useful when 
monitoring the health of an economy. A rising LIBOR may indicate concerns of the financial 
sector in an economy or the country’s overall economic well-being probably due to 
speculation and/or the observed weakening of macroeconomic fundamentals. Therefore, an 
examination of the trending patterns of the LIBOR can help to identify whether the country is 
perceived to be suffering stress or a crisis. In order to illustrate this, historical data for the 
monthly quotes of the 3-month LIBOR were obtained for five major currencies. These 
include the Yen, dollar, Pound sterling, Franc, and the Euro for Japan, the US, the UK, 
Switzerland, and the European Union. Data was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis database. The starting point of each series is based on data availability; the earliest 
starting date is January 1986. A graphical representation of the trending behaviour of interest 
rates from January 1986 to December 2014 is shown in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: 3-Month LIBOR of major currencies (Jan 1986 to Dec 2014) 
Data Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2015) 
There are two noticeable peaks in the European Union LIBOR, in November 2000 and 
October 2008. The last spike in the LIBOR coincides with the timing of the 2007 GFC. 
Although there is a spike in the UK LIBOR in February 1990 there does not seem to be a 
record of any crisis in the UK at the same time. Similarly, the high values of the Swiss 
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LIBOR from January 1990 to May 1992 are not indicative of a corresponding crisis at around 
that time. High values of the US LIBOR were recorded on October 1987, March 1989, May 
2000, and September 2007 which correspond to the timing of the 1987 Black Monday, 1980-
1989 Savings and Loan Crisis, 2000-2002 Dot-com Crisis, and the 2007-2009 Subprime 
Mortgage Crises respectively. In the case of Japan, rising levels of the Japanese LIBOR until 
it peaks in November 1990 correspond to 1990s Japanese banking crisis. Kindleberger and 
Aliber (2005) state that following the collapse of the Japanese stock and property market, 
Japanese banks caused large financial losses that rendered banks insolvent and at the mercy 
of the Japanese government as a lender of the last resort. Furthermore, delayed intervention 
by the government to mitigate the crisis may have nurtured increased angst among foreign 
banks evaluating creditworthiness of Japanese banks. 
An examination of the LIBORs of the five countries in Figure 7.1 suggests that the LIBOR 
provide useful information for predicting the incidence and timing of financial crises. In 
practice however, a LIBOR spread (instead of the LIBOR) is used to assess the credit-
worthiness of banks borrowing funds. Two LIBOR spreads are commonly used to gauge the 
risk of default; these are the use of the LIBOR- OIS (Overnight Indexed Swap) spread and 
the TED (a LIBOR to treasury bill) spread especially after the 2007 to 2009 Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). Section 7.2.3 explores the performance of the two LIBOR spreads in the five 
countries. 
 
7.2.3 LIBOR-OIS and TED spreads 
The LIBOR-OIS spread is a calculated by taking the difference between the LIBOR and the 
OIS rate
46
 of the same maturity. The former United States (US) Federal Reserve chairman 
Alan Greenspan states that the “LIBOR-OIS remains a barometer of fears of bank 
                                                 
46
 The FED reports the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate as the Effective Federal Funds Rate. 
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insolvency” such that rising levels of uncertainty in the financial market are mirrored by 
rising levels of the LIBOR-OIS spread (Thornton, 2009). Based on this definition it would 
seem that the LIBOR-OIS spread is a measure of the prevailing interbank lending sentiments. 
However, it should be noted that large increases in the LIBOR-OIS spreads were reported 
after the GFC had begun to unfold. Seemingly, not all LIBOR-spreads are sufficient 
measures for risk of default. Upon examining LIBOR-OIS spreads of different maturities (1, 
3, and 6 month), Thornton (2009) suggests that the 3 and 6 month spreads provide better 
estimates of prevailing ‘market perceptions’ about the health of the banking sector than the 1-
month spread. Gefang, Koop, and Potter (2011) hold a somewhat opposing view that unique 
information can be obtained from LIBOR spreads of different maturities. The one and three 
month LIBOR-OIS spreads were found to be good indicators of rising liquidity risk while the 
12-month LIBOR-OIS could help to gauge credit and liquidity risk. An interesting finding of 
a study by Hammoudeh, Chen, and Yuan (2011) was that the TED spread played the same 
role as the 12-month LIBOR-OIS spread; sufficiently gauging liquidity and credit risk even 
in times when information asymmetry seems to have increased in financial markets. Because 
the TED and 12-month LIBOR-OIS are considered similar indicators of distress, this study 
focuses on the estimation of the 3-month LIBOR-OIS spreads and the 3-month TED spread. 
Further, instead of using the daily frequency that is used in some studies (Hammoudeh et al., 
2011; Olson, Miller, & Wohar, 2012), this study uses monthly spreads; this is because the 
ultimate aim of this study is to develop a financial stress index of monthly frequency.  
The TED spread was originally defined as the difference between the Eurodollar interest rate 
(ED) and the Treasury bills interest rate (T) of a country. However, recent studies define the 
TED spread as the difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the 
rate on treasury bills (Hammoudeh, Chen & Yuan, 2011; Lee, Shrestha & Welch, 2007). The 
latter definition is more common in recent studies and is employed in this study. Hammoudeh 
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et al. (2011) states that rising TED spreads are an indication that banks are unwilling to lend 
to each other for fear of default loss. Moreover, the same authors hold that the TED spread 
performs better as a warning indicator as compared to the LIBOR-OIS spread. The reason for 
this argument is that the LIBOR-OIS spreads remained narrow even in periods when it was 
evident in late 2007 that the GFC had begun to wreak havoc on the American financial 
system. TED spreads tend to widen in the lead up to a financial crisis. The widening in the 
TED spread is partially due to decreasing confidence in the financial markets and decreasing 
yields on the treasury bills during the crisis period (Lashgari, 2000).  
This study shall now explore the performance of the two LIBOR spreads during periods of 
financial crisis. Data for the 3-month LIBOR was obtained for five countries from the Saint 
Louis Federal Reserve website; these countries are Japan, the US, the UK, Switzerland, and 
the European Union (EU). Data for the OIS rates were sourced from various websites as 
follows. The Japanese OIS is the Tokyo Overnight Average Rate (TONAR) as reported on 
the Bank of Japan website. The US OIS is the effective federal funds rate as reported on the 
Saint Louis Federal Reserve website. The UK OIS is the Sterling Overnight Index Average 
(SONIA) as reported on the Bank of England website. The Switzerland OIS is available from 
the Swiss National Bank and is the Swiss Average Rate Overnight (SARON) (formerly 
referred to as the repo overnight index). The EU OIS is the Euro Overnight Index Average 
(EONIA) which was sourced from the European central bank website. Figure 7.2 shows the 
LIBOR OIS spread for the five main currencies. Overall, there appears to be a noticeable 
spike in the spreads that corresponds to the timing of the 2007-2009 GFC. Notably, the 
Japanese LIBOR-OIS spread is higher in the 1990s which corresponds to the 1990s banking 
crisis that affected shares and property markets.  
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Figure 7.2: LIBOR-OIS Spread for Major Currencies (Jan/86 to Dec/14)  
Data Sources: Authors calculation based on data from Bank of England (2015); Bank of Japan (2015); European 
Central Bank (2015); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2015); Swiss National Bank (2015) 
This discussion now turns to the estimation of the TED spreads. In the case of the US the 
reported TED spread was sourced from the St Louis Federal Reserve. Data for the treasury 
bills rates was sourced from different sources, in order to estimate the other TED spreads, as 
follows. The 3-month Japanese Treasury bill rates were obtained for the St Louis Federal 
Reserve; data was available from April 1955 onwards. The UK Treasury bill rate is the 
average monthly rate of discount on 3-month Treasury bills in Pound Sterling as reported by 
the Bank of England; data was available from January 1975 onwards. In the case of Europe, 
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the 3-month Treasury bill rate for the EU is the Short Term European Paper yields (STEP) of 
32 to 91 maturity days; yields are available from the European Central bank from April 2007 
onwards. The Swiss 3-month Treasury bill rate is the yield on federal money market debt 
register claims for 3 months; the Swiss National Banks published data online from January 
1992 onwards and there are some series breaks especially in 1992 to 1993. The graphical 
representation of the Treasury bill yields for Japan, the UK, Switzerland, and the EU are 
shown in Figure 7.3.  
 
 Figure 7.3: Treasury bill rates for all countries (Jan/86 to Dec/14)  
Data Sources: Bank of England (2015); Bank of Japan (2015); European Central Bank (2015); Swiss National Bank (2015) 
TED spreads were estimated based on the availability of data. For example in the case of the 
EU, the TED spread is estimated from 2007 onwards since there is no data available for the 
STEP before October 2007. The estimated TED spreads for all countries is shown in Figure 
163 
 
7.4.
47
 The TED spreads follow a similar trend with the noticeable spikes in the spreads at the 
timing of the GFC. Since most spreads seem to signal the GFC, the subsequent discussion 
focuses on the GFC. 
   
    
 
Figure 7.4: TED spreads for all countries (January 1986 to December 2014) 
Data Sources: Bank of England (2015); Bank of Japan (2015); European Central Bank (2015); Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis (2015); Swiss National Bank (2015) 
Figure 7.5 shows an example of the trending of the LIBOR-OIS and TED spreads of the US 
during the GFC. The LIBOR-OIS spread is calculated by taking the difference between the 3-
                                                 
47
 This study estimated three out of the five spreads since data for the other countries treasury bills was not 
readily available.   
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month LIBOR and the OIS
48
 in US dollars. The TED spread is a monthly estimate as reported 
by Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) and is the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-
month Treasury bill rate expressed in US dollars. As expected, both spreads report the highest 
values when the crisis was at its worst in October 2008; after a large investment bank, 
(Lehman brothers) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. In the US, 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy occurs when a company files for bankruptcy
49
 based on the criteria 
outlined in the eleventh chapter of the bankruptcy code. It is interesting to note that leading 
credit rating agencies may have played a role in the market panic that ensued. Usually, credit 
rating agencies are supposed to provide ratings of securities to investors so that the investors 
can adequately assess the risk before making an investment. The general idea is that 
securities with lower risk of default receive lower ratings and vice versa, thereby allowing 
investors that are risk averse to select investments with high ratings as they believe that these 
investments would have lower risk of default. In theory this sounds good however in practice 
the credit rating agencies failed to provide ratings that reflected the true riskiness of an 
investment. For example, Ivry, Pittman, and Harper (2009) claim that Standard & Poor's, 
Moody's Investors Service, and Fitch Ratings, gave commercial papers issued by Lehman the 
highest ratings in the lead up to the bankruptcy announcement. These ratings caused investors 
to operate under the illusion that securities issued by Lehman were very safe and the 
bankruptcy announcement must have come as a shock. The announcement also came as a 
shock to global investors and the lenders adjusted the LIBOR upwards to reflect the increased 
riskiness of investment in US financial institutions during the GFC.  
 
                                                 
48
 The OIS rate is reported as the effective federal funds rate. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2015) defines 
the federal funds rate as “…the interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds (balances held 
at Federal Reserve Banks) with each other overnight.” 
49
 Once the company has filed for a petition with the bankruptcy court, it is classified as a Chapter 11 debtor 
which is allowed to reorganize the structure of their assets and liabilities in order to continue as a going 
concern and facilitate payment of its creditors over time (Administrative Office of the US Courts, 2015).   
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Figure 7.5: 3-Month LIBOR-OIS and TED for US (January 1986-December 2014) 
Data Source: FRED (2015) 50 
 
7.2.4 Is the LIBOR relevant for the Australian financial market? 
The LIBOR and LIBOR spreads appear to be suitable measures for predicting banking stress 
or crisis. However, the issue of concern is, should the LIBOR be used as a barometer of the 
health of the Australian banking sector? A graphical representation of the Australian LIBOR 
in Figure 7.6 shows the trend of the 3-month LIBOR from January 1989 to May 2013. The 
highest levels of the LIBOR are observed in June to September 1989. These peaks in the 
LIBOR may be attributed to the deregulating the banking industry in the 1980s.  
 
                                                 
50
 Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: TED Spread; 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TEDRATE; accessed May 11, 2015. 
 Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: 3-Month London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) based on US Dollar; ICE Benchmark Administration Limited; 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USD3MTD156N;accessed May 9, 2015. 
 Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Effective Federal 
Funds Rate; https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FEDFUNDS; accessed May 11, 2015. 
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Figure 7.6: 3-Month Australian LIBOR (January 1989 to May 2013) 
Data Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2015)
51
 
7.2.4.1 The Wheatley Review of the Australian LIBOR 
Based on the presented facts, one may be convinced that the LIBOR is a suitable barometer 
for Australian banking health. This was the prevailing school of thought until the release of 
the 2012 Wheatley report that suggested among other things that the Australian LIBOR was 
based on inadequate trade data making it over reliant on estimation techniques and vulnerable 
to manipulation (and probably was manipulated). So sceptical was Wheatley (2012) of the 
reliability of the reported LIBOR that he suggested that the LIBOR for the Australian be 
scrapped altogether; which is was since May 2013. Following the release of report it was 
discovered that Barclays bank was guilty of manipulating the LIBOR in the UK and USA 
markets (Chartered Financial Analyst Institute, 2012). In counterpoint, some steps have been 
taken to restore confidence in the LIBOR including the change of management in 2012 from 
British Banks Authority (BBA) to a more objective administrator Intercontinental Exchange 
                                                 
51
  Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: 3-Month London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), based on Australian Dollar; ICE Benchmark Administration Limited; 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AUD3MTD156N; accessed May 9, 2014. 
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Group (ICE) (Intercontinental Exchange, 2017b). However, until the new administrator (ICE 
LIBOR) establishes a credible record of accomplishment, this research will err on the side of 
caution and refrain from using the LIBOR spreads in the Australian financial stress index. 
Nonetheless, the importance of the LIBOR may still prove useful in other countries where no 
problems where highlighted in the Wheatley Review.  
 
7.2.5 What is the way forward for evaluating banking risk in Australia?  
Despite the popularity of the LIBOR in other countries, it does not seem to be a suitable 
measure for measuring gauging risk in the Australian sector. Nevertheless, this study uses 
LIBOR spreads as a starting point for developing alternative risk spreads. More precisely, 
past movements in the LIBOR spreads are viewed as a guideline on how proxy spreads 
should trend during periods of financial stress or crises. The main issue of concern is to 
correct for the misstatement of LIBOR by choosing a more representative rate that 
realistically represents sentiments among Australian banks that is more importantly less 
vulnerable the manipulation highlighted in the Wheatley report. Therefore, this study shall 
proceed to use the LIBOR as a reference for developing alternative spreads and compare the 
movements in other spreads with movements in the LIBOR spreads. This was done in four 
steps. First, the LIBOR and TED spreads for Australia were estimated using the data from 
January 1986 to May 2013. Second, the LIBOR component of the LIBOR-OIS and TED 
spread was substituted with other proxy variables. Third, pairwise correlation coefficients of 
the proxy series and the LIBOR spreads were estimated. Last, the proxy series with the 
highest correlation coefficients are selected for inclusion in the final stress index. The 
following section provides a detailed discussion of how the four steps were implemented. 
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7.2.6 Alternatives to the LIBOR 
After the LIBOR scandal was highlighted in the Wheatley report, various stakeholders sought 
suitable substitutes for the LIBOR. Chartered Financial Analyst Institute (2012) published a 
survey report that explored possible alternatives to the use of the LIBOR. Majority of the 
survey responses are from CFA Institute charter holders at the management or analyst level. 
39 and 32 percent of the respondents from the Asia Pacific region recommend the use of 
other market-based interest rates and overnight indexed swap rates respectively. These were 
the most preferred options. Examples of other market-based interest rates include yields on 
treasury bills, certificates of deposit, and commercial papers. In the case of Australia, Bank 
Bill Swap (BBSW) rate that is estimated and reported by the Australia Financial Markets 
Association (AFMA) is widely accepted as the best proxy for the LIBOR. Unfortunately, the 
historical data for the BBSW rates are only provided to AFMA subscribers. Consequently, 
this study explores the use of other proxy rates in lieu of the BBSW rate. Accordingly, the 
next phase of this study explores the use of alternative interest rates as proxies of the LIBOR 
in the estimation of TED and LIBOR-OIS spread. The sections that follow discuss proxies for 
the LIBOR spreads using the four-step procedure outlined in Section 7.2.5. 
7.2.6.1 Proxy for the LIBOR in the TED spread 
This section is devoted to finding a suitable alternative measure of the LIBOR for estimating 
the TED spread. First, the Australian TED spread is estimated using the 3-month LIBOR in 
Australian dollars and 90-day bank accepted bill (BAB) to represent the Treasury bill rate in 
Australia. The 90-day BAB yield is subtracted from the 3-month LIBOR in order to arrive at 
the TED spread. In order to estimate the proxy TED spread, this study considered the use of 
the Treasury note yields and the interbank overnight cash rate. The Treasury note yields were 
considered due to the recommendations of the CFA institute report. However, due to 
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insufficient data, the use of the treasury notes was deemed insufficient. Specifically, the RBA 
only reports the 3-month treasury notes yields from January 1995 to April 2002 and March 
2009 to May 2013. This series gap coincides with the timing of the GFC and makes it 
impossible to examine the performance of the Treasury note yields as a proxy. The interbank 
overnight cash (IOC) rate was selected due the notion that it would capture the interbank 
lending preferences that would be reflected in the trade of BBSW. This study did not find 
another variable that is closely linked to interbank trades. In the case of the IOC rate, there is 
sufficient data ranging from May 1976 onwards. Therefore, the proxy variable was estimated 
by taking the difference between the IOC cash rate and the 3-month BAB. Figure 7.7 shows 
the graph of the estimated TED spread and the proxy TED or IOC-BAB spread. The graph 
shows that the proxy TED does not seem to track movements in the TED spread well. The 
data for the two series was used to calculate the correlation coefficient. The calculated 
spearman correlation coefficient is only 0.296 which indicates a weak positive linear 
relationship. Due to the poor performance of the proxy TED variable, this study did not 
utilise this variable in the final stress index. 
   
Figure 7.7: The Australian TED & Proxy TED spread (Jan/86 to Dec/14) 
 
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
PROXY_TED TED_AUS
170 
 
7.2.6.2 Proxy for the LIBOR in the LIBOR-OIS spread 
This subsection is devoted to finding a suitable alternative measure of the LIBOR for 
estimating the LIBOR-OIS spread. The 3-month LIBOR-OIS spread is the difference 
between the 3-month LIBOR and 3-month OIS rate. It is only possible to estimate the spreads 
from 2001 since the data for the OIS is only available from July 2001 onwards. The proxy 
LIBOR-OIS variable is the IOC-OIS spread, which was estimated by taking the difference 
between the IOC and the 3 month OIS. Figure 7.8 shows the resultant LIBOR-OIS and its 
proxy. The correlation coefficient for the LIBOR-OIS and the IOC-OIS spreads was 
calculated and found to be equal to 0.780, which is indicative of a strong positive linear 
correlation. Owing to the strong relationship between the two variables, this study opted in 
favour of including this proxy variable in the final financial stress index. 
 
Figure 7.8: The Australian LIBOR-OIS & Proxy LIBOR-OIS (Jan/86 to Dec/14) 
 
7.3 Inverted CMAX Australian Property Index 
Several studies suggest that the property bubbles precede financial crises such that rising 
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uses the S&P/ ASX 200 Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) composite 
index to monitor the overall changes in the Australian property prices. This index is a 
subindex of the S&P/ASX 200 and it comprises of companies that earn rental income or own 
properties. A rise in the property prices and income from the rented properties would be 
accompanied by a corresponding rise in the A-REITs. Consequently, a rapid rise in the A-
REITs could signal that a property bubble is developing and the progressive rise of property 
prices to unsustainable levels could potentially lead to a financial crisis once the bubble 
bursts (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005). The contemporaneous presence of moral hazard, rising 
prices and rising mortgage debt would make a country more vulnerable or likely to suffer a 
financial crisis that is similar to the 2007-09 GFC.  
The S&P/ASX 200 A-REIT index was used to estimate the 12-month inverted S&P/ASX 200 
A-REIT property index. Figure 7.9 shows the A-REIT index and the estimated inverted 
property A-REIT index. As expected there is a noticeable spike in the CMAX index in March 
2009 that corresponds to the timing of the GFC. Moreover, the inverted CMAX index 
adequately captures a month of the highest levels of stress (March 2009) as identified by 
(Sykes, 2010). Consequently, this variable is included in the final stress index. 
 
Figure 7.9: Australian Normal and Inverted A-REIT Property Index (Dec/79 to Dec/14) 
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7.4  Inverted CMAX Australian Mining Index  
7.4.1 The Importance of Mining to Australia 
This study would not be complete without the mention of a mining variable. Mining is the 
back bone of the Australian economy with mineral resources dominating the exported goods 
from Australia. Because Australia is primarily a resource-based economy, the extraction of 
mineral resources for export is a key source of export revenue and employment. For example, 
the 2016 Trade at a Glance report analysed the data for the top exports from the Australian 
economy. Mined resources and fuels made up to 42.2 percent
52
 of the total exports from 
Australia with iron, coal, natural gas, gold, aluminium, copper, coke, uranium, and various 
metallic ores being ranked among the top 20 export earners for Australia. Most recently 
available data shows that mined resources and fuels ranked highly in the list of Australian 
exports. For example in 2015, iron ore and concentrates, coal and natural gas ranked first, 
second, and fourth, respectively, out of the top 20 exported goods and services for that year. 
Moreover these top three mineral exports earned Australia export revenue of 102,580 
Australian dollars out of the total export revenue of 315,748 Australian dollars (DFAT, 
2016b). Given the major role that mining plays in the Australian economy, it is expected that 
during a resource boom, Australia would enjoy an increase in the production and sale of 
mineral products and a corresponding increase in revenue from exports to other countries. 
Conversely, a significant decline in the demand of mineral exports could translate to a 
decrease in export revenue which could prove harmful to the Australian economy.  
The Australian mining sector has benefitted from a Chinese property boom and bubble in 
recent years. However, reports of a bursting property bubble in the last quarter of 2014 due to 
declining demand for Australia’s key exports and an economic slowdown in the Chinese 
economy has economists and analysts worried for all the right reasons. Firstly, China is 
                                                 
52
 Mined resources and fuels generated of A$ 133,285 out of A$ 315,748 of the total export revenue from goods 
and services.  
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Australia’s leading bilateral trader. For example, China accounted for approximately $29.4 
billion, $28.5 billion, and $47.4
53
 billion dollars in net exports in, respectively, 2011, 2012 
and 2013 (DFAT, 2012, 2013, 2014). Secondly, Australia’s top three mineral and fuel exports 
to all economies are iron ore and coal. Incidentally, two of the three exports are the leading 
exports to China. For example in 2013, Australia’s top three exports consisted of iron ores 
and concentrates, coal and natural gas worth $69,494 million, $39,805 million, and $14,602 
million, respectively. The top three exports to China consisted of iron ores and concentrates 
($52,654 million), coal ($9082 million), and gold ($8074 million). In terms of Australia’s 
leading exports, China accounted for about 75.76 percent of all iron ore exports and 22.81 
percent of all coal exports (DFAT, 2015b). These figures indicate that the Australian 
economy is heavily reliant on the Chinese economy and that a significant decline in demand 
for mineral exports such as iron ore could affect Australia negatively. Large declines in the 
export of minerals and fuels would be indicative of stress in the Australian mining sector 
which is an issue of concern to policy makers. Unfortunately, there are already signs that the 
slowing economic growth in China is being mirrored by a declining demand for iron ore.  
An examination of historical trends in iron ore prices is used to illustrate the recent decline in 
prices. Historical data of iron ore prices was obtained from the Market Index website. 
Reported price quotes are based on data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The monthly quotes for iron ore prices are estimated by taking the average of the spot price 
of iron ore that are traded at the Tianjin port in China and the average price is quoted in US 
dollars per tonne of iron ore (Market Index, 2017). The historical trend in the iron ore prices 
from January 1980 to December 2016 is shown in Figure 7.10. Percentage changes in iron 
ore prices were also estimated. A graphical representation of the percentage changes in iron 
ore prices from a month ago for the same period is provided in Figure 7.11.  
                                                 
53
 The net exports value is estimated as the difference between exported and imported goods (e.g., in 2013, 
exports and imports were valued at $94,709 million and $47,250 million, respectively; DFAT, 2015b).  
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Figure 7.10: Spot Iron Ore Price in USD/tonne (Jan/80 to Dec/16) 
Source: Market Index (2017) 
 
Figure 7.11: Percentage Change in Iron Ore Price from prior month (Jan/80 to Dec/16) 
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ore especially over the last four years until December 2016. Most notably, the iron ore price 
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frequent decline in the price of iron ore is more noticeable when the percentage changes in 
spot prices for the iron ore are examined. An examination of Figure 7.11 reveals larger than 
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ore in the month of March 2009 compared to the spot price in February of the same year. 
Recent declines in the prices of the iron ore are indicative of stress in the iron ore mining 
industry. Signs of the iron ore bubble fading were seen as early as January 2014, when iron 
ore prices begun to decline as shown in figure 7.10. Hutchens (2014) estimated a fall in 
revenue from iron ore to the tune of between 20 and 25 billion Australian dollars if prices 
continued to decline from 2014 onwards which they did. In particular, the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (2015b) found that in the span of 12 months to February 2015 spot iron ore prices 
had almost halved and led to a significant decline in the export revenue for Australia. The 
large declines in iron ore prices is in part due to the decreasing demand for iron ore and 
concentrates in the Chinese markets (Hutchens, 2014). Some negative effects of the falling 
demand for iron ore are higher than normal job cuts in the mining sector and losses in the 
value of Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton shares; these are major mining companies that trade on 
the Australian Securities Exchange (Keane, 2015). Garnaut (2015) suggests that the decline 
in iron ore prices is bound to continue in the near future especially because the best years of 
the Chinese resource boom that lasted for seven years, ended in 2014. It would, therefore, be 
prudent for Australia to seek out alternative buyers of iron ore in the Southeast Asia region.  
The decline in iron ore prices is of particular concern; however, what would be more 
concerning would be an overall decline in the demand for all mined products that Australia 
produces. Consequently, this discussion will now consider the use of an aggregate measure to 
gauge the overall trend of prices and the level of financial stress in the Australian mining 
sector. The S&P/ASX 300 metals and mining index was found to be a suitable aggregate 
measure for tracking the aggregate changes in prices of mined resources and fuels. In the 
subsection that follows this study explored how the metals and mining index could be used to 
construct a variable that gauges the level of stress in the Australian mining sector. 
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7.4.2 A Stress Indicator for the Australian Mining Sector 
This subsection uses information from the S&P/ASX 300 metals and mining index (XMM) to 
construct a stress indicator for the Australian mining sector. The XMM is a subindex of the 
S&P/ASX 300 that consists of 300 Australian publicly listed companies. It tracks movements 
in the trading prices of companies that mine and sell gold, aluminium, steel and other 
precious or diversified metals or minerals. Moreover, the XMM provides a valuable tool for 
monitoring the health and performance of mining sector companies in a timely manner, 
thereby making it a suitable tool for investor portfolio management (Australian Securities 
Exchange, 2010). This study obtained the data for the XMM in the following manner. Daily 
end-of-day values of the index were obtained from SIRCA’s Thomson Reuters Tick History 
database. Data is available from April 2000 onwards; this study uses data until July 2017. 
This study obtained data until July 2017 in order to check the performance of the estimated 
stress variable in recent periods of stress in the Australian mining sector. However, only data 
from April 2000 to December 2014 will be used in the construction of the aggregate stress 
index. Daily data was transformed to monthly data by considering the closing price of the last 
trading day of each month; the resulting series is shown in Figure 7.12. 
 
Figure 7.12: S&P/ ASX 300 Metals & Mining Index (Mar/00 to Jul/17) 
Source: SIRCA (2015) 
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An inspection of Figure 7.12 reveals a general downward trend in the prices of mined 
resources as indicated by the XMM from March 2011 to January 2016 when the reported 
value of the XMM was 5174 and 1727 respectively. Thereafter, the prices of mined resources 
and fuels appear to be on the rebound. The XMM was used to construct an inverted CMAX 
measure was estimated for the Australian mining industry. A two year moving window was 
used to estimate this CMAX measure. Details of the CMAX estimation procedure are 
provided in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Figures 7.13 shows the inverted CMAX index for the 
Australian mining sector. Figure 7.14 provides a standardised version of the CMAX index 
presented in Figure 7.13. Values of the inverted CMAX measure in Figure 7.14 that are more 
than two standard deviations above the mean of the variable are indicative of stressful periods 
in the Australian mining sector. Stressful periods in the mining sector are contained in the 
unshaded region of Figure 7.14. There are three stressful periods that were identified. The 
first period was from October 2008 to March 2009 when the values of the inverted CMAX 
variable were 2.69 and 2.14 respectively. The second stressful period is probably the shortest 
and occurred in June 2013 as indicated by variable measure of 2.21. The third and most 
recent period of stress lasted from November 2015 to February 2016 when the index recorded 
values of 2.41 and 2.40 respectively. It is important to note that the recent declines in the iron 
ore prices are also reflected in the constructed stress variable via the spike in February 2016. 
This confirms the hypothesis set out by this study, in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, that significant 
decline in exports from the mining sector over a prolonged period could actually contribute to 
increased vulnerability to financial stress within the Australian economy. Moreover, while 
the first period of stress coincides with the timing of the 2007-2009 GFC, the other two 
periods do not coincide with the timing any financial crisis. Therefore, it can be argued that 
the inverted CMAX metals and mining variable provides some insights into the level of 
financial stress in the Australian mining sector that are not readily apparent when examining 
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trends in the Australian equity markets. For this reason the inclusion of this variable in the 
composite index for stress in Australia is justified. 
 
Figure 7.13: Inverse 24-month CMAX for S&P/ASX 300 Metals & Mining Index 
(Mar/00 to Jul/17) 
 
 
Figure 7.14: Standardised 24-month Inverse CMAX for S&P/ASX 300 Metals and 
Mining Index (March 2000 to July 2017) 
 
 
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
-1
0
1
2
3
4
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
179 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the feasibility of using the LIBOR and LIBOR spreads as barometers 
of financial stress. The LIBOR was found to be an unsuitable measure for stress. Among 
many issues, in Australia, it could easily be manipulated as highlighted by Wheatley (2012). 
As a result of the Wheatley report (2012), the Australian LIBOR was discontinued and there 
is insufficient data to continue to use it as a future stress indicator for Australia. Alternative 
measures for LIBOR spreads were proposed in this study, with the most feasible being the 
IOC-OIS spread. Unfortunately, the use of this proxy variable has its limitations. In 
particular, while the proxy variable for the LIBOR-OIS spread performs relatively well, some 
movements in the LIBOR-OIS spread cannot be explained by the IOC-OIS spread. 
Consequently, the proxy variable may introduce a margin of error in estimation that would 
not have been present had better proxies such as the BBSW been used, but the data for the 
BBSW is not readily available. This chapter also estimated an inverted CMAX property 
index and an inverted CMAX mining index which shall be used in the final stress index to 
gauge the level of stress in the Australian property and mining market respectively. Overall, 
this chapter has proposed useful indicators for stress that can gauge the level of stress in 
different sectors of the Australian economy that have not been considered in other studies. 
This study has to this point focussed on using Australian variables as early indicators of 
financial stress. Those variables measure economic or financial attributes of the Australian 
financial sector in order to gauge Australia’s potential for financial crisis in the near future. It 
would be interesting to consider if foreign-based variables can provide some insight into the 
potential for financial stress in the Australian markets or offer predictions in future market 
movements in Australia. This is one of the motivations for the inclusion of following chapter 
in this thesis. Chapter 8 of this study is dedicated to exploring whether it is viable to use 
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foreign country-based variables as early indicators of stress in the Australian financial 
markets. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
FOREIGN-BASED INDICATORS OF FINANCIAL STRESS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents foreign-based variables that can be used as indicators of financial stress 
in Australia. For purposes of this study, a foreign-based variable is defined as an economic or 
financial variable, of countries other than Australia, which is deemed relevant for explaining 
potential for distress in the Australian economy. This chapter performs exploratory empirical 
analysis in order to identify foreign variables that are suitable for measuring stress in 
Australian equity markets. Based on the outcome of the exploratory analysis, a decision was 
made to either omit or include a variable in the final composite stress index. The subsequent 
sections and subsections of this chapter are organised as follows. Section 8.2 highlights the 
important role that linkages can play in the transmission of financial stress. Here a brief 
overview of the Australian economy and the importance of trade with Australia’s top four 
bilateral traders are also provided. Section 8.3 performs an empirical analysis in order to 
identify the foreign-based variables that were suited for gauging the potential for financial 
stress in Australian equity market in Section 8.3. The analysis in this section mainly focuses 
on examining the relationship between returns and trading volume for major composite stock 
indexes of Australia and four countries with key bilateral trade links with Australia. 
Therefore, the subsections of Section 8.3 are organised as follows. The data selection 
procedure and research methods used in this study are outlined in Subsections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 
respectively. The empirical analysis and presentation of results are contained in Subsection 
8.3.3 of this chapter. The implications of the findings to this study are highlighted and 
discussed in Subsection 8.3.4. Based on the findings of the empirical analysis, this study 
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proposed the use of two foreign-based variables, which are the inverted CMAX measures for 
the lagged Hang Seng and the S&P 500 indexes in Section 8.4. Both variables were 
subsequently included in the composite index for Australian financial stress. Section 8.5 
contains the chapter summary while Section 8.6 concludes this chapter.  
 
8.2 Linkages as Conduits for Financial Stress 
The recent GFC has enhanced interest among financial researchers on the factors that lead to 
the spread of financial crisis from one country to another and on finding appropriate policy 
stances that mitigate such occurrences. There are diverging views as to why and how 
financial crises spread and why some countries are more vulnerable to financial contagion, 
whereas, others appear to be more immune to financial difficulties experienced by 
neighbouring countries. Academics often disagree as to whether cross-border transmissions 
of a crisis arise from financial links, trade links or a combination of both. Here are some 
explanations offered by scholars on financial contagion and possible channels of transmission 
of stress or crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) define contagion as the process by which 
“financial difficulties spread from one economy to another in the same region and beyond” 
via trade and financial linkages (p. 51). The aforementioned authors posit that in addition to 
trade links, financial links that exist between banks or financial markets can also help explain 
channels of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest that contagion occurs when a 
financial shock results in a significant increase in the cross-market linkages and co-movement 
in the countries’ financial markets. Glick and Rose (1999) assert that currency crises are often 
experienced by countries within the same geographical area and spread via bilateral trade 
links. However, being in close proximity to another country does not guarantee that a country 
with suffer from contagion. For instance, Park and Song (2001) confirm the importance of 
trade links but stresses that herding behaviour, speculative attacks among investors and 
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common macroeconomic practices contributed to the contagion of the 1997 Asian Crisis. It is 
difficult to determine if contagion experienced at the regional level is due mostly to financial 
or to trade links, because countries tend to concurrently establish regional trade agreements 
and the interbank linkages needed to facilitate the associated trade (Caramazza, Ricci, & 
Salgado, 2004). In fact, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that it is difficult to directly 
measure how the various linkages contribute to the development as well as the propagation of 
crises across borders.  
Overall it appears that most researchers agree that linkages, whether trade or financial, play a 
role in the transmission of financial crisis. The linkages act as a conduit for the cross-border 
or global transmission of financial stress or crisis. Consequently, it is important for policy 
makers to consider the role that either or both financial and trade links play in the 
development and spread of financial crises. Further, empirical studies on linkages may help 
develop early warning indicators to facilitate timely intervention to forestall or ameliorate 
future crises. The empirical exercises conducted in this thesis focus on the role that inter-
country linkages with key bilateral traders may play in the spread of financial crises is of 
particular interest.  
This study focuses on the notion that trade and financial linkages can be used to explain why 
and how financial crises spread from one country to another. This research hypothesises that 
a country is more likely to experience contagion of a crisis arising in a country with which it 
has extensive trade links and that an examination of financial links will reveal the channels of 
crisis transmission (Mukulu, Hettihewa, & Wright, 2014). The notion is that a financial crisis 
will cause a decline in regional and global trade especially in the case of the country or 
countries that are the epicentre of the crisis. Moreover, during a financial crisis it is expected 
that the panic responses to a shock/s in the financial system will reverberate through the 
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financial markets. As investors become aware of the unfolding crisis, panic selling of 
financial assets may ensue. This study examines movements in the equity markets of 
Australia and four of its key bilateral trading partners in order to determine whether 
Australia’s key trading relationships influence or can help anticipate movements in its equity 
market and/or the equity markets of its trading partners. The section that follows provides a 
brief overview of the Australian economy and the existing trade links.  
 
 
8.2.1 The Australian Economy and Trade links 
Australia is an open economy that engages in trade agreements based on shared political and 
economic interests. Australia has not had a dominant trading partner over the past 150 years; 
that role has rotated from the UK, to the USA, to (at present) China. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 2015c) asserts that Australia’s top four bi-lateral trading 
partners in 2015 were (in order of importance) China, Japan, the US, and the republic of 
Korea. Mining plays an important role in Australia’s economy with minerals being 
Australia’s key export. The most recently available data shows that in 2014 Australia 
exported goods worth 326.9 billion dollars with 157.3 billion dollars, almost half all exports 
consisting of mineral and fuel products. In 2014 Australia’s leading bilateral trader China 
imported $89,998 million of goods of which about 80 percent ($71,817 million) consisted 
mainly of mineral and fuel resources
54
. The top three exports to China are iron ore and 
concentrates, coal, and gold, in that order. Imports from China mainly consisted of tele-
communication products, computers, and furniture, which accounted for 12,866 million 
dollars. Japan, Australia’s second bilateral trader, imported goods worth 48,193 million 
dollars in 2014 of which mineral and fuel products such as coal, iron ore, copper, and 
aluminium comprised of almost half (23,991 out of 48193 million dollars) of all imports. 
                                                 
54
 DFAT (2015b) states that China imported iron, coal, gold, other ores, copper ores and copper worth $50,582 
million, $8,326 million, $7,023 million, $2,074 million, $2,056 million, and $1,756 million, respectively. 
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Exports from Japan mainly consisted of cars and refined petroleum worth 9,802 million 
dollars (DFAT, 2015b). Collaborations on security matters include the 2007 Joint Declaration 
on Security Co-operation (ABS, 2012). The US, ranks third as a bilateral trading partner, has 
had a free trade agreement with Australia since 2005-the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (AUSFTA). Unlike other countries that mainly import minerals, US primarily 
imports agricultural products such as beef and alcoholic beverages. In 2014, the only mineral 
resource exported was zinc worth 200 million dollars; this is barely two percent
55
 of the total 
exports to the US. A decline in the demand for mineral products by the US would have the 
least impact on the Australian mining industry. The republic of Korea was ranked as 
Australia’s fourth trading partner in 2014, with bilateral trade in goods and services 
amounting to approximately 34.6 and 30.2 billion dollars respectively. Exports to Korea are 
primarily iron ore and coal (worth $10,325 million) (DFAT, 2015b). 
Given the considerable degree of trade between Australia and its top four bilateral traders, 
this study examines whether the existing trade links can help to explain the interdependence 
in stock market movements among these five countries (Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and 
the USA). Increased economic integration of markets is often accompanied by increased 
financial market integration and correlation in the stock market prices. Paramati, Roca, and 
Gupta (2016) used returns on composite stock indexes to explore the impact of bilateral trade 
between Australia and ten Asian countries. This study found no significant link between 
bilateral trade and the correlations of returns of the Australian and Chinese equity markets. 
However, bilateral trade links seems to explain the correlation between the Australian equity 
markets and its three key bilateral traders (Japan, South Korea, and Singapore).
56
 The mixed 
                                                 
55
 According to DFAT (2015b), zinc ore worth 200 million dollars was exported to the US and the total revenue 
from goods exported to the US in 2014 was $11,890 million. Therefore, zinc made up approximately (200/ 
11,890) 1.682 percent of all the exports to the American economy. 
56
  Based on recently available data, Singapore is ranked as Australia’s fifth bilateral trader (DFAT, 2016a). The 
author of this thesis considered examining the movements of the Singaporean versus the Australian equity 
markets. Unfortunately, the data for the Singaporean markets was not readily available via the Yahoo finance 
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findings of this study indicate that the relationship between bilateral trade links and the 
correlations between equity markets is far more complex. It seems that the sole examination 
of the returns did not give a comprehensive view of the market dynamics in this case. 
Perhaps, a better understanding of the co-movements in equity markets could have been 
gained if other (or a combination of) factors was considered when examining the relationship 
between economic and financial links. Consequently, the section that follows is dedicated to 
gaining a broader understanding how key bilateral trading relationships can be used to 
explain market movements in the Australian equity market. Specifically, instead of focusing 
on the analysis of the composite index returns alone, this study follow the approach adopted 
by more recent studies by considering volume in addition to returns in order to explain equity 
market movements (Chen, 2012; Tapa & Hussin, 2016; Yadav, Aggarwal, & Khurana, 2015).  
 
8.3 An Examination of Returns-Volume Relationship  
This section focuses on the examining the relationship between closing prices (or returns) of 
assets and the volume of assets traded in an equity market. This study shall now embark on 
the contemporaneous examination of market returns together with volume in different 
countries as this could provide useful insights to policy makers about the market dynamics of 
global markets. The focus of this analysis is to understand how the market dynamics could 
help to explain co-movement in prices in different markets and the potential for propagation 
of shocks to the Australian financial market. The rest of this section discusses the work by 
scholars that have carried out this contemporaneous examination of market returns together 
with volume before embarking on a similar analysis for the Australian case.  
                                                                                                                                                        
website. Daily closing prices were only available from November 1, 2016. Therefore, this study omitted 
Singapore from the empirical analysis.  
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According to Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992), the contemporaneous study of price and 
volume is important as it provides a better understanding of the market and volatility that 
would not have been possible when considering prices or returns alone. These authors 
analysed daily closing values for the American S&P 500 to better understand the price-
volume relationship in the US. Some key findings of this study were that changes in volume 
lagged price changes (returns) and a positive relationship existed between changes in price 
and changes in volume such that large price increases were associated with large increases in 
volume. In regards to investors, Kamath (2008) argues that the consideration of the price and 
volume could help to identify the prevailing market sentiment as either bullish or bearish. 
This information could help investors of different risk preferences and investment goals to 
identify an opportune time to invest. According to Mahajan and Singh (2008), both price and 
volume are important considerations, since each variable gauges different characteristics in 
the stock market. These authors assert that the price-volume relationship may be dependent 
on market efficiency, information asymmetry, market size, and trading restrictions, all of 
which could affect the rate or timing of the flow of information (e.g. given that investors 
trading in the equity markets receive information sequentially, price changes would reflect 
the average knowledge of new information while changes in trading volume would reflect the 
aggregate response of investors to the price change). Mahajan and Singh (2008) found that 
the change in returns led the change in trading volume, which meant that past values of 
returns could help explain the current trading volume of the Indian stock market. At this 
point, it is important to note that it is possible for a ‘feedback mechanism’ to exist between 
returns and volume such that volume leads returns, making volume useful for predicting 
returns. In this case, current changes in volume could help to gauge prevailing investors’ 
expectations and signal possible changes in price (or returns) in the near future. 
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Researchers that have considered the idea that there is a predictive relationship between stock 
returns and trading volume have arrived at two main conclusions. Scholars assert that the 
relationship exists in two main forms; either a unidirectional (one-way) or bidirectional (two-
way) relationship exists between returns and volume. In the former case, only current values 
of stock returns can be used to predict future values of trading volume; current values of 
trading volume have no predictive value for future stock returns. Alternatively, by the same 
token, there are instances where current values of trading volume can be used to forecast 
future stock returns; in this case current values of the stock returns have no predictive value 
for future trading volume. In the latter case, past values of the trading volume can be used to 
explain the current stock returns and vice versa. Here are a few examples of some studies on 
the price-volume relationship. Kamath (2008) explored the relationship between daily returns 
and traded volume in the Chilean stock market over three years from 2003-2006. Linear 
granger causality tests developed by Granger (1969) were used to examine this relationship. 
This author found a positive relationship between returns and the traded volume, whereby 
rising returns were associated with a rise in trading volume and vice versa. Moreover, there 
was a one-way causation from returns to traded volume, no causal relationship was found 
from the trading volume to the returns. This meant that the general rise in the returns was 
associated with increased optimism among investors and consequently more trading (buying 
and selling) of shares on the stock market. Assogbavi, Schell, and Fagnissè (2007) examined 
this relationship using weekly data for the Russian market and similar granger causality tests. 
This study found bidirectional causation existed between returns and traded volume. Mahajan 
and Singh (2008) took a slightly different approach to examining the daily returns on the 
Indian stock market. Instead of just examining the relationship between price and volume, 
these authors also considered the stock volatility in their analysis. Stock market volatility was 
modelled using GARCH models and causality tests were performed on the three variables 
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(stock returns, trading volume, and return volatility). This study revealed unilateral linear 
causality from volume to return and volatility to volume. The flow of causality from volatility 
to volume to returns suggests that market volatility has predictive power and offers relevant 
information when examining the price-volume relationship. Mahajan and Singh (2008) 
suggest that the nature of the relationship among the three variables may be indicative of 
existing market inefficiencies in the Indian market.  
So far, this section has focussed on studies that use linear causality tests to explore the 
relationship between price and volume. Linear causality tests assume that if there is a 
relationship between the two variables that it is a linear one and this assumption forms the 
basis for how the linear causality test is designed. However, if the relationship between the 
two variables is nonlinear then the assumption that there is a linear relationship between the 
two variables is incorrect. As a result, the linear causality test would be an inefficient tool for 
detecting the causal relationship between the two variables, primarily because it assumes a 
linear relationship. Indeed, Hiemstra and Jones (1994) assert that linear causality tests have 
low power in revealing nonlinear causal relationships between two variables. Thus, a better 
approach to testing for causality would be to use a nonlinear causality test if one suspects that 
a nonlinear relationship exists between two variables. In this manner, the test for causality 
would take into account the nonlinear aspect of the relationship when exploring the nature of 
the relationship, whether unidirectional, bidirectional or no causal relationship at all. This is 
why this discussion will soon turn to understanding the notion of nonlinear causality. 
Nevertheless, before doing so it is important at this point to note that because it is not always 
known beforehand whether the relationship between two variables is a linear, reasonably 
approximated by a linear relationship, or must be given as a nonlinear one, a more prudent 
approach to testing for causal relationships would be to examine whether either a linear or a 
nonlinear causal relationship exists between two variables. Accordingly, this study will check 
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for the presence (or absence) of linear or nonlinear causal relationships between two 
variables; this is similar to the approach adopted by several scholars (Baek & Brock, 1992; 
Diks & Panchenko, 2006; Gallant et al., 1992; Lin, Yeh, & Chien, 2013; Pavlidis, Paya, & 
Peel, 2015; Silvapulle & Choi, 1999).  
Much of the work on the nonlinear causality tests is based on a working paper by Pavlidis et 
al. (2015) that explored the uses of a correlation integral and conditional probabilities to 
develop a nonlinear causality test that examines the relationship between two variables; in 
this study the economic variables were money and income. This foundational work suggested 
that the residuals of a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model could be examined to 
reveal the presence (or absence) of a nonlinear relationship. In order to implement this test 
Pavlidis et al. (2015) assume that the two series being examined for causality were mutually 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). This assumption is one of the main 
shortcomings of Baek and Brock’s testing procedure since it leads to power and finite-sample 
size estimation problems as highlighted by Gallant et al. (1992). Gallant et al. (1992) 
consequently developed a modified version of Baek and Brock’s test for nonlinear causality 
and found that the modified test revealed a bidirectional nonlinear relationship between daily 
returns and volume in the US stock market unlike the linear causality tests which only 
revealed the presence of a unidirectional causal relationship. Unfortunately, the modified 
version of the Pavlidis et al. (2015) also has its shortcomings. Specifically, Hiemstra and 
Jones (1994) test is biased as it tends ‘over-reject’ the null hypothesis of non-Granger 
causality; this tendency to over-reject the null increases with the sample size (Diks & 
Panchenko, 2005; Lin et al., 2013). Lin et al. (2013) offer an improved testing framework that 
solves the over-rejection problem even when the sample size increases. Therefore, this study 
will proceed to use framework provided by Lin et al. (2013) to check for the presence of 
nonlinear causal relationships between variables.  
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The subsections that follow provide a detailed explanation of how the causal tests were 
performed. Because the sequential steps followed in this analysis can seem laborious, a brief 
overview of the steps followed is necessary. In order to perform the linear and nonlinear 
causality tests the following steps were followed. First, the data for the composite stock 
indexes and trading volume was downloaded at daily frequency for the five countries. 
Second, all series were used to obtain the monthly averages of each series. Third, the data at 
monthly frequency was expressed in Australian dollars and natural logarithmic form. Fourth, 
the percentage changes in all series were obtained; this is the percentage change in monthly 
returns and the percentage change in trading volume of the stock indexes. Fifth, unit root tests 
were performed on the returns and volume series. Sixth, all series were adjusted for month-
of-year effects.
57
 Seventh, linear and nonlinear causality tests were performed. Eighth, the 
findings of the causality tests were discussed. Finally, the implications of the results for this 
study were outlined. 
 
8.3.1 Data selection and transformation 
This research uses composite equity indexes for Australia and its top four bilateral trading 
partners to explore the potential of cross-border transmission of financial stress or crises to 
Australia. Two characteristics of the composite indexes shall be examined; these are the 
changes in share prices and trading volume.
58
 Pairwise linear and nonlinear tests are used to 
investigate the causality relationships between price and volume. All tests are performed 
using data at a monthly frequency because the final composite stress index is also constructed 
using monthly data. The purpose of this investigative analysis is to provide some insight as to 
                                                 
57
 This process uses the two step procedure outlined by Silvapulle and Choi (1999). In addition to month-of-the-
year effects, Gallant et al. (1992) also remove the day-of-the-week and holiday effects. However, day-of-the-
week and holiday effects are not relevant since this study uses the monthly average values of the composite 
stock indexes and trading volume.  
58
 This study did not examine the relationship between returns and volatility, because the returns and volume are 
adjusted for market volatility.   
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the possible usefulness of either volume or stock returns in the prediction of future price 
changes in the Australian equity market.  
 
8.3.1.1 Stock Returns Data 
 
This study commenced the investigation of the price and volume relationships by using daily 
values of the composite indexes to estimate monthly average values. Data was obtained at the 
daily frequency in order to obtain the monthly average returns for each stock index. Daily 
data comprised of the closing prices at the end of a day of trading. On days when there were 
no stocks traded there is no data reported. The daily closing prices for the All Ordinaries 
(Australia), Hang Seng (China), S&P 500 (US), KOSPI (South Korea), and NIKKEI 225 
(Japan) stock indexes were obtained from the Yahoo finance database (Yahoo, 2017). Each 
composite stock index series is reported in the home currency indicated in table 8.1. The 
range of data available varies and the starting dates of each series vary as shown in table 8.1.  
Table 8.1: Time range and home currencies composite stock indexes  
 
In relation to the closing prices of the composite indexes, the latest starting date of data 
sourced from the Yahoo finance website is on July 1, 1997; this relates to the starting date for 
the KOSPI index. However, it was possible to obtain data for the KOSPI index from May 1, 
1990 to June 30, 1997 from the SIRCA Thomson Reuters Tick History database. Hence, this 
study chose to use data from two sources for the KOSPI index; the closing price values from 
May 1, 1990 to June 30, 1997 were sourced from SIRCA. The other closing price value of the 
stock indexes was sourced from the Yahoo finance website. Henceforth, a standardized 
 
Index 
 
Currency 
Time range 
Daily closing price Daily traded volume 
All Ordinaries Australian Dollar August 3, 1984 onwards February 24, 2003 onwards 
Hang Seng  Chinese Yuan Renminbi December 31, 1986 onwards July 9, 2001 onwards 
S&P 500  US Dollar January 3, 1950 onwards January 3, 1950 onwards 
KOSPI South Korean Won July 1, 1997 onwards April 28, 1998 onwards 
NIKKEI 225  Japanese Yen January 4, 1984 onwards June 10, 2002 onwards 
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sampling period ranging from 1 May 1990 to 30 September 2016 was obtained for each 
equity index.
59
 The monthly averages for each series were obtained using a simple averaging 
method. An example can be used to illustrate how this method is implemented. In the case of 
Australia, the average closing prices for the All Ordinaries index in month of January 2014 
were obtained as follows. First, the daily closing prices for all trading days in January 2014 
were added up and divided by the number of days when the stocks were traded on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). There were 21 trading days based on the closing 
quotes provided. Therefore, the sum of closing prices was divided by twenty one. The 
monthly averages for the subsequent months and other stock indexes were calculated in a 
similar manner. Once all data was expressed at a monthly frequency, the range of the 
resulting monthly series for each stock index consists of 317 data points.
60
 
For ease of comparison with the Australian All Ordinaries index, all composite indexes are 
expressed in Australian dollars. Each series was converted to Australian dollars using the 
monthly exchange rates reported on the Reserve Bank of Australia website; the resultant 
series are then expressed in natural logarithmic form. Figure 8.1 shows the graphical 
representation of the resultant series while Table 8.2 presents the summary statistics for each 
series after the logarithmic transformation.  
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 The end date was chosen as September 2016, so as to maximise the number of data points available for the 
analysis. However, the final index will still be estimated with data up to December 2014.   
60
 The resulting returns series will consequently contain 316 data points. 
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Figure 8.1: Logged stock indexes for all countries (May/90 to Sep/16) 
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Table 8.2: Summary Statistics for Logged Stock Indexes (May 1990 to September 2016) 
  
Australia 
(All Ordinaries) 
China 
(Hang Seng) 
Japan 
(NIKKEI 225) 
Korea 
(KOPSI) 
US (S&P 
500) 
 Mean   8.1007    7.7920  5.1815    0.2968   7.1815 
 Median   8.1068    7.8301  5.1949    0.3397   7.2957 
 Maximum   8.8096    8.6476  5.7351    0.9196   7.9752 
 Minimum   7.1386    6.6301  4.6741   -0.9889   5.9464 
 Standard Deviation   0.4288    0.4469  0.2869    0.3820   0.5094 
Skewness -0.4061   -0.5553 -0.0717  -0.8554  -0.6128 
Kurtosis  2.0732    2.7938  1.8395   4.0469   2.4530 
Jarque-Bera Statistic       20.058***  16.851***     18.059***    3.131***   3.791***  
Note: * indicates that the Jarque-Bera test statistic is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
 
For the period of study, Australia has the highest mean monthly return while Korea has the 
lowest mean monthly return. Based on the reported standard deviations for the five series, the 
highest variation in stock prices occurred in the USA market has 0.2595 (0.5094
2
) while the 
least variation in stock prices was observed in the Japanese market 0.0823(0.2869
2
). This 
suggests that for the period being examined, the USA markets were the most risky or volatile 
while the Japanese were the lease risky. All series have negative skewness. With the 
exception of Korea series that has kurtosis that is greater than three (4.05) and is fat-tailed, all 
other series have smaller tails than a normal distribution. The test statistics for Jarque-Bera 
test are significant at all levels of significance for all series. Thus, the null hypothesis for a 
normal distribution of all series is rejected at a 5% level of significance. Thus, it can be 
concluded that all series are not normally distributed.  
The logarithmic values of each index were used to calculate the continuously compounded 
return as shown in equation 8.1
61
 where 𝑅𝑡 is the average logarithmic return of a stock index 
in month t, 𝑃𝑡 is the average value of the stock index in month t and 𝑃𝑡−1 is the average value 
of the index in month t-1.  
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 Equation 8.1 is similar to the return equation 4.5 that was first discussed in chapter 4. The main difference 
between the two equations is that equation 4.5 represents the change in stock prices (returns) and is calculated 
as follows: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡−1),  while equation 8.1 uses percentage change in returns which is estimated 
by 𝑅𝑡 = [𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡−1)] ∗ 100 
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𝑅𝑡 = [𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡−1)] ∗ 100     (8.1) 
 
It should be noted that the monthly values are the average closing price for each month. 
Hence, the monthly return is estimated by comparing the average value of an index in a 
particular month with the average value of the index in the previous month. Figure 8.2 shows 
the graphical representation of the returns series for the five countries while table 8.3 presents 
the summary statistics for the returns of the composite stock indexes.  
 
Figure 8.2: Stock indexes returns for all countries (May/90 to Sep/16) 
  
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
All Ordinaries Returns
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
Hang Seng Returns
-20
-10
0
10
20
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
Nikkei225 Returns
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
KOSPI returns
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
S&P500 returns
197 
 
Table 8.3: Summary Statistics for Stock returns (June 1990 to September 2016) 
 
  
Australia 
(All Ordinaries) 
China 
(Hang Seng) 
Japan 
(NIKKEI 225) 
Korea 
(KOPSI) 
US (S&P 
500) 
 Mean  0.4126   0.5453   -0.0721  0.1674   0.5763  
 Median  0.8100   0.9535   -0.3627  0.7860   0.6052  
 Maximum  9.9906   14.0588   17.5930   28.9277   10.7525  
 Minimum  -16.7522  -35.4283  -18.6700  -56.8685  -10.5061 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 3.3637   5.7803   4.8633   7.3781   3.5020  
Skewness  -0.7612  -0.9259  0.0122   -1.3003  -0.2114 
Kurtosis  5.1482   7.5126   4.2205   14.4266   3.6858  
Jarque-Bera 
Statistic 
        91.2820***  313.276***      19.622*** 1,808.188***     8.546** 
Note: * indicates that the Jarque-Bera test statistic is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
With the exception of Japan, all countries have positive mean returns. Similarly, skewness 
was negative for all countries except Japan. All series reported a kurtosis that is more than 
three; this is indicative of a fat-tailed distribution instead of a normal distribution of the 
returns. The Jarque-Bera tests confirm the non-normal properties of the returns series. The 
test statistics for all Jarque-Bera tests are significant and the null hypothesis for a normal 
distribution of all series is rejected at a 5% level of significance.  
8.3.1.2 Trading Volume Data 
 
In relation to the closing values of the trading volume for the composite indexes, the latest 
starting date of data sourced from the Yahoo finance website is on February 24, 2003; this 
relates to the starting date for the All Ordinaries index. It was not possible to obtain more 
historical data for all series from the SIRCA Thomson Reuters Tick History database. Hence, 
this study uses a standardized sampling period for the volume series 1 March 2003 to 30 
September 2016
62
 was obtained for each equity index. The daily trading volume series are 
used to obtain the monthly averages for each series using a simple averaging method similar 
to the one used to obtain monthly stock prices. With the exception of the Australian case, the 
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 There is no data available for the trading volume of the All Ordinaries index for five months from January to 
May 2015. Thus, for purposes of empirical analysis, the Australian volume series ranges from March 2003 up 
to December 2014. 
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dataset for each volume series consists of 163 data points.
63
 The monthly series were then 
expressed in natural logarithmic form. Figure 8.3 shows the graphical representation of the 
resultant series while table 8.4 presents the summary statistics for each series after the 
logarithmic transformation.  
 
Figure 8.3: Logged Trading Volume for Stock Indexes (March 2003 to September 2016) 
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 Australia has missing data points and the volume series is truncated to 142 data points. 
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Table 8.4: Summary Statistics for Logged Trading Volume (Mar/03 to Sep/16) 
 
Australia 
(All Ordinaries) 
China 
(Hang Seng) 
Japan 
(NIKKEI 225) 
Korea 
(KOPSI) 
US 
(S&P 500) 
 Mean       20.5262    20.8280        11.8075      12.9153   21.8663 
 Median       20.5266    21.1551        11.7819      12.8546   21.9693 
 Maximum       21.4075    21.9929        19.4908      17.0593   22.7189 
 Minimum       18.6704    19.1853        10.8962      12.1453   20.8929 
Std. Dev.         0.3414      0.7883          0.6968        0.6184     0.4318 
Skewness        -0.7682    -0.8431          8.3714        4.9597    -0.5885 
Kurtosis         7.2739     2.2131        92.3751      32.9618     2.6364 
Jarque-Bera 
Statistic 
    136.650***   23.517*** 56,155.020*** 6,765.187*** 10.307*** 
Note: The Jarque-Bera test statistic is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
 
For the period of study, the US (21.87) and Japan (11.81) has the highest and lowest mean 
monthly traded volume respectively. Based on the reported standard deviations for the five 
series, the highest variation in trading volume was recorded in the Chinese market has 0.6214 
(0.7883
2
) while the least variation in stock prices was observed in the Australian market 
0.1166 (0.3414
2
). With the exception of Chinese volume (2.21) and US volume (2.64), the 
other series have kurtosis that exceeds three and are fat-tailed; the Chinese and the US 
volume series have smaller tails than a normal distribution. The test statistics for Jarque-Bera 
test are significant at all levels of significance for all series. Thus, the null hypothesis for a 
normal distribution of all series is rejected at a 5% level of significance. It can be concluded 
that all series are not normally distributed. 
The logarithmic values of the volume traded of each index were used to calculate the 
percentage changes in trading volume as shown in equation 8.2. Where 𝑇𝑉𝑡 is the percentage 
changes in the trading volume of a stock index in month t, 𝑉𝑡 is the average trading volume of 
the stock index in month t and 𝑣𝑡−1 is the average trading volume of the index in month t-1.  
𝑇𝑉𝑡 = [𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑡−1)] ∗ 100     (8.2) 
It should be noted that the monthly values are the average trading volume for each month. 
Figure 8.4 shows the graphical representation of the percentage changes in volume series for 
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the five countries while table 8.5 presents the summary statistics for the percentage changes 
in volume traded of the composite stock indexes.  
 
Figure 8.4: % Change in Trading Volume of all Stock indexes returns (Apr/03 to Sep/16) 
 
Table 8.5: Summary Statistics for % Change in Trading Volume (Apr/03 to Sep/16) 
  
Australia 
(All Ordinaries) 
China 
(Hang Seng) 
Japan 
(NIKKEI 225) 
Korea 
(KOPSI) 
US 
(S&P 500) 
 Mean       -0.9818       1.3429          -4.9696       -0.2614     0.5824 
 Median        0.1902       1.5699          -1.0822       -1.0976    -0.8379 
 Maximum      50.5313     70.8584       205.9231    446.1432   48.4259 
 Minimum   -172.6039    -46.8289     -859.4631   -417.6090 -39.0965 
 Std. Dev.      20.4540     23.6445        74.0960      80.0084  12.7229 
Skewness       -4.0511       0.2382         -9.6118        0.1368    0.2370 
Kurtosis      36.5094       2.7959      111.6543      24.6523    4.1288 
Jarque-Bera 
Statistic 
6,982.5900***       1.8128 82,183.2700*** 3,165.0480***  10.1161*** 
Note: * indicates that the Jarque-Bera test statistic is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
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On average, there is a negative average percentage change in the volume traded on the 
Australian (-0.98), Japanese (-4.97) and Korean (-0.26) equity markets, indicating an average 
decline in the volume of assets traded in the three aforementioned equity markets during the 
period of study. Conversely, on average there is a positive percentage change in volume 
traded on the Chinese (1.34) and American (0.58) markets; indicating an average increase in 
volume traded in these two equity markets. The test statistics for all Jarque-Bera tests are 
significant and the null hypothesis for a normal distribution of all series is rejected at a 5% 
level of significance, suggesting that all of the series are not normally distributed. 
 
8.3.2 Research Methods 
Granger causality tests were used to explore causality relationships between stock indexes of 
Australia and its four key trading partners. Two kinds of causality tests are employed in this 
study; these are the linear and nonlinear causality tests. The causality testing procedure used 
in this study is similar to the one used by Baek and Brock (1992). As a starting point, it was 
necessary to examine the univariate properties of the estimated series to confirm that they 
were stationary,
64
 as this is a necessary condition for Granger causality tests. For this reason, 
this study performed unit root tests on the estimated returns and percentage change in the 
volume series before implementing the causality tests. After the unit root testing, all series 
were adjusted for calendar effects. The adjusted series were used to estimate a linear bivariate 
VAR model. The linear bivariate VAR model was used to test for linear granger causality. 
The residuals of the same VAR model were adjusted for volatility effects before testing for 
non-linear granger causality. The discussions that follow briefly highlight the empirical tests 
applied prior to conducting Granger causality tests.  
                                                 
64
  A stationary series has mean reverting tendencies and contains no unit root while a non-stationary series 
follows a random walk and contains a unit root. 
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(i) Unit Root Testing Procedure 
Two kinds of unit root tests were used to check for the presence of a unit root in this study. 
One type of unit root test was performed with no structural breaks while the other type was 
designed to test for the presence of a unit root when data has a structural break. The section 
that follows provides a detailed overview of unit root testing procedures before performing 
unit root tests to check whether the series are stationary. 
 Review of Unit Root Testing Procedures 
A review of literature indicates that two kinds of unit root tests are popular among scholars 
namely the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests 
(Phillips & Perron, 1988; Said & Dickey, 1984). This study shall refer to these two tests as 
the classical tests for unit root henceforth. The classical tests are an extension of the Dickey 
Fuller (DF) unit roots tests and provide a testing procedure that corrects for serial correlation 
and heteroscedasticity of errors (Dickey & Fuller, 1979, 1981). Popularity of the classical 
tests can be attributed to the fact that they have been in use since the 1980s, can easily be 
estimated using most statistical software and are easy to interpret. 
Said and Dickey (1984) designed the traditional ADF tests with a null hypothesis that a series 
contains a unit root. The mathematical expressions for testing the null hypothesis as show in 
equations 8.3 and 8.4. Equation 8.3 has a constant and no trend while equation 8.4 has a 
constant and a trend term. 
∆yt = α + ρyt−1 + γ1∆yt−1 + ⋯ + γp∆yt−p + et              (8.3)                          
∆yt = α + βt + ρyt−1 + γ1∆yt−1 + ⋯ + γp∆yt−p + et                (8.4) 
Where ∆yt is the first difference of the stock returns, α is a constant term, β is the coefficient 
of the trend term, t is the trend term and ρ is the correlation coefficient of the lagged stock 
returns. γ1 is the coefficient of the first difference of the first lag of the stock returns, γp is the 
coefficient of the first difference of the p
th
 lag of the stock returns and et is the error term. 
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Similar equations can be used to test for the presence of a unit root in the percentage change 
in volume. Ng and Perron (2001) recommend the used of the Modified Akaike Information 
Criterion (MAIC) to select the number of lags (p) to include in equations 8.3 and 8.4. The 
null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if ρ = 0, and it will be concluded that a series is 
stationary; conversely, if ρ < 0, the null hypothesis of existence of a unit root cannot be 
rejected and a conclusion should be made that the series is non-stationary.  
The alternative PP unit root test offered by Phillips and Perron (1988) is often reported 
alongside the ADF tests. While the ADF method improves on work by Dickey and Fuller 
(1979) by including lagged differenced terms in the ADF, Phillips and Perron (1988) opt to 
modify the DF test statistic in order to deal with the problem of possible autocorrelation of 
the errors. Due to this correction, there is no longer a need for including extra lagged terms 
when conducting the PP tests. The null and alternative hypotheses for the PP test are 
borrowed from the DF test. In particular, mathematical expressions for testing the null 
hypothesis as show in equations 8.5 and 8.6. Equation 8.5 has a constant and no trend while 
equation 8.6 has a constant and a trend term. 
∆yt = α + ρyt−1 + et                 (8.5)                          
∆yt = α + βt + ρyt−1 + et                    (8.6) 
Where ∆yt is the first difference of the stock return (or percentage change in volume), α is a 
constant term, β is the coefficient of the trend term, t is the trend term and ρ is the correlation 
coefficient of the lagged stock return (percentage change in volume). The term et represents 
the error that follows an independent and identically distribution (i.i.d) with a mean of zero 
and a constant variance (et~IID(0, σ
2)). The rejection rules for this test are as outlined for the 
ADF test.  
Though widely accepted, the classical tests are imperfect. Notably, researchers highlight a 
major drawback in the framework for hypotheses testing in that they fail to account for 
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structural breaks. A structural break occurs when a series undergoes a change in the growth 
rate or general trending of the series over time. Perron (1989) argues that in the presence of a 
structural break, classical tests are biased as they are more likely to fail to reject the null even 
if a series is stationary. In other words, a type II error would have occurred. To avoid making 
this error, researchers have attempted to address this shortcoming by adjusting the unit root 
testing procedure to account for the presence of one or more structural breaks.  
Perron (1989) proposed a unit root testing procedure based on prior knowledge of an 
exogenous structural break; in Perron’s paper the structural breaks were deemed to coincide 
with the timing of the 1929 Great crash and the 1973 oil price shock. In the same vein, one 
could deduce that historical periods of financial crises were accompanied by corresponding 
breaks in the series of the equity indices considered in this study. Table 8.6 shows the 
possible exogenous shocks that may translate to structural breaks for five countries 
considered in the causality analysis.  
Table 8.6: Financial Crises from 1970 to 2007  
Country Year of Systemic Banking Crisis Year of Currency Crisis 
Australia none recorded none recorded 
China 1998 none recorded 
Japan 1997 none recorded 
The United States 1988, 2007 none recorded 
Korea 1997 1998 
Source: Luc and Valencia (2008) 
Focusing on the timeframe of data used in this study (1990 to 2014), there are two notable 
crises that are recorded, namely the 1997 to 1999 Asian Crisis and the 2007-2009 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC). From Perron’s work, one could infer that structural breaks 
corresponding to the timing of these crises would be seen in the series of the respective 
countries.  
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Under the null hypotheses, Perron (1989) allows for three possibilities. Model A (crash 
model) allows for a structural change in the level of the series, model B (changing growth 
model) allows for a change in the rate of growth of a series and model C (break model) 
allows for a structural change in the level followed by a change in the growth rate. 
Mathematical expressions of these models are shown in equations 8.7, 8.8, and 8.9. 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (𝐴)      𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝑑𝐷(𝑇𝐵)𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡       (8.7)                          
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (𝐵)      𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝑦𝑡−1 + (𝜇2 − 𝜇1)𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡      (8.8) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (𝐶)      𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝐷(𝑇𝐵)𝑡 + (𝜇2 − 𝜇1)𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                (8.9) 
Where 𝑦𝑡 in all models represents a time series with a unit root that may have a non-zero 
drift. TB represents the time of the structural break that occurs at a specific time over a period 
being considered (1 < 𝑇𝐵 < 𝑇), 𝐷(𝑇𝐵)𝑡 is the dummy variable indicating when there is the 
structural break in the level such that 𝐷(𝑇𝐵)𝑡 = 1 when 𝑡 = 𝑇𝐵 + 1 (when a level-break is 
present) and zero otherwise. 𝜇 is a drift parameter that changes from 𝜇1 to 𝜇2 at the time of 
the break (𝑇𝐵). 𝐷𝑈𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating the change in the growth rate such that is 
𝐷𝑈𝑡 = 1 when 𝑡 > 𝑇𝐵 and zero otherwise. The error term 𝑒𝑡 of all the models is specified as 
a white noise process with i.i.d residuals (Perron, 1989, p. 1364). 
 The alternative hypotheses for model A is a trend stationary series with a single structural 
break in the intercept of the series, B is a model allows for a change in the slope without a 
major change in the level of a series and C is a series with a single change in both the growth 
rate and level. Equations 8.10, 8.11 and 8.12 show the alternative hypotheses for the 
respective models. 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (𝐴)      𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝛽𝑡 + (𝜇2 − 𝜇1)𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                  (8.10)                          
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (𝐵)      𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽1𝑡 + (𝛽2 − 𝛽1)𝐷𝑇𝑡
∗ + 𝑒𝑡                  (8.11) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (𝐶)      𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝛽1𝑡 + (𝜇2 − 𝜇1)𝐷𝑈𝑡 + (𝛽2 − 𝛽1)𝐷𝑇𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡    (8.12) 
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Where: 𝑦𝑡, 𝐷𝑈𝑡, 𝜇1, and 𝜇2 are as specified in the null. 𝐷𝑇𝑡
∗ = 𝑡 − 𝑇𝐵, 𝐷𝑇 = 1 if 𝑡 > 𝑇𝐵 and 
zero otherwise. This means that if 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝐵, 𝐷𝑈𝑡 = 𝐷𝑇𝑡 = 0. Slow growth in a series is 
characterised by 𝛽2 < 𝛽1. 
While Perron’s hypothesis framework is setup based on the notion of a known exogenous 
break, subsequent studies have deemed this idea rather restrictive. For this reason, Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) (ZA) extends Perron’s work based on three models. However, ZA preferred 
a unit root testing procedure that determined the timing of a structural break endogenously 
from the data as determining one beforehand could lead to data mining. Moreover, unlike the 
Perron (1989) approach which allows for a structural break in the null the ZA approach fails 
to allow for a structural break in the null. Rather the break is only included in the alternative 
hypothesis of the ZA test. In this case, rejection of the null may imply two things that the 
series has no unit root or that the series has a unit root with structural breaks. Thus, rejection 
of the unit root does not mean that a series is stationary. Lee and Strazicich (2001) stress the 
importance of including a break in the null as it affects the outcome of unit root test and offer 
an alternative unit root testing procedure that includes a break in the null and the alternative 
hypothesis.  
Lee and Strazicich (2001) unit root tests with one structural break (LS1) are set up using a 
data generating process (DGP) that estimates equation 8.13. Where 𝑍𝑡 is a vector containing 
exogenous variables, 𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 such that: 𝜀𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2), under the null and 
alternative hypothesis 𝛽 = 1 and 𝛽 < 1 respectively. In model A, 𝑍𝑡 = [1, 𝑡, 𝐷𝑡]
′ with 
𝐷𝑡 = 1 if 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝐵 + 1 and zero otherwise. 𝑇𝐵 is the time of the break. In model C, 𝑍𝑡 =
[1, 𝑡, 𝐷𝑡, 𝐷𝑇𝑡]
′ where 𝐷𝑇𝑡 =  𝑡 −  𝑇𝐵 for 𝑡 ≥  𝑇𝐵  +  1 and zero otherwise. The alternative 
hypotheses allow for a change in the intercept in model A and a combined change in the 
intercept and trend in model Lee and Strazicich (2004, pp. 3-4) recommend the estimation of 
unit root test statistics based on equation 8.14 so that the LM t-test statistic tests whether 
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𝜙 = 0 under the null. ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − ?̃?𝑥 − 𝑍𝑡𝛿, t=2,…,T, t=2,...,T; 𝛿 are the coefficients in the 
regression of Δ𝑦𝑡 on Δ𝑍𝑡. ?̃?𝑥 is specified as a restricted maximum likelihood estimation of  
𝜓𝑥(≡ 𝜓 + 𝑋0) which is based on 𝑦1 − 𝑍1𝛿. 65 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿
′𝑍𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡            (8.13) 
Δ𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿
′Δ𝑍𝑡 + 𝜙?̃?𝑡−1+𝑢𝑡          (8.14) 
Later work by Lee and Strazicich (2003) posits that the consideration of one structural break 
when a series has two breaks may yield biased results and result in loss of power of unit root 
tests. Accordingly, these authors propose a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) methodology for 
testing for a unit root in a series with two endogenously identified structural breaks. Lee and 
Strazicich (2003) use the models proposed by Perron (1989) with specific emphasis on model 
A and C, as the consensus among academics is that these two models adequately model most 
economic variables. Unit root tests with two structural breaks (LS2) are setup using the DGP 
in equation 8.13. However, model A and C are specified with two breaks instead of the one. 
Consequently, model A has two breaks in the intercept with 𝑍𝑡 = [1, 𝑡, 𝐷1𝑡 , 𝐷2𝑡]
′ where 
𝐷1𝑡 = 1 and 𝐷2𝑡 = 1, when: 𝑡 ≥  𝑇𝐵  +  1, otherwise 𝐷1𝑡 = 𝐷2𝑡 = 0. Model C allows for 
two combined breaks in the trend and intercept. Model C is specified as follows: 𝑍𝑡 =
[1, 𝑡, 𝐷1𝑡, 𝐷2𝑡 , 𝐷𝑇1𝑡, 𝐷𝑇2𝑡]
′ where 𝐷𝑇𝑗𝑡 = 𝑡 − 𝑇𝐵𝑗 when 𝑡 ≥  𝑇𝐵  +  1, 𝑗 = 1, 2, and zero 
otherwise. The unit root test statistics are calculated based on the same methodology as LS1. 
An important feature of the LS2 hypothesis testing setup is that the null tests a series for a unit 
root with two structural breaks and the alternative indicates a series has no unit root with two 
structural breaks. In this respect, rejection of the null clearly indicates that the series is trend 
stationary. Although Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) (LP) offer a testing procedure with two 
structural breaks, the framework suffers from the same shortcoming as the ZA approach; 
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 This estimation technique is based on earlier work by Schmidt and Phillips (1992) (Lee & Strazicich, 2001; 
Lee & Strazicich, 2004). 
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there are no breaks included in the null and, thus, it is not reasonable to either affirm or reject 
the null hypothesis. Subsequently, it is possible to conclude there is no unit root present in a 
series that actually contains a unit root with structural breaks. Thus, it would appear that the 
method offered by Lee and Strazicich (2003) is more suitable when dealing with the scenario 
of two endogenous breaks.  
After considering various unit root tests, this study suggests that unit root tests with structural 
breaks are better than the classical unit root tests. Although several scholars prefer to use 
classical tests, Figures 8.2 and 8.4 reveal that there may be least one structural break in the 
series and perhaps two. Lee and Strazicich (2003) assert that there is no harm in assuming the 
presence of two breaks when there are none in a series as it does not lead to major size 
distortion. Hence, performing unit root tests with breaks precludes possible bias
66
 in the 
results and caters for the scenario that breaks are absent in a series. This is an interesting 
assertion as it implies there is little use for the classical test results, once the LS2 results are on 
hand. However, it is always better to err on the side of caution as is generally encouraged in 
academia and adopt a certain amount of scepticism about this assertion. Therefore, this study 
shall perform classical tests in order to assess whether there is a major difference in the 
results of the unit root tests when structural breaks are included or excluded in the testing 
procedure. Overall, two kinds of unit root tests were conducted on all series used in this 
study; classical tests (ADF and PP) and a test with two structural breaks (LS2). For structural 
unit root tests, this study allows for a change in the intercept and trend of each series (model 
C).  
 ADF and PP test results 
As there was no evidence of a deterministic trend component in the returns and percentage 
change in volume series, the ADF and PP tests were estimated using equations 8.3 and 8.5 
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 Results could be biased because of ignoring the presence of breaks 
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respectively. Both equations omit the trend component when performing the unit root tests. 
Table 8.7 shows the results of the unit root tests of all series. The tests results indicate that all 
series are stationary, since the null hypothesis for no unit root is rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. The next section shows the unit root test results after allowing for structural 
breaks in all series. 
Table 8.7: Unit root tests without structural breaks 
  
Returns Percentage change in volume 
ADF test PP test ADF test PP test 
All Ordinaries (Australia) -7.4943*** -13.8545***   -9.9760 ***     -9.1290*** 
Hang Seng (China) -4.6084*** -14.7570*** -17.1241***   -19.4355*** 
NIKKEI 225 (Japan) -4.9395*** -14.2040*** -33.2430*** -123.0591*** 
KOSPI (Korea) -4.7523*** -13.4054*** -21.8110***   -44.7530*** 
S&P 500 (US) -3.3172** -13.9711*** -17.3514***   -19.8572*** 
Note: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller tau statistic is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) level 
 
 Lee-Strazicich Test Results 
Table 8.8 shows unit root test results for all series after allowing for two structural breaks in 
the series. The null hypothesis for presence of a unit root is rejected at a 5% level of 
significance. The outcome of the LS2 tests is similar to the ADF and PP test results; the unit 
root tests indicate that the returns of the stock indexes and the percentage change in volume 
are stationary at any level of significance. Overall, it would appear that in most cases the 
location of the significant breaks in the level and/or trend of the series correspond to the 
timing of the GFC and Asian crisis. For instance, the second break of the All Ordinaries and 
the first break of the S&P 500 returns, KOSPI volume, and S&P 500 volume series 
correspond to the timing of the GFC. It is worth noting there is no difference in the 
conclusions arrived at whether a structural break is included or excluded from the analysis. 
Now that it has been determined that the returns and percentage change in volume series are 
stationary, all series can be adjusted for calendar effects. The discussion that follows provides 
a detailed explanation of how the calendar adjustments were performed.  
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Table 8.8: Unit root tests with structural breaks  
Variable t-statistic First break Second break k 
All Ordinaries returns  -14.5151*** Feb-2006 Oct-2008 0 
Hang Seng returns  -14.7903*** May-1997 Jun-2000 0 
NIKKEI 225 returns  -14.2663*** Apr-1994 Aug-1999 0 
KOSPI returns  -13.5529*** May-1998 May-2001 0 
S&P 500 returns    -7.3047*** Mar-2008 Jan-2013 7 
All Ordinaries volume   -5.7199** Oct-2006 Jul-2013 2 
Hang Seng volume   -16.2821*** Jun-2006 Aug-2010 0 
NIKKEI 225 volume   -10.4117*** Dec-2010 Oct-2012 3 
KOSPI volume   -22.5128*** Aug-2008 Jan-2015 1 
 S&P volume   -16.4176*** Aug-2007 Jan-2011 0 
 Note: **, *** indicate the significance at a 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. Table 2 of Lee and 
Strazicich (2003, p. 1084) outlines the critical values for the break model. Critical values for the 1, 5, and 
10 % level of significance of the break models are -5.823, -5.286, and -4.989 respectively. The variable 
“k” is the lag selected using on the general-to-specific technique with the maximum starting value of k 
being set to 8 lags as recommended by Lee and Strazicich (2003, p. 1086). 
 
(ii) Calendar Effects Testing Procedure 
From the unit root tests results it has been determined that all series are stationary. All the 
returns and percentage change in volume can now be adjusted for calendar effects. This study 
starts by considering a popular and well-documented market anomaly or calendar effect that 
occurs in the month of January. This anomaly is commonly referred to as the January effect 
and it is characterised by higher security prices (and/or earnings) in January than in other 
months of the year. Several authors have endeavoured to explain the reasons why this 
anomaly occurs. Some explanations for the January effect are that it is: i) A result of asset 
mispricing in the last few months of the year; ii) Possibly a reflection of investor expectations 
of company announcements that occur in the beginning of the year in some financial markets; 
and iii) A reflection of investor selling at a time that ensures tax benefits (Dbouk, Jamali, & 
Kryzanowski, 2013; Easterday & Sen, 2016; Haug & Hirschey, 2006; Klein & Rosenfeld, 
1991). While the January effect is often associated with the US financial market, a study by 
Gu (2003) suggests that it may be on the decline. He and He (2011) further assert that market 
dynamics may be changing such that the November effect may be replacing the January 
effect regardless of the nature of market capitalisation (whether large and small market 
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capitalisation). Moreover, Lumsdaine, and Papell (1997) state that the January effect is not 
prevalent in all US equity markets at all times. While the tax timing in the US may explain 
the reason why the January effect occurs, it fails to explain why this anomaly occurs in other 
countries with different tax reporting times. Nevertheless, since it is possible that the January 
effect will be present in some of the five markets being studied, the empirical analysis that 
follows checks whether this anomaly is observed over the period studied. Moreover, this 
study recognises that even when the January effect is absent, there may be another calendar 
effect that is experience in the equity markets being studied. For this reason, this study checks 
for the presence of different month-of-the-year effects using the testing approach proposed by 
Marrett and Worthington (2011).  
The month-of-the-year testing procedure was performed in the following manner. Twelve 
dummy variables were constructed for every month of the year. Each dummy variable is a 
binary variable that takes the value of one in the month of interest and zero otherwise. For 
example, in the case of January, the January dummy would be equal to one in the months of 
January and zero in the other months of the different years; the dummy is equal to zero in the 
months of February through to December. Each series was then regressed on the twelve 
dummy variables; a constant coefficient was excluded from the regression equation to avoid 
the problem of the dummy trap. Equation 8.15 shows the mathematical expression of the 
regression for the case of the stock returns. A similar regression was used to test for calendar 
effects in the percentage change in volume series; the mathematical expression of the 
regression is given in equation 8.16. Where 𝑅𝑡 represents the average returns, 𝛽 represents 
the parameters to be estimated, 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,12 depending on the month of interest (e.g., 𝑖 is 
equal to one in the month of January, two in the month of February, and so on). 𝑇𝑉𝑡 is the 
percentage change in the trading volume of a stock index in month t and 𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the 
dummy variables constructed for the twelve months. 𝜀𝑡 and 𝑣𝑡 are the error terms.  
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𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
12
𝑖=1           (8.15) 
𝑇𝑉𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡
12
𝑖=1          (8.16) 
Table 8.9 reports the estimated coefficients for the month-of-the-year effect (MOY) in stock 
returns for the five countries. With the exception of the Australian market, all other markets 
fail to exhibit the January effect for the period of study. Even in the case of Australia, the 
January coefficient is weakly significant and only significant at the 10 percent level of 
significance. For purposes of this study a five percent level of significance will be used to 
determine whether the effect is significant, thus, the seeming presence of the January effect in 
Australia will be disregarded. Accordingly, it is concluded that there is no January effect in 
the monthly stock returns of the five markets. In the case of Australia, significantly higher 
average returns are reported in the month of April. This is similar to what Dbouk et al. 
(2013). However, unlike the aforementioned authors, this study failed to find significantly 
higher returns in the months of July and December.
67
 In regards to the other equity markets, 
significantly higher average returns are reported in the months of November and December in 
the US. This is an indication of a December effect instead of a January effect in the American 
equity market. Surprisingly, no significant calendar effects were found in the Chinese, 
Japanese or Korean markets.  
Table 8.9: Estimated coefficients for calendar effects in stock returns 
  
All Ordinaries 
(Australia) 
Hang Seng  
(China) 
NIKKEI 225 
(Japan) 
KOSPI 
(Korea) 
S&P 500 
(US) 
January 
1.2486* -1.8441 -1.0925 0.5227 0.3634 
(0.6591) (1.1392) (0.9623) (1.4604) (0.6861) 
February 
0.9192 1.0889 0.2638 -0.0574 0.6980 
(0.6591) (1.1392) (0.9623) (1.4604) (0.6861) 
March 
0.3612 -0.3612 0.8485 -0.5212 0.4213 
(0.6591) (1.1392) (0.9623) (1.4604) (0.6861) 
April 
1.6401** 1.0811 0.3311 2.3910 0.4491 
(0.6591) (1.1392) (0.9623) (1.4604) (0.6861) 
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 This may be due to use of data of different frequency and the examination of data from different time periods. 
Dbouk et al. (2013) uses daily data for the All Ordinaries from September 1996 and the series contains 2,635 
observations, whereas, this study uses monthly averages from June 1990 to September 2016. 
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All Ordinaries 
(Australia) 
Hang Seng  
(China) 
NIKKEI 225 
(Japan) 
KOSPI 
(Korea) 
S&P 500 
(US) 
May 
0.2536 1.2165 0.3741 -0.4140 1.1770* 
(0.6591) (1.1392) (0.9623) (1.4604) (0.6861) 
June 
-0.7093 0.4349 -0.1775 -0.2281 0.5096 
(0.6468) (1.1179) (0.9443) (1.4331) (0.6733) 
July 
0.9221 1.1657 0.2773 0.7961 0.0127 
(0.6468) (1.1179) (0.9443) (1.4331) (0.6733) 
August 
0.3135 0.5250 -1.0904 -0.9255 0.0703 
(0.6468) (1.1179) (0.9443) (1.4331) (0.6733) 
September 
-0.3369 -0.1608 0.3039 -0.2519 0.0842 
(0.6468) (1.1179) (0.9443) (1.4331) (0.6733) 
October 
-0.1363 1.1138 -0.7798 -0.4627 -0.4294 
(0.6591) (1.1392) (0.9623) (1.4604) (0.6861) 
November 
0.2701 1.7498 -0.7044 1.7057 2.0218*** 
(0.6591) (1.1392) (0.9623) (1.4604) (0.6861) 
December 
0.2619 0.5422 0.5962 -0.4962 1.6004** 
(0.6591) (1.1392) (0.9623) (1.4604) (0.6861) 
Note: Coefficients for each month are given in each cell followed by the standard errors in parentheses; *, **, 
and *** are statistically significant at, respectively, the 10, 5, and 1% level. 
 
The percentage change in trading volume variables were also checked for calendar effects. 
Table 8.10 reports the results of the test for the month-of-the year-effects. For Australia, there 
is a significantly higher percentage change in the volume of stocks traded in February and 
August. Conversely, there is a significantly lower percentage change in the volume of stocks 
traded in July and December during the period under study. For China, the percentage change 
in volume of stocks traded is significantly higher in January and September. However, the 
percentage change in volume of stocks traded in the Chinese market is significantly lower in 
February. Japanese markets only show evidence of significantly lower percentage change in 
trading volumes in the month of April. At a five percent level of significance, there is no 
significant evidence of any calendar effects in the Korean equity markets. America has 
significantly lower percentage change in volume of stocks traded in February and December. 
Conversely, there are significantly higher percentage changes in the volume of stocks traded 
in January and September. Overall, there is only significant evidence of the January effect in 
the Chinese and American markets. This is an interesting finding given that an examination 
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of the returns found no evidence of the January effect in the equity markets under study. 
These findings illustrate the importance of the contemporaneous examination of volume and 
stock returns as it could provide more insight into investor behaviour and equity market 
dynamics. 
Table 8.10: Estimated coefficients of calendar effects in trading volume 
 
Australia
68
 China Japan Korea US 
January 
      0.4132   27.6806***    15.5948     32.1876 17.3064*** 
     (5.3601)    (5.8250)   (20.5273)    (22.0842) (3.1015) 
February 
    15.6279***  -20.3642***      3.4489    -28.0858 -6.4538** 
    (5.3601)    (5.8250)   (20.5273)    (22.0842) (3.1015) 
March 
     8.2588     9.9095*     -4.0847      -0.5972 3.5121 
    (5.3601)    (5.8250)   (20.5273)    (22.0842) (3.1015) 
April 
    -9.2576*     0.3677   -63.3001***      35.1842 -0.6778 
    (5.1319)    (5.6131)   (19.7806)     (21.2808) (2.9887) 
May 
     6.2905    -5.4240      0.1242     -37.6293* 0.3137 
    (5.1319)    (5.6131)   (19.7806)     (21.2808) (2.9887) 
June 
     6.2842     8.0068     -4.7804       -4.5706 -1.7857 
    (5.1319)    (5.6131)   (19.7806)     (21.2808) (2.9887) 
July 
  -16.6755***    -7.9064      9.1374        7.0612 -1.6170 
    (5.1319)    (5.6131)   (19.7806)     (21.2808) (2.9887) 
August 
   12.6203**     2.2682   -16.4956      26.7239 -4.4783 
    (5.1319)    (5.6131)   (19.7806)     (21.2808) (2.9887) 
September 
     2.4284   14.0442**      7.2235     -22.0806 8.5229*** 
    (5.1319)    (5.6131)   (19.7806)     (21.2808) (2.9887) 
October 
    -7.5081     5.0563      3.4248       -1.4058 5.1555* 
    (5.1319)    (5.8250)   (20.5273)     (22.0842) (3.1015) 
November 
    -5.2753    -6.9046     -1.3053 -7.7343 -5.8467* 
    (5.1319)    (5.8250)   (20.5273) (22.0842) (3.1015) 
December 
  -22.7177***  -10.8728*     -5.6790 -2.6715 -6.7152** 
    (5.1319)    (5.8250)   (20.5273) (22.0842) (3.1015) 
 Note: Coefficients for each month are given in each cell followed by the standard errors in parentheses; *, **, 
*** are statistically significant at, respectively, the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Based on the findings of the calendar effect tests, the returns adjusted in the following 
manner. The Australian returns series was adjusted for an April effect and the US returns 
series was adjusted for the November and December effects. These adjustments were 
facilitated by consideration of the significant dummy variables for the aforementioned 
months. No calendar effects were found in the Chinese, Japan, and Korean returns series. In 
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  No trading-volume data is available for the All Ordinaries index for five months (January to May 2015). 
Therefore, the Australian month-of-year equation is estimated using April 2003 to December 2014 data.  
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addition to the data specific adjustments for calendar effects, this study follows Baek and 
Brock (1992),
69
 and Francis, Mougoué, and Panchenko (2010); (Phillips & Perron, 1988) and 
also adjusts all returns for the January effect.  
Based on the findings of the calendar effect tests, the percentage change in volume series 
adjusted in the following manner. The Australian volume series was adjusted for the 
February, July, August, and December effects. The Chinese volume series was adjusted for 
January, February, and September effects. The Japanese volume series was adjusted for the 
April effects. No calendar effects were identified in the Korean volume series. The US 
volume series was adjusted for January, February, September, and December effects. Apart 
from the data specific adjustments, an adjustment for January effect was made even if it was 
found to be insignificant in all markets except the US. 
(iii) Adjustments for Calendar effects 
Given that the significant month-of-the-year effects have been identified, this study will now 
proceed to adjust for calendar effects in the mean and variance using a two-step procedure 
proposed by Silvapulle and Choi (1999). In the first step, the mean and variance for the 
relevant returns, and volume series are estimated. To understand how this is done it is 
worthwhile to consider how this adjustment was performed on the returns series. The mean 
and variance equations for adjusting the returns series can be expressed mathematically as 
shown in equations 8.17 and 8.18.  
Mean equation:  𝑀1,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝛽𝑀 + 𝑒𝑡      (8.17) 
Variance equation: ln(?̂?𝑡
2) = 𝐷𝑡𝜑𝑀 + 𝑢𝑡       (8.18) 
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  A study by Baek and Brock (1992) found similar results of insignificant January effects for the Korean stock 
market. In particular, January dummies were found to be insignificant in all mean equations of estimated 
volatility models. There were mixed results of the significance of the January dummies in the variance 
equations; the January effect seemed significant in two sampled periods and insignificant in one sample 
period. Nevertheless, Baek and Brock (1992) stressed on the importance of considering the January dummy 
in the analysis of changes in equity markets due to past studies that identify the January effect as essential to 
understanding movements in financial markets. 
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Where 𝑀1,𝑡 stands for the mean returns and 𝐷𝑡 is a vector of dummy variables representing 
the month-of-year-effect. 𝛽𝑀 and 𝜑𝑀 represent the parameter vectors for the estimated 
equations. 𝑒𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 are the residuals for the estimated equations. The dependent variable in 
the variance equation 8.18 is the natural logarithm of the squared value of residuals obtained 
from the mean equation 8.17. The choice of which dummy variables to include is in part data 
dependent, based on the results of the month-of-the-year tests. The January effect is 
considered in addition to the significant effects for this adjustment exercise. If no significant 
effects are identified, the mean and the variance are adjusted for the January effect only. 
Table 8.11 shows a summary of all the adjustments are made to the returns and volume 
series.  
Table 8.11: Summary of Calendar Adjustments 
 
Variable Calendar adjustment months 
All Ordinaries returns  January, April 
Hang Seng returns  January 
NIKKEI 225 returns  January 
KOSPI returns  January 
S&P 500  returns  January, November, December 
All Ordinaries volume  January, February, July, August, December 
Hang Seng volume  January, February, September 
NIKKEI 225 volume  January, April 
KOSPI volume  January 
 S&P 500 volume  January, February, September, December 
 
In the second step, the residuals of the mean equation are standardised as shown in equation 
8.19
70
. Where 𝑀1,𝑡
∗  represents the standardised residuals of the returns of a given country, 𝑒𝑡 
is the error term obtained from equation 8.17 and 𝐷𝑡𝜑𝑀 stands for the estimated values of 
variance as obtained from equation 8.18. Similar equations were estimated for the percentage 
change in volume series.  
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 This method of standardization is similar to the one employed by Lin et al. (2013). 
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𝑀1,𝑡
∗ =
𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝(
𝐷𝑡𝜑𝑀
2
)
         (8.19) 
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 provide the graphical representations of the adjusted returns and volume 
series respectively. The calendar-adjusted series can now be used to perform the linear and 
nonlinear granger causality tests.  
 
Figure 8.5: Adjusted Returns Series (May/90 to Sep/16) 
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Figure 8.6: Adjusted % Change in Volume series (Mar/03 to Sep/16) 
 
8.3.3 Empirical Analysis and the Results 
i. Linear Granger Causality  
The concept of linear Granger causality was first introduced by Granger (1969) who argued 
that Granger Causality occurs when past values of one series (At) can be used to predict the 
current value of another series (Bt). At is said to Granger cause Bt if it contains information 
that can be used to predict series Bt and vice versa. The nature of causality may be 
unidirectional or bidirectional. Unidirectional causality occurs when At Granger cause Bt but 
Bt does not Granger cause At. Bi-directional causality is when At Granger causes Bt and Bt 
Granger cause At; in other words, the two variables are interdependent. 
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Investigation of Granger causality relationships between economic or financial variables can 
form the basis for risk management. For instance, a study on causal relationships between 
world oil and agricultural commodity prices could reveal that causal relationships exist 
(Nazlioglu & Soytas, 2012). If this is the case, importers and exporters of either commodity 
could hedge against anticipated fluctuation in prices of either commodity by using forward or 
future contracts. This subsection focuses on the analysis of two financial variables; the stock 
returns and the percentage change in trading volume. The procedure followed for linear 
causality tests is discussed in this subsection while the nonlinear causality testing procedure 
is the subsequent subsection. It is worthwhile to note at this point that both tests for Granger 
causality shall be used to examine the presence or absence of these four causal relationships: 
a) Stock returns for country A Granger causes stock returns in country B 
b) Stock returns in country B Granger causes stock returns in country A 
c) Percentage change in volume in country A Granger causes stock returns in country A 
d) Returns in country A Granger causing percentage change in volume in country A 
In order to initiate the linear Granger causality tests linear bivariate vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models were constructed using the calendar adjusted series for stock returns and 
percentage change in trading volume series. The bivariate VAR models checked for existence 
of short-run causal relationships between two series. Granger (1969) recommends that when 
two series are level stationary
71
 (meaning they are integrated of order zero I (0)), the Granger 
causality relationship can be tested using the bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model in 
equations 8.20 and 8.21.  
𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖𝐴𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛼2𝑖𝐵𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝜀1𝑡                     (8.20) 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖𝐴𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛽2𝑖𝐵𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝜀2𝑡                          (8.21) 
Where At and Bt represent returns (or percentage change in volume) series, At−i and Bt−i are 
the i
th
 lagged coefficients of  At and Bt respectively, α0 and β0 are constant terms, and ε1t and 
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 The results of the unit root tests in tables 8.7 and 8.8 indicate that the stock returns and the percentage change 
of trading volume series are level stationary. 
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ε2t are the error terms of the estimated VAR models. Series Bt Granger causes series At if 
any α2i is not equal to zero and At Granger causes Bt if any β1i is not equal to zero. Thus, if 
all α2i  and β1i are zero, there is no causal relationship between At and Bt. Since Granger 
causality tests are sensitive to the variation in the lag-length, the number of lags used in the 
tests was determined by estimating unrestricted VAR models between different pairs of 
series. Four lag selection criteria were used to determine the optimal number of lags to 
include in the linear bivariate VAR models; these were the finite prediction error, Akaike 
information criterion, Schwarz information criterion and the Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion. Tables 8.12 and 8.13 shows the optimal lag length identified for the pairwise 
Granger causality tests.  
Table 8.12 presents the linear Granger causality test results for the returns of the five 
countries. The null hypothesis checks for Granger non-causation, whereby a rejection of the 
null hypothesis means that a causal relationship exists. At a five percent level of significance, 
the GC test results highlight three causal relationships from China-to-Australia, US-to-
Australia, and Australia-to-Japan.  
Table 8.12: Linear Granger Causality Tests Results –Returns  
Null hypothesis F-Statistic Lag 
China Returns −/→Australia Returns 7.4129*** 1 
Japan Returns −/→Australia Returns 1.1864 1 
Korea Returns −/→Australia Returns 1.7215 1 
US Returns −/→Australia Returns 3.2665*** 8 
Australia Returns −/→China Returns 0.5828 1 
Australia Returns −/→Japan Returns 4.5554** 1 
Australia Returns −/→Korea Returns 0.0206 1 
Australia Returns −/→US Returns 1.1977 8 
  Notes:  
1. Granger causality tests check for non-causation between two series. The null hypothesis of each test is 
stated in the following manner.H0: Country A Returns −/→ Country B Returns , where “−/→” stands 
for “does not Granger cause”.  
2. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level 
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Linear Granger causality tests for stock returns and percentage change in volume traded are 
contained in table 8.13. At a five percent level of significance, only one causal relationship 
was found from the US returns to the US percentage change in volume traded. Two causal 
relationships were found from the percentage change in volume to returns in the Japanese and 
Korean stock markets. 
Table 8.13: Linear Granger Causality Tests Results –Returns-Volume  
Null hypothesis F-Statistic Lag 
Australia returns −/→Australia %∆ in volume 0.9509 1 
China returns −/→China %∆in volume 1.7793 2 
Japan returns −/→Japan %∆in volume 2.2371* 4 
Korea returns −/→Korea %∆in volume 1.7064 7 
US returns −/→US %∆ in volume 5.6046*** 4 
Australia %∆ in volume −/→ Australia returns 0.0140 1 
China %∆ in volume −/→China returns 2.2907 2 
Japan %∆ in volume −/→Japan returns 3.3522** 4 
Korea %∆ in volume −/→Korea returns 3.1293*** 7 
US %∆ in volume −/→US returns 1.2292 4 
Notes:  
1. Granger causality tests check for non-causation between two series. The null hypotheses of the first five 
tests and the last five tests are stated in the following manner respectively: H0: Country A Returns −/→
Country A %∆ in volume and H0: Country A %∆ in volume −/→ Country A Returns. 
2. Where “−/→” stands for “does not Granger cause” and “%∆” stands for “percentage change” .  
3. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level 
ii. Nonlinear Granger Causality  
The nonlinear Granger causality technique that is used in this study is the modified Hiemstra 
and Jones (1994) testing framework as developed by Diks and Panchenko (Lin et al., 2013; 
Perron, 1989). This testing framework can best be understood by considering an example. 
Accordingly, suppose there are two stationary series At and Bt. In order to test for nonlinear 
causality between the two series conditional probabilities will be employed in the following 
manner. Let 𝐴𝑡
𝑛 represent an n-length vector for At such that the length of the vector can be 
defined as shown in equation 8.22; where 𝑛 ≥ 1, 𝑡 ≥ 1. 
 𝐴𝑡
𝑛 = {At, At+1, At+2, … , At+n−2, At+n−1}      (8.22) 
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If the letter 𝐿 is used to denote a lag operator then 𝐿𝐴 and 𝐿𝐵 represent the lengths of the lag 
vectors for series At and Bt respectively. The lagged vector series can be denoted by 𝐴𝑡
𝐿𝐴 and 
𝐵𝑡
𝐿𝐵 and are specified as shown in equations 8.23 and 8.23 b. 
𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 = {At−𝐿𝐴 , At−𝐿𝐴+1, At−𝐿𝐴+2, … , At−1}, 𝑡 = 𝐿𝐴 + 1, 𝐿𝐴 + 2, …   (8.23 a) 
𝐵𝑡−𝐿𝐵
𝐿𝐵 = {Bt−𝐿𝐵 , Bt−𝐿𝐵+1, Bt−𝐿𝐵+2, … , Bt−1}, 𝑡 = 𝐿𝐵 + 1, 𝐿𝐵 + 2, …    (8.23 b) 
The following conditions must hold in order to initiate the conditional probability framework. 
Let 𝐿𝐴 ≥ 1 , 𝐿𝐵 ≥ 1, and 𝑘 denote a constant such that 𝑘 > 0. Then Bt does not strictly 
Granger cause At if: 
𝑃(‖𝐴𝑡
𝑛 − 𝐴𝑠
𝑛‖ < 𝑘|‖𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 − 𝐴𝑠−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 ‖ < 𝑘, ‖𝐵𝑡−𝐿𝐵
𝐿𝐵 − 𝐵𝑠−𝐿𝐵
𝐿𝐵 ‖ < 𝑘)  
=                𝑃(‖𝐴𝑡
𝑛 − 𝐴𝑠
𝑛‖ < 𝑘|‖𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 − 𝐴𝑠−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 ‖ < 𝑘) 
(8.24) 
Where 𝑃(. ) denotes the probability, ‖. ‖ denotes the maxim norm.  
The left hand side of equation 8.24 represents the conditional probability that the two 
arbitrary n-length of At are within a 𝑘 distance of each other given that the lagged vectors of 
At and Bt are also within 𝑘 distance of each other. The right hand side of equation 8.24 
represents the conditional probability that two arbitrary vectors of At are within 𝑘 distance of 
each other given that their corresponding lagged vectors being within 𝑘 distance of each 
other. Using the framework developed by Gallant et al. (1992) and improved by Lin et al. 
(2013) correlation integrals of joint probabilities can now be specified in order to implement 
the test for nonlinear causality. Equation 8.25 shows the expression of the ratio of conditional 
probabilities used to perform the tests. The joint probabilities that are used in equation 8.25 
are as estimated as shown in equations 8.26a to 8.26d. 
𝐶𝐼(𝑛+𝐿𝐴 , 𝐿𝐵,𝑘)
𝐶𝐼(𝐿𝐴 , 𝐿𝐵,𝑘)
=
𝐶𝐼(𝑚+𝐿𝐴 ,k)
𝐶𝐼(𝐿𝐴 ,k)
         (8.25) 
𝐶𝐼(𝑛 + 𝐿𝐴 ,  𝐿𝐵, 𝑘) ≡ P(‖𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝐴
𝑛+𝐿𝐴 − 𝐴𝑠−𝐿𝐴
𝑛+𝐿𝐴‖ < 𝑘, ‖𝐵𝑡−𝐿𝐵
𝐿𝐵 − 𝐵𝑠−𝐿𝐵
𝐿𝐵 ‖ < 𝑘),   (8.26a) 
𝐶𝐼(𝐿𝐴 ,  𝐿𝐵, 𝑘) ≡  𝑃(‖𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 − 𝐴𝑠−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 ‖ < 𝑘, ‖𝐵𝑡−𝐿𝐵
𝐿𝐵 − 𝐵𝑠−𝐿𝐵
𝐿𝐵 ‖ < 𝑘 )  (8.26b) 
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𝐶𝐼(𝑚 + 𝐿𝐴 , k) ≡  (‖𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝐴
𝑛+𝐿𝐴 − 𝐴𝑠−𝐿𝐴
𝑛+𝐿𝐴‖ < 𝑘)      (8.26c) 
𝐶𝐼(𝐿𝐴 , k)  ≡ 𝑃(‖𝐴𝑡−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 − 𝐴𝑠−𝐿𝐴
𝐿𝐴 ‖ < 𝑘 )       (8.26d) 
Lin et al. (2013) followed three steps when testing for nonlinear causality. Step one involved 
estimating a linear bivariate VAR model and storing the residuals of the estimated model
72
. 
In step two, the nonlinear causality tests were performed on the residuals and residuals that 
had been adjusted for volatility effects. An EGARCH (1, 1) was used to purge volatility 
effects from the residuals. Specifically, an EGARCH (1, 1) model was estimated and the 
standardized residuals were obtained by dividing the residuals of the bivariate VAR model by 
the estimated volatility of the EGARCH (1, 1) model. The results of the tests were discussed 
in the third step. This study used a similar procedure.
73
 The results of the nonlinear Granger 
causality tests are contained in table 8.14. 
Table 8.14: Nonlinear Granger Causality Tests Results –Returns  
Null hypothesis 
Before filtering 
T-statistic 
After EGARCH filtering 
T-statistic 
China Returns −/→Australia Returns 2.185** 1.166 
Japan Returns −/→Australia Returns -0.683 -0.545 
Korea Returns −/→Australia Returns 0.755 1.160 
US Returns −/→Australia Returns 0.610 0.505 
Australia Returns −/→China Returns -0.401 -0.243 
Australia Returns −/→Japan Returns 0.300 0.159 
Australia Returns −/→Korea Returns 0.824 0.684 
Australia Returns −/→US Returns 0.966 1.063 
Notes:  
1. Granger causality tests check for non-causation between two series. The null hypothesis of each test is 
stated in the following manner. H0: Country A Returns −/→ Country B Returns , where “−/→” stands 
for “does not Granger cause”.  
2. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
3. All tests were performed with one lag (n=1) and a bandwidth of 1.5 (k=1.5). 
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 This step is only necessary if a researcher has not estimated a bivariate VAR model. Given that this study has 
already estimated linear bivariate VAR models when performing the linear causality tests, it was not 
necessary to estimate bivariate VAR models again. 
73
 Diks and Panchenko (2005, 2006) developed the nonparametric Granger causality testing technique that is 
used in this study. One of the co-authors, Valentyn Panchenko, provides programs and interfaces that can be 
used to perform the nonlinear Granger causality tests in Microsoft Windows, C programming language and 
Microsoft Command Prompt.  This study uses the GCtest-win.exe program to execute the nonlinear Granger 
causality tests. This program is available for download on Valentyn Panchenko’s website at the University of 
New South Wales School of Economics (Panchenko, 2017). 
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At a five percent level of significance there is only one causal relationship identified from the 
Chinese Hang Seng returns to the Australian All Ordinaries returns; this causal relationship is 
only evident in the data before filtering from volatility effects, no causal relationship is 
identified in the data that has been filtered for volatility effects. No other nonlinear causal 
relationship was found.  
 
Table 8.15 shows the nonlinear Granger causality test results for returns and percentage 
change in volume. All tests were performed before, and repeated after, filtering for volatility 
effects. No causal relationships were identified at a five percent level of significance. It is 
only at a ten percent level of significance that weak nonlinear causal relationships were 
identified. Korean returns were found to nonlinearly Granger cause the percentage change in 
volume; this causal relationship exists regardless of whether the data was filtered or 
unfiltered. The results also indicate that Korean percentage change in trading volume was 
found to nonlinearly Granger cause Korean returns in the unfiltered data; no causal 
relationship between Korean returns and volume was found in the filtered data. 
Table 8.15: Nonlinear Granger Causality Tests Results –Returns-Volume  
Null hypothesis 
T-statistic 
(before filtering) 
T-statistic 
(after filtering) 
Australia returns −/→Australia %∆ in volume -0.012 -1.037 
China returns −/→China %∆in volume 0.245 0.337 
Japan returns −/→Japan %∆in volume -1.107 0.022 
Korea returns −/→Korea %∆in volume 1.590* 1.609* 
US returns −/→US %∆ in volume 0.586 0.619 
Australia %∆ in volume −/→ Australia returns 0.695 -0.485 
China %∆ in volume −/→China returns 0.940 0.260 
Japan %∆ in volume −/→Japan returns -1.002 0.115 
Korea %∆ in volume −/→Korea returns 1.357* 1.006 
US %∆ in volume −/→US returns -0.065 0.734 
Notes:  
1. Granger causality tests check for non-causation between two series. The null hypotheses of the first five 
tests and the last five tests are stated in the following manner respectively: H0: Country A Returns −/→
Country A %∆ in volume and H0: Country A %∆ in volume −/→ Country A Returns. Where “−/→” 
stands for “does not Granger cause” and “%∆” stands for “percentage change” .  
2. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
3. All tests were performed with one lag (n=1) and a bandwidth of 1.5 (k=1.5). 
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8.3.4 Implications of the Results for this study 
This subsection summarises the results of the Granger causality tests for the returns and 
percentage change in volume series. The implications of these findings for this study are 
discussed thereafter. Table 8.16 provides a summary of all the linear and nonlinear causality 
tests that were conducted in the Section 8.3.3. A five percent level of significance was used to 
identify significant cases of Granger causality. 
Table 8.16: Summary of linear and nonlinear causality results 
Null hypothesis Linear Causality 
Nonlinear Causality 
Unfiltered Filtered 
China Returns −/→Australia Returns Y Y N 
Japan Returns −/→Australia Returns N N N 
Korea Returns −/→Australia Returns N N N 
US Returns −/→Australia Returns Y N N 
Australia Returns −/→China Returns N N N 
Australia Returns −/→Japan Returns Y N N 
Australia Returns −/→Korea Returns N N N 
Australia Returns −/→US Returns N N N 
Australia returns −/→Australia %∆ in volume N  N N 
China returns −/→China %∆in volume N N N 
Japan returns −/→Japan %∆in volume N N N 
Korea returns −/→Korea %∆in volume N  N N 
US returns −/→US %∆ in volume Y N N 
Australia %∆ in volume −/→ Australia returns N N N 
China %∆ in volume −/→China returns N  N N 
Japan %∆ in volume −/→Japan returns Y N N 
Korea %∆ in volume −/→Korea returns Y N N 
US %∆ in volume −/→US returns N N N 
Notes:  
1. Granger causality tests check for non-causation between two series. 
2.  “−/→” stands for “does not Granger cause” and “%∆” stands for “percentage change”.  
3. Y stands for “Yes” and indicates that a causal relationship between two series is present. 
4. N stands for “No” and indicates that a causal relationship between two series is absent. 
 
The linear Granger causality test results indicate the presence of more causal relationships 
than the nonlinear Granger causality tests; six linear Granger causal relationships compared 
to one nonlinear Granger causal relationship. In regards to the Australian equity market, the 
linear causality test results suggest that American and Chinese equity markets play a key role 
in influencing movements in the Australian equity markets. These linear causality results 
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indicate that in the short-run, movements in American and Chinese markets lead the 
movements in the Australian market. Therefore, past values of returns of the two 
aforementioned equity indexes can provide useful information for predicting the current 
value of the Australian All Ordinaries index. Furthermore, past movements in the Australian 
returns can help predict current movements in the Japanese returns. It is worth noting that 
there is only one case where the results indicate a linear and a nonlinear causality relationship 
between two variables; this is the unidirectional causal relationship from the Chinese returns 
to the Australian returns. From these two tests, it can be concluded that movements in the 
Chinese market are a more important predictor of movements in the Australian equity 
markets than the movements in the American market.  
Now that it has been established that equity market movements in Chinese and American 
markets may provide clues on future movements in the Australian equity market, it follows 
that an examination of other possible Chinese-based and American-based variables that may 
provide some useful information about the potential for financial stress in the Australian 
financial markets. Hence, this study turns to an explorative analysis of other foreign variables 
especially with relation to their usefulness in predicting Australian financial stress. The 
section that follows discusses the variables that were identified as relevant for this analysis 
and the procedures used to assess the variables usefulness in gauging financial stress in 
Australia. 
8.4 Foreign-based Indicators of Stress in Australian Equity Markets 
It has widely been documented that financial crises are often accompanied by larger than 
usual drops in share prices and increased volatility in share prices (Edison, 2003; 
Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Patel & Sarkar, 1998). The increased volatility and rapid 
decline of share prices are two symptoms of panic among investors in equity markets as 
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investors attempt to sell off shares during the early stages of a crisis in order to minimise 
crisis related losses at the peak of the financial crisis. This study proposes the use of two 
foreign-based variables that are able to detect either or both of these symptoms in order to 
predict the potential for a crisis in the Australian equity market. Following on the results of 
the Granger causality tests, this section focuses on the use of information from the Chinese 
and American composite stock indexes in order to predict the potential for stress and/or 
subsequently crisis in the Australian equity market. The basic premise is that, in the short-
run, movements in Chinese and American equity markets can be used to explain movements 
in the Australia, such that the movements in the Chinese market have more impact on the 
Australian market than the American market. Specifically, if this premise was to hold true 
then it can also be concluded that the current values on the Chinese Hang Seng and US S&P 
500 can be used to predict future movements in the Australian All Ordinaries Index. By the 
same logic, it can be stated that the past values of the Hang Seng and US S&P 500 can help 
predict current values of the All Ordinaries Index; here the two aforementioned indexes lead 
the movements of the Australian index. Therefore, rising levels of stress in either the Chinese 
or American equity markets are useful for predicting the level of stress in the Australian 
equity markets. Owing to the lead-lag relationship that exists between Australia and China 
and Australia and the US, this study focuses on the analysis of the lagged values of the 
American and Chinese composite indexes from this point henceforth. Consequently, this 
study uses the lagged values of the Chinese and American stock indexes to develop stress 
indicators which could predict the potential for stress in the Australian equity market. In the 
discussion that follows, this study explains how the stress indicators were estimated. 
The month-end closing values of the Hang Seng (China) and (US) indexes were downloaded 
from the Yahoo finance website. The two series were then lagged by one month so as to 
develop the indicators for future stress in the Australian market. This study used an inverted 
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CMAX index to gauge developing stress in the Chinese and American markets. The inverted 
CMAX index is a modified measure the prevailing level of share volatility that is based on 
the CMAX measure developed by Patel and Sarkar (1998). In order to distinguish financial 
stress from financial crisis, this study makes some inference based on the criteria designed by 
Vila (2000).
74
 Consequently periods of crisis are identified when the value of the inverted 
CMAX index are 1.5 or 2 standard deviations above the mean value of the series are 
indicative of stress that has developed into a crisis. A detailed discussion of the procedure for 
estimating the inverted CMAX variables is provided in section 4.2.1 of chapter 4. 
Figure 8.7 presents the two estimated inverted CMAX series that were estimated using a 2-
year window. There are two noticeable peaks in the Hang Seng CMAX in August 1998 and 
February 2009, which correspond to the timing of the 1997-1999 Asian financial crises and 
the 2007-2009 Global financial crises. The two episodes of the crisis were identified by 
considering values of the CMAX series that are more than two standard deviations above the 
mean value of the estimated CMAX series; the mean was 1.2181 and the standard deviation 
was 0.2910 so that the threshold to be exceeded was 1.8001 (1.2181+(2*0.2910)). A similar 
approach was used to identify the crises in the US market. In the American case, the mean of 
the US CMAX series was 1.1041 with a standard deviation of 0.1895 such that a crisis was 
identified when the series exceeded the threshold of 1.4831 (1.1041+(2*0.1895)). There are 
two peaks in the US CMAX series on September 2002 and February 2009, which correspond 
to the 2000-2002 Dot-com and the Global financial crises, respectively. The two CMAX 
series adequately capture the timing of crises that affected the Chinese and American 
markets. It is expected that at times of the crisis, periods of distress in China and the US 
would indirectly cause stress in the Australian equity market (if not a crisis). Therefore, these 
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  Vila (2000) propose the criteria of 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below the mean value of the CMAX series. 
However, since this study makes use of the inverted CMAX index this study uses the criteria of 1.5 to 2 
standard deviations above the mean value of the inverted CMAX series. 
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two foreign-based variables were incorporated into the final composite index to measure 
stress in the Australian market. 
 
Figure 8.7: 24-Month Inverted CMAX for China and the US 
 
 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the identification of foreign-based variables to measure stress in the 
Australian equity market. After conducting empirical analysis of composite stock indexes of 
Australia and its top four trading partners, it was concluded that policy makers would benefit 
from a closer examination of the movements in the Chinese and American equity markets 
when trying to predict future movements in the Australian equity markets. Two foreign-based 
variables were estimated to incorporate the lead-lag relationship that exists between China-
and-Australia and the US-and-Australia. The two inverted CMAX series for the two countries 
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were incorporated into the final stress index for Australia. It should be noted that this chapter 
only focused on the identification of foreign variables for measuring stress in the equity 
market since the investor panic and large drops in asset prices are often more noticeable in 
equity markets. Nonetheless, it is possible that other foreign-based variables can be 
constructed to gauge the impact that financial crisis has on neighbouring currency markets or 
the banking sectors and via contagion the Australian market. This could be an avenue for 
future research into foreign-based indicators of financial stress in Australia. The chapter that 
follows discusses the aggregation techniques that were used to design the Australian 
composite financial stress index. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
INDEX AGGREGATION AND EVALUATION 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter assembles a composite stress index to measure financial stress in the Australian 
financial market. This study uses 22 variables presented in chapter four to chapter eight of 
this thesis to construct a composite financial stress index. Two weighting techniques are 
considered when combining stress variables into an aggregate measure of financial stress. 
These techniques are the variance-equal-weights approach and the principal components 
analysis approach. These techniques are used to construct two composite indexes that are 
then compared in order to assess the performance of the two indexes. For the sake of 
comparison, this study standardises the variables of the stress indexes before including them 
in stress subindexes and subsequently in the composite stress index. The rest of this chapter is 
organized as follows. First, the procedure used to standardise the stress variables is outlined 
and implemented. Second, the standardised variables are used to construct stress subindexes. 
Third, a brief review of different index aggregation techniques is provided. Fourth, composite 
stress indexes are constructed using two index aggregation techniques. Fifth, the performance 
of the estimated indexes assessed. Last, concluding remarks are provided at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
9.2 Standardisation of the Variables 
This section discusses the importance of standardising variables prior to their inclusion in a 
composite index. It consists of an examination of the properties of the variables before 
standardisation, a discussion of the standardisation procedure utilised in this study and a brief 
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discussion of the properties of the standardised variables. This study considers the use of 22 
variables for inclusion in the composite stress index; a detailed discussion of how each 
variable was constructed is contained in Chapters 4 to 8 of this thesis. Table 9.1 provides 
reference to the specific chapters and subsections that contain these discussions.  
Table 9.1: Cross References to the Variables 
Category of Variables Chapter Section(s) Variables 
Equity market  4 4.2.1 
 
4.2.2-4.2.3 
 
4.2.4 
 
4.2.5 
 Inverted CMAX for the All Ordinaries index 
 Modified percentage change in the All Ordinaries 
index from a year ago 
 Negative Equity returns on the All Ordinaries Index 
 Volatility (AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) model for the All 
Ordinaries index 
Bond  
market 
5 5.3.1  3-year BBB to A corporate bond yield spreads 
 5-year BBB to A corporate bond yield spreads 
 7-year BBB to A corporate bond yield spreads 
 10-year BBB to A corporate bond yield spreads  
Currency markets  6 6.4.1 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4.2 
6.4.3 
 Currency market volatility models for the: 
a. Australian Dollar to the Chinese Yuan Renminbi 
b. Australian Dollar to the Japanese Yen 
c. Australian Dollar to the US dollar 
d. Australian trade weighted index 
 Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) 
 Inverted CMAX Australian Trade Weighted index  
Banking sector 6 6.7.1 
6.7.2 
6.7.3 
 Refined banking beta 
 Inverted yield spread (10 year Government bond to 
90 day treasury bill) 
 Credit to GDP gap 
Supplementary 
Australian-based 
indicators  
7 7.2.6 
 
7.3 
7.4 
 Proxy LIBOR-OIS spread: interbank overnight 
cash-overnight indexed swap (IOC-OIS)spread  
 Inverted CMAX Australian property index 
 Inverted S&P/ASX 300 Metals and Mining 
Foreign-based 
indicators  
8 8.3  Inverted CMAX for lagged Chinese Hang Seng 
Index 
 Inverted CMAX for lagged American S&P 500 
Index 
 
 
9.2.1 The Importance of Standardising Variables 
The ultimate purpose of this study is to develop an aggregate stress index that subsumes 
information derived from the 22 variables. Given that these variables are often measured 
and/or presented at different (rather than a) common scale/s, it is imperative to start with a 
consideration of variable scaling (Oet et al., 2015). When variables are measured using 
different scales, it can result in variables with extreme values inappropriately emerging as a 
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dominant indicator of financial stress. If one were to examine each variable separately with 
due consideration for the scaling used, it would be possible to correctly identify the extreme 
value or threshold that signals the presence of financial stress. However, if one were to 
combine variables of different scales without bearing in mind the effect that the different 
scales could have on the aggregate measure; it would result in a composite measure that only 
identifies presence of stress based on the highest value of set the variables being aggregated. 
Thus, there is a risk that a variable with the highest values will be inappropriately highlighted 
as the most important factor for explaining financial stress while a variable with lowest 
values will be deemed the least important. Consequently, the resulting composite stress index 
would be susceptible to the ad hoc identification of the most important indicator of stress 
being the variable with the highest values. It is important to note that this could change 
depending on the range of data collected by a researcher, the choice of variables to be 
included in the composite index and so on. This problem can be addressed by standardising 
the variables before using them in the composite index. This study uses standardisation to 
rescale the variables to a common scale and rebases the variables via indexing from 0 to 100 
before aggregating the variables into a composite index. This is an approach that was utilised 
by Cardarelli et al. (2011) and Illing and Liu (2006). Standardised variables are measured on 
one scale and it is possible to identify and set a global threshold or identify extreme value that 
signal financial stress (or crisis). Moreover, standardised variables will be easier to compare 
and interpret both prior to, and after, the aggregation of the variables into a composite 
measure. In the subsection that follows this study will proceed to examine the variables of 
interest while bearing in mind the variable scaling. Hereafter, variables will be standardised 
before being incorporated into composite measures of stress. 
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9.2.2 Procedure for Standardising Variables 
This study now inspects the scaling of variables used to determine whether standardisation of 
the variables is appropriate. One way to examine the variable scaling is by finding the 
maximum and minimum values of the variables of interest. Table 9.2 reports the maximum 
and minimum values for the 22 variables used in this study along with other summary 
statistics. At first glance, the scaling of the percentage change in equity index variable is far 
removed from the scaling of the other 21 variables. In particular, the observed values of this 
variable approximately range between 55 and 146 whereas most of the other variables 
approximately range between negative eight and six. The difference in scaling of the 
variables is due to the fact that each variable is constructed in a different manner, which 
results in each variable being measured on a different scale as is evident in Table 9.2. The use 
of variables with varying scales poses distinct problem to a researcher especially when all 
variables have to be subsumed into a composite index. While it is easy to use the individual 
variables to assess the presence (or absence) of stress in different sectors of the Australian 
economy, it is difficult to incorporate variables with diverse scales into one index that can be 
easily and meaningfully interpreted. In particular, this means that each variable will have a 
different threshold or extreme value that signals a crisis. The importance of scaling of 
variables can be illustrated considering two variables. Specifically, let the variables being 
considered be the percentage change in the Australian equity index and the inverted CMAX 
for the All Ordinaries stock exchange. Now suppose further, that these two variables are to be 
included in a composite index that was comprised of these variables only. If this is the case, 
then an examination each variable prior to their inclusion in the composite index is 
warranted. Refer to the summary statistics of the percentage change in the Australian equity 
index and the inverted CMAX for the All Ordinaries provided in Table 9.2. Extreme values 
that would signal a crisis would be the maximum values. In the case of the inverted CMAX 
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for the All Ordinaries and the percentage change in the Australian equity index, the 
maximum values would be 2.006 and 145.729 respectively. If the composite index were to be 
obtained by a simple average of the two variables then the new value that indicates a crisis 
would be 73.8675 ((2.006+145.729)/2). The average maximum value (73.8675) is much 
higher than the maximum value of the inverted CMAX for the All Ordinaries (2.006) and 
much lower than the maximum value of the percentage change in the Australian equity index 
(145.729). Moreover, it is not truly representative of the maximum value of either of the 
variables; this is because the average maximum value is far removed from the maximum 
values of the two variables that were subsumed into the composite index. If the standardised 
variables were used instead then the maximum values of the two variables as shown in Table 
9.3 would be 4.858 and 3.008 for the inverted CMAX of the All Ordinaries and the 
percentage change in the equity index respectively. The maximum average of the two 
variables now would be 3.993 ((4.458+3.008)/2); this would be the value of the composite 
index of the two variables. Note that in this case the average of the standardised variables 
provides a maximum average that is not far removed from the maximum values of the 
variables that form the index. Moreover, it can also be concluded that average measure 
obtained from standardised variables is a better representation of the maximum values of the 
variables that are contained in the summary measure. For this reason, this study expresses all 
variables in a standard form and incorporates the standardised variables into a composite 
stress index; the resultant composite index can easily be interpreted. It is important to note 
that standardised variables are still able of gauge the potential for stress or crisis in the 
Australian financial market.  
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Table 9.2: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables  
 Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Inverted CMAX for the All Ordinaries  1.000 2.006 1.145 0.232 
Percentage change in equity index  55.143 145.729 93.814 18.636 
Negative Equity returns, All Ordinaries Index 0.000 0.168 0.013 0.027 
Volatility in the All Ordinaries index  0.000 0.006 0.001 0.001 
3-year BBB to A yield spread -0.160 3.930 0.745 0.693 
5-year BBB to A yield spread -0.040 5.050 0.791 0.774 
7-year BBB to A yield spread -0.020 2.130 0.692 0.481 
10-year BBB to A yield spread -0.100 4.790 0.807 0.752 
Volatility, Australian Dollar to Chinese Yuan Renminbi 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 
Volatility, Australian Dollar to the Japanese Yen 0.001 0.015 0.002 0.001 
Volatility, Australian Dollar to the US dollar 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.001 
Volatility of Trade Weighted index (TWI) 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.000 
Exchange Market Pressure Index -8.459 5.884 0.048 1.778 
Inverted CMAX TWI 0.991 1.081 1.011 0.018 
Refined banking beta 0.000 1.802 0.330 0.560 
Inverted yield spread  -2.350 1.810 -0.134 0.927 
Credit to GDP gap -0.126 0.154 -0.002 0.066 
IOC-IOS spread -0.400 1.060 0.035 0.235 
Inverted CMAX Australian property index 1.000 2.677 1.187 0.356 
Inverted S&P/ASX 300 metals and mining 1.000 1.888 1.234 0.240 
Inverted CMAX, lagged Chinese Hang Seng Index 1.000 2.447 1.187 0.314 
Inverted CMAX, lagged American S&P 500 Index 1.000 2.108 1.122 0.225 
 
Several authors suggest that a variable can be adequately standardised by considering its 
mean and standard deviation in order to estimate z-score values (Corbet, 2014; Dahalan et al., 
2016; Ekinci, 2013; Hakkio & Keeton, 2009; Oet et al., 2015; Siņenko et al., 2013; 
Vermeulen et al., 2015).Therefore, each series was standardised by calculating the sample 
mean and standard deviation, and these measures are used to estimate the z-values for each 
series as shown in formula 10.1. Where 𝑧𝑡 is the estimated z-score value of a given variable 
at time t, 𝑥𝑡 is the value of the variable at time t and the arithmetic mean and the sample 
standard deviation are, respectively, ?̅? and 𝑠. 
 𝑧𝑡 =
𝑥𝑡−?̅?
𝑠
      (9.1) 
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Table 9.3: Descriptive Statistics for Standardised Variables  
 
 
Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Inverted CMAX for All Ordinaries√ -0.608 4.858 0.000 1.000 
Percentage change in equity index√ -4.062 3.008 0.000 1.000 
Negative Equity returns on the All Ordinaries Index√ -0.425 12.720 0.000 1.000 
Volatility in the All Ordinaries index√ -0.562 8.608 0.000 1.000 
3-year BBB to A yield spread
∆
 -1.306 4.595 0.000 1.000 
5-year BBB to A yield spread
∆
 -1.074 5.504 0.000 1.000 
7-year BBB to A yield spread
∆
 -1.479 2.989 0.000 1.000 
10-year BBB to A yield spread
∆
 -1.206 5.297 0.000 1.000 
Volatility, Australian Dollar to the Chinese Yuan Renminbi√ -2.949 2.213 0.000 1.000 
Volatility, Australian Dollar to the Japanese Yen√ -0.826 10.544 0.000 1.000 
Volatility, Australian Dollar to the US dollar √ -1.131 4.300 0.000 1.000 
Volatility of Trade Weighted index (TWI)
 √ -1.179 8.370 0.000 1.000 
Exchange Market Pressure Index√ -5.407 3.764 0.000 1.000 
Inverted CMAX TWI√ -1.469 4.009 0.000 1.000 
Refined banking beta
⸹
 -0.519 2.946 0.000 1.000 
Inverted yield spread
⸹
 -2.463 2.356 0.000 1.000 
Credit to GDP gap
⸹
 -2.132 2.552 0.000 1.000 
IOC-IOS spread
∆
 -1.849 4.352 0.000 1.000 
Inverted CMAX Australian property index
∆
 -0.526 4.190 0.000 1.000 
Inverted S&P/ASX 300 metals and mining
∆
 -0.976 2.725 0.000 1.000 
Inverted CMAX for lagged Chinese Hang Seng Index
∆
 -0.595 4.009 0.000 1.000 
Inverted CMAX for lagged American S&P 500 Index
∆
 -0.541 4.374 0.000 1.000 
Note: The range of data sampled varies as follows. 
1. √ indicates that data is sampled from February 1984 to December 2014 
2. ∆ indicates that data is sampled from January 2005 to December 2014 
3. ⸹ indicates that data is sampled from February 2002 to December 2014 
Table 9.3 presents the summary statistics for the standardised variables. From this point 
onward, this study used the standardised variables in the following manner. First, some of the 
standardised variables were used to construct stress subindexes. Second, standardised 
variables that were excluded from the stress subindexes were combined with the stress 
subindexes in order to construct composite stress indexes. The section that follows explains 
why this study uses stress subindexes and outlines how each stress subindex was constructed. 
9.3 Construction of the Stress Subindexes  
While the primary goal of this thesis is to construct a composite financial stress index, this 
study acknowledges that different stakeholders may be interested in measuring the level of 
stress in certain sectors of the Australian economy. In order to cater to needs that are more 
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specialised, this chapter estimated four subindexes in addition to the composite stress 
indexes. The four subindexes are an equity market, bond market, currency market, and 
banking sector subindexes. These subindexes are designed to gauge financial stress that could 
be emanating from different sectors of the Australian economy. Further, these subindexes 
should cater for the specialised needs of most stakeholders in the financial markets. Also, this 
study uses the subindexes to reduce the risk of a certain sector of the economy being given 
higher priority than other sectors of the economy simply because there are more indicators for 
gauging the potential for stress in that sector than in any other sector (Oet et al., 2015). In 
order to understand the potential for this risk, refer to the summary of variables shown in 
Table 9.1. This study considers the use of 22 stress variables. Now, suppose the 22 variables 
were to be incorporated in a composite index without the use of subindexes. The following 
would ensue, the currency market category would be deemed the most important in 
determining the potential for stress in the Australian market because it has the greatest 
number of variables (six variables) compared to the other categories. Following the same 
logic, the equity and bond or money markets would be ranked second in importance (with 
four variables each). The ranking of the other categories seems ad hoc, especially since the 
importance of a category is merely dependent on the number of variables available in a 
particular category, there is no economic rationale to justify why that category is most 
important in determining the likelihood of stress in the Australian economy. In order to avoid 
the risk of overstating the importance of certain sectors as indicators of financial stress, this 
study proposes the use of the four subindexes. The constructed subindexes were subsequently 
incorporated into the composite stress indexes along with other variables, which were omitted 
from subindex measures. The sections that follow outlines the procedures used to estimate the 
four stress subindexes used in this study. 
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9.3.1 Equity Market Subindex 
The equity market subindex is a composite measure of financial stress in the Australian 
equity market. It consists of four standardised variables, namely: the inverted CMAX of the 
All Ordinaries index, the percentage change in the All Ordinaries index from a year ago, the 
negative equity returns on the All Ordinaries index and the volatility in the All Ordinaries 
index variable. The range of data points available for the four series varies as shown in Table 
9.4. This study uses the latest starting date to determine the range of the equity market 
subindex. As a result, the equity market subindex is constructed using the data from February 
1984 to December 2014 by taking the arithmetic mean of the four standardised variables. 
Figure 9.1 shows the graphical representation of the estimated equity market subindex.  
Illing and Liu (2003) suggest that stressful events can be identified by examining the value of 
this subindex relative to its long-run mean whereby values of the equity market subindex that 
are more than two standard deviations from the mean are considered as stressful events. This 
criterion was used to identify episodes of financial stress or crisis in this study. Accordingly, 
Figure 9.1 was shaded in order to highlight values that lie within two standard deviations of 
the mean. None of the values of the subindex is more than two standard deviations below the 
mean. However, some values of the subindex are more than two standard deviations above 
the mean. A demarcation line has been included in Figure 9.1 in order to identify the values 
that require further examination. A closer examination of the equity market subindex reveals 
that there are two noticeably peaks in the equity market subindex in November 1987 and 
November 2008. These two points correspond to two stressful episodes in the Australian 
equity market due to the 1987 stock market crash and 2007-2009 subprime mortgage crises. 
It would appear that the impact of the former crisis was greater than the latter. 
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Table 9.4: Range of Data for Equity Subindex Variables 
Variable 
Range of data Number of 
observations Starting date Ending date 
Inverted CMAX for All Ordinaries  December 1981 December 2014 397 
% change in the All Ordinaries over a year  January 1980 December 2014 420 
Negative Equity returns on the All Ordinaries  January 1980 December 2014 420 
Volatility for the All Ordinaries index February 1984 December 2014 371 
 
 
       Figure 9.1: Equity Market Subindex (Feb 1984 to Dec 2014) 
 
9.3.2 Bond Market Subindex 
The bond market subindex is comprised of four variables which are the standardised BBA to 
A corporate bond yield spreads for fixed maturities; these are for 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. Data 
for all variables ranges from January 2005 to December 2014 such that each series has 120 
observations. The bond market subindex was estimated by taking the arithmetic mean of the 
four yield spreads. The resultant index is graphed in Figure 9.2. The highest value of the bond 
subindex was recorded in December 2008 with an index value of 4.3; this value is more than 
two standard deviations above the mean value of the index and indicative of high levels of 
distress. This episode of distress in the bond markets corresponds to the timing of the 2007-
2009 subprime mortgage crises.  
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Figure 9.2: Bond Market Subindex (Jan 2005 to Dec 2014) 
 
9.3.3 Currency Market Subindex 
Six variables were used to construct the currency market subindex. These variables are an 
Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI), an inverted CMAX Australian Trade Weighted 
index (TWI) and four volatility models for: i) The Trade Weighted Index; ii) Australian 
dollar to the Chinese Yuan Renminbi (AUD/CNY); iii) Australian dollar to the Japanese Yen 
(AUD/JPY); and iv) Australian dollar to the American dollar (AUD/USD). The number of 
data points available for each variable varies as shown Table 9.5. The latest starting date was 
used to determine the range of the subindex. Consequently, the currency market subindex 
ranges from February 1984 to December 2014 and was estimated by taking the arithmetic 
mean of the six variables. The resultant subindex is represented graphically in Figure 9.3. The 
currency market subindex peaks at two points in August 1986 and November 2008. Both 
points exceed two standard deviations from the mean value of the currency subindex. These 
two points are indicative of distress in Australian currency markets that corresponds to the 
timing of two major crises. The data suggests the Australian currency markets suffered more 
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distress during the 2007-2009 subprime mortgage crises compared to the than in the 1987 
stock market crash. 
Table 9.5: Range of Data for Currency Subindex Variables  
Variable 
Range of data Number of 
observations Starting date Ending date 
Volatility of the AUD/CNY February 1984 December 2014 371 
Volatility of the AUD/JPY February 1984 December 2014 371 
Volatility of the AUD/USD February 1984 December 2014 371 
Volatility of TWI February 1984 December 2014 371 
Exchange Market Pressure Index January 1984 December 2014 372 
Inverted CMAX TWI January 1980 December 2014 420 
 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Currency Market Subindex (Feb 1984 to Dec 2014) 
 
9.3.4 Banking Sector Subindex 
This study constructed the banking sector subindex by finding the arithmetic mean of three 
standardised variables. These variables are the refined banking beta, inverted yield spread, 
and credit-to-GDP gap. The range of data points available for each variable varies as shown 
in Table 9.6. The latest starting date was used to determine the starting point of the subindex. 
Consequently, the banking sector subindex ranges from February 2002 to December 2014 
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and a graphical representation of the estimated subindex is provided in Figure 9.4. There are 
no values of the banking sector subindex lies beyond two standard deviations from the mean. 
Hence, it can be concluded that there were no episodes of distress in the Australian banking 
sector from February 2002 to December 2014. It is interesting to note that Australian banks 
fared better than other countries during the 2007-2009 subprime mortgage crisis in part due to 
the presence of lower risk loans in the Australian banks’ portfolio and strict regulatory 
requirements enforced by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (Edwards, 2010; 
Pais & Stork, 2011). 
Table 9.6: Range of Data for Banking Sector Variables  
Variable 
Range of data Number of 
observations Starting date Ending date 
Refined banking beta February 2002 December 2014 155 
Inverted yield spread  January 1970 December 2014 540 
Credit to GDP gap September 1976 December 2014 460 
 
 
Figure 9.4: Banking Sector Subindex (Feb 2002 to Dec 2014) 
 
At this point, it is important to note that the estimated stress subindexes no longer possess the 
standardised features of the original variables (a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one). This study standardised the stress subindexes to maintain uniformity of all variables 
being used in the composite stress index. The descriptive statistics of the standardised stress 
subindexes are shown in Table 9.7. This study now proceeds to use the constructed stress 
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subindexes and other stress variables
75
 to construct composite stress indexes. The section that 
follows outlines the procedure used to construct composite stress indexes. 
Table 9.7: Descriptive Statistics for Standardised Stress Subindexes 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Equity Market Subindex -0.939 3.722 0.000 1.000 
Bond Market Subindex -1.268 4.408 0.000 1.000 
Currency Market Subindex -1.107 6.856 0.000 1.000 
Banking Sector subindex -2.131 2.404 0.000 1.000 
 
9.4 Construction of Composite Stress Indexes 
The procedures used to estimate composite stress indexes are outlined in this section. The 
subsequent subsections are organised as follows. First, a brief overview of commonly used 
approaches to index aggregation is discussed. Here the issue of different weighting 
techniques that could be used for index aggregation is discussed before determining the 
weighting techniques that are suitable for construction of the Australian stress index.  
9.4.1 Overview of Index Aggregation Approaches 
Few studies explore the performance of different index aggregation techniques. A notable 
study is one by Illing and Liu (2006) which compares four aggregating approaches, namely 
the credit weights, the variance-equal weights (VEW), the principal component analysis 
(PCA), and the transformation based on sample cumulative distribution functions (CDF) 
approach. The aforementioned authors transformed all stress variables so that each variable 
lay between 0.0 and 100.0, inclusive. This transformation ensured that the variables could be 
represented on the same scale. The transformed variables were then used to construct four 
indexes. Stressful events were identified when values lay more than two standard deviations 
above the mean.
76
 The four indexes were compared and the performance of the indexes was 
assessed based on the ability of these indexes to provide accurate predictions of an episode of 
                                                 
75
 These stress variables were excluded from the stress subindexes. 
76
 The threshold for identifying a crisis was set based on the two standard deviations above the mean based on 
the 68-95-99.7 empirical rule. Therefore, stress index values that are more 97.5 highlight the presence of a 
crisis (Illing & Liu, 2003, 2006). 
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financial stress. The best performing index was identified as the index based on the credit 
weights approach since it reported the least type I and II errors.
77
 In a more recent study, Oet 
et al. (2015) examined the performance of the four weighting approaches and arrived at the 
same conclusion when considering monthly data. An interesting finding of the 
aforementioned authors study was that, when dealing with quarterly data, the credit weights 
and the PCA stress indexes performed better than the VEW and the CDF stress indexes. 
Nevertheless, the credit weights index seems to be the preferred option overall because the 
choice of weights can be economically justified.  
While the use of the credit weights approach seems ideal, it is often not the approach of 
choice for many researchers because data needed to estimate the weights is not always readily 
available. By definition, the credit weights approach divides an economy into sectors and 
then assigns stress variables to those sectors. Quantitative data for the identified sectors of the 
economy is obtained and used to calculate the weights of the stress variables. This approach 
is most successful when the variables can be grouped into categories that are representative of 
the economy. Moreover, the researcher must be able to identify suitable quantitative 
measures that can be used to represent the identified sectors of the economy. Illing and Liu 
(2006) use total credit in the Canadian economy to determine the credit weights and 
successful categorise stress variables based on whether the credit was owed to the 
government, banks, corporate bodies or the equity market.  
Oet et al. (2015) employed the credit weights technique by dividing the financial system up 
into six segments in order to estimate credit weights for the stress variables. These segments 
were comprised of the property, equity, credit, currency, securitization, and funding markets. 
Attempts to obtain data for the six segments proved unsuccessful in some cases and it was 
                                                 
77
  A Type I Error occurs when the estimate stress index indicates that there is no crisis while there actually was 
a crisis. A Type II Error occurs when there is actually no crisis but the index indicates that there is a financial 
crisis. Illing and Liu (2006) use a survey to identify periods of financial crisis. 
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necessary to allocate equal weights for segments with no data. This ad hoc assignment of the 
weights could compromise the economic significance of the weights, especially since the 
choice of weights can no longer be economically justified.  
This study suggests that, when in doubt, it is better to avoid ad hoc assignment of the weights 
to variables that might result in weights of questionable economic relevance. Balakrishnan et 
al. (2011) adopt this approach when dealing with the credit weights identification problem. 
The aforementioned authors examined 35 countries (17 advanced and 18 emerging countries) 
in order to determine the potential for transmission of financial stress from advanced to 
emerging countries. The credit-weighted approach was considered, but obtaining comparable 
weights for all countries being considered in the study was difficult. Therefore, Balakrishnan 
et al. (2011) chose to use the VEW approach instead—it was useful in developing a stress 
index that performed just as well as the credit weights approach stress index and offered 
weights that were as robust as those obtained from the PCA approach. 
With respect to this study, the use of the credit weights approach was considered and deemed 
inadequate for a number of reasons. Apart from the foreign and currency market variables, 
the other variables can be grouped into the following categories: equity market, bond market, 
and banking sector. An attempt was made to segment the Australian economy into three 
sectors based on the total credit outstanding to the bond market, equity market, and banks. 
With the exception of the foreign-based variables
78
 and currency market variables,
79
 other 
sectors could adequately be used to classify most of the stress variables used in this study. 
Data for credit outstanding is available for the three sectors from the Australian Bureau of 
                                                 
78
 These variables are the lagged Chinese Hang Seng index and the lagged US S&P 500 index. 
79
 These variables are the exchange market pressure index (EMPI), the inverted Australian trade weighted index 
and volatility measures for the Australian dollar to the Japanese Yen, US dollar and Chinese Yuan. 
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Statistics
80
 website, albeit at a quarterly interval.
81
 The Australian Bureau of Statistics reports 
total credit information for credit owed to the rest of the world. However, the focus of this 
study, especially with respect to the foreign-based variables, is the historical credit owed in 
the American and Chinese financial markets, as this is what would be relevant in determining 
the credit weights for the foreign-based variables. Data relating to currency market was not 
readily available. Therefore, in summary, this study opted against the use of the credit 
weights approach due to lack of data at monthly frequency that could be used to accurately 
estimate credit weights for the currency market and the foreign-based variables. Therefore, 
the discussion that follows will now focus on the use of the VEW, the transformation by 
CDFs and the PCA aggregation approaches.  
Siņenko et al. (2013) explores the use of the VEW, the transformation by CDFs and the PCA 
approaches when constructing a stress index for the Latvian financial market on a quarterly 
interval. The aforementioned authors argue that the VEW and PCA approaches were noted to 
provide similar estimates of financial stress and performed better than the transformation by 
sample CDFs approach. The methodology used in the transformation by sample CDFs 
approach was criticised for yielding stress estimates that were more amplified (higher or 
lower) than the other two approaches. Furthermore, the transformation by sample CDFs 
seemed to distort the structure of the stress variables and the composite stress index in a 
manner that could suggest that periods with varying levels of financial stress had the same 
level of financial stress (Siņenko et al., 2013). Oet et al. (2015) also raised similar concerns 
about the transformation by sample CDFs approach in stress index construction. In particular, 
the aforementioned authors argued that the process of transformation by sample CDFs could 
be used to develop a stress index, which adequately identified when financial stress had 
                                                 
80
 Data for the total credit is available from ABS spreadsheets of catalogue number 5232.0 - Australian National 
Accounts: Finance and Wealth.   
81
 The Reserve Bank of Australia also provides information of credit aggregates at an annual interval (Reserve 
Bank of Australia, 2017). 
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occurred. Unfortunately, the same index made it difficult to determine the degree of financial 
stress that had occurred. It is imperative to develop a financial stress index that not only 
measures the prevailing level of stress but also provides a reasonable estimate of the 
magnitude of stress at a given time. Moreover, it is likely that an index aggregation approach 
that limits the stress index’s ability to adequately signal the magnitude of stress also makes 
that stress index an unsuitable measure of financial stress. This study opted against using a 
transformation by sample CDFs approach in the index construction because of the drawbacks 
of this approach, that are highlighted in literature (Oet et al., 2015; Siņenko et al., 2013). 
This discussion now turns to the usefulness of the last two index aggregation approaches, the 
VEW and the PCA approach. The VEW approach seems to be the most popular method of 
index aggregation (Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Cardarelli et al., 2011; Ekinci, 2013; Illing & 
Liu, 2006; Park & Mercado, 2014; Siņenko et al., 2013). This is probably because it is easy to 
estimate and interpret a stress index that is constructed by the VEW approach. All that is 
required in this approach is estimation of the arithmetic mean of standardised variables in 
order to obtain a composite stress index. Values of the stress index that lie more than two 
standard deviations above the mean are indicative of a stressful or crisis period. One 
shortcoming of this approach is it assumes that the stress variables are normally distributed 
when in fact they may be non-normally distributed (Illing & Liu, 2006). Moreover, Oet et al. 
(2015) argue that assigning equal weights to all variables could cause the resulting stress 
index to be dominated by the sector that contains the most stress indicators.
82
 However, 
Siņenko et al. (2013) compared the performance of a stress index constructed with equal 
weights (VEW approach) and a stress index with varying weights (PCA approach) and found 
no significant difference in the estimated level of financial stress. Overall, proponents of the 
VEW approach argue that it sufficiently captures the periods of financial stress and crisis that 
                                                 
82
 This issue was discussed in more detail earlier and is one of the main motivations for the use stress 
subindexes in this study. 
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have been documented in literature (Balakrishnan et al., 2011). This is most likely why the 
VEW approach is still widely accepted method for index aggregation. 
Several studies have explored the use of the principal component analysis (PCA) weighting 
approach for constructing a composite financial stress index (Dahalan et al., 2016; Hakkio & 
Keeton, 2009; Illing & Liu, 2006; Park & Mercado, 2014; Siņenko et al., 2013). PCA is often 
used to summarise essential information from a set of interrelated variables into a single 
variable. Furthermore, the PCA approach is used to determine the weights to be assigned to 
the stress variables when combining the variables to a composite index. Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009) use monthly data for 11 stress indicators and the PCA approach to develop the Kansas 
City Financial stress index (KCFSI). The stress indicators were standardised before 
estimating the principal component, which explained about 61 percent of the variation in all 
the indicators. Values of the KCFSI that were greater than two standard deviations above the 
mean adequately highlighted the incidence of the 2007-2009 GFC. In particular, the highest 
value of stress recorded on the KCFSI was 5.6 standard deviations from the mean, which was 
reported in October 2008. This corresponds to the timing when the crisis was at its worst. 
Park and Mercado (2014) used the PCA approach to estimated financial stress indexes for 
forty countries
83
 and found that the resulting indexes adequately highlighted the historical 
incidents of crisis as identified in literature. This study will follow a similar approach when 
using the PCA approach. The estimated PCA stress index shall be checked to see whether it 
captures historical periods of crisis or stress. 
This study estimated two composite stress indexes using two weighting approaches, namely 
the VEW and the PCA approaches. The subsequent subsections discuss how the stress 
subindexes and other stress variables are used to construct the two composite stress indexes. 
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 This study examined fifteen advanced and twenty five emerging countries. 
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For ease of comparison and interpretation, all composite stress indexes are expressed in 
standardised form. 
 
9.4.2 Variance-equal Weights Approach 
This subsection outlines the procedures followed when estimating the Australian composite 
financial stress index using the variance-equal weights (VEW) approach. The resulting index 
is referred to in subsequent sections as the VEW stress index.  
The variance-equal weights (VEW) approach is one of the simplest approaches to 
aggregating an index. This approach calculates the arithmetic mean of the standardised 
variables in order to determine the value of the composite index. This study uses the stress 
subindexes that were constructed in Section 9.3 and other variables that were excluded from 
these subindexes to assemble the VEW stress index. As a result, the VEW stress index is 
comprised of nine variables; these are five variables and four subindexes. Table 9.8 lists the 
variables of the VEW stress index and the range of data available for each variable or 
subindex. In order to estimate the composite stress index this study sampled data ranging 
from January 2005 to December 2014. This range of data was chosen in order to avoid the 
problem of missing data. For instance, if data was sampled from February 1984 to December 
2014, there are missing data points from February 1984 to December 2004 for five variables 
and the bond subindex. Additionally, there would be missing data points from February 1984 
to January 2002 for the banking sector subindex. Therefore, the VEW composite index was 
estimated by calculating the arithmetic mean of the nine variables with data ranging from 
January 2005 to December 2014. 
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Table 9.8: Range of Data for VEW Index Variables 
Variable Range of data 
Equity Market Subindex February 1984 to December 2014 
Bond Market Subindex January 2005 to December 2014 
Currency Market Subindex February 1984 to December 2014 
Banking Sector subindex February 2002 to December 2014 
IOC-IOS spread January 2005 to December 2014 
Inverted CMAX Australian property index January 2005 to December 2014 
Inverted S&P/ASX 300 metals and mining January 2005 to December 2014 
Inverted CMAX for lagged Chinese Hang Seng Index January 2005 to December 2014 
Inverted CMAX for lagged American S&P 500 Index January 2005 to December 2014 
 
 
Equation 9.1 shows the formula for calculating the index. Where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the value of variable i 
at time t and n is the total number of variables in the index. Since the VEW index contains nine 
variables, the value of the stress index at time t would be obtained by summing the value of the 
nine variables at time t and dividing this sum by nine.  
𝑉𝐸𝑊 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = ∑
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1            (9.1) 
A graphical representation of the estimated VEW stress index is provided in Figure 9.5. 
Values of the VEW stress index that are more than two standard deviations from the long-run 
mean are identified as stressful events. One period of stress is identified that lasted from 
October 2008 to March 2009 when the estimated values of the index are 2.4 and 2.3, 
respectively. The most stressful month for the period being studied is identified as November 
2008 when the value of the index was 3.5. The timing of the episode of stress identified by 
this index corresponds to the timing of the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis as cited in 
literature. For instance, Sykes (2010) states that the worst months of the financial crisis were 
from September 2008 to March 2009. This study re-estimates composite stress indexes using 
the principal components analysis weighting approaches in the next section of this chapter.  
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Figure 9.5: Composite VEW Stress Index (Jan 2005 to Dec 2014) 
 
9.4.3 Principal Components Analysis 
This subsection outlines the procedure followed when estimating the Australian composite 
financial stress index using the principal components analysis (PCA) approach. The resultant 
index will be referred to in subsequent sections as the PCA stress index. PCA estimations 
were performed using IBM SPSS version 22 statistical software package. 
Much like the VEW stress index, the PCA stress index is comprised of the nine variables 
listed in Table 9.7. This study uses PCA approach to summarise essential information from 
five stress variables and four subindexes into a composite stress index. It is good practice to 
examine the relationship between variables in a data set before engaging in a PCA exercise. 
This will help to determine whether the use of the PCA is warranted. Accordingly, this study 
shall examine the set of data to see if the nine variables meet three criteria. If these three 
criteria are met, the use of PCA is warranted, otherwise the use of the PCA may be 
inappropriate. The first criterion is that at least two pairwise correlation coefficients of the 
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variables under study should be more than 0.3. The second criterion is that the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO-MSA) (Kaiser, 1970, 1974) for the estimated 
principal components should be greater or equal to 0.6. A KMO-MSA value of 0.6 or more 
indicates that the sample is adequate and suitable for PCA. Therefore, this study checks if the 
KMO-MSA for individual variables and the set of variables is over 0.6. The third criterion is 
that the reported Bartlett’s test of sphericity statistic (Bartlett, 1954) for the estimated 
principal components is significant at a five percent level of significance. A significant 
Bartlett test statistic suggests that a sufficient correlation exists among the set of variables 
being studied (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2005; Pallant, 2011; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
This study uses pairwise correlation coefficients for the nine variables to determine if the first 
criterion was satisfied. Table 9.9 contains a summary of the estimated correlation coefficients 
that are presented in the form of a correlation matrix. An inspection of the correlation matrix 
reveals the presence of several coefficients that exceed 0.3. Notably, it is only the correlation 
coefficients relating to the banking sector subindex that are all less than 0.3. There are very 
strong positive correlations between the four pairs of variables. These are the inverted lagged 
Hang Seng index and the inverted Australian property index, the inverted lagged S&P 500 
index and the inverted Australian property index with correlation coefficients of 0.933 and 
0.906 respectively. In addition, the inverted lagged Hang Seng index and the inverted lagged 
S&P 500 index have correlation coefficients of 0.942 while the Australian equity market 
subindex and the inverted lagged Hang Seng Index have correlation coefficient of 0.935. The 
strong positive correlations indicate that an increase in one variable is associated with an 
increase in the other variable. For example, a one-month-lagged increase in the prices on the 
American and Chinese stock markets is associated with increases in the Australian property 
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market. Generally, highly correlated variables could lead to the problem of multicollinearity
84
 
when performing regression analysis. However, this is not an issue of concern when 
performing PCA because the technique can be performed on a set of variables that are highly 
correlated. In fact, Kennedy (2008) states that the PCA is better than regression analysis 
because it can be used to eliminate redundant information.  
Table 9.9: Correlation Matrix for PCA Index Variables 
 
  IOC-
OIS 
Spread 
Inverted 
Property 
Index 
Inverted 
Metals & 
Mining 
Index 
Inverted 
lagged 
Hang Seng 
Index 
Inverted 
lagged 
S&P 500 
Index 
Bond 
Market 
Subindex 
 
Equity 
Market 
Subindex 
Currency 
Market 
Subindex 
Banking 
Sector 
Subindex 
IOC-OIS 
Spread 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
Inverted 
Property 
Index 
0.578 1.000 - - - - - - - 
Inverted 
Metals & 
Mining 
Index 
0.726 0.554 1.000 - - - - - - 
Inverted 
lagged 
Hang Seng 
Index 
0.719 0.933 0.718 1.000 - - - - - 
 Inverted 
lagged S&P 
500 Index 
0.538 0.906 0.637 0.942 1.000 - - - - 
Bond 
Market 
Subindex 
0.762 0.554 0.815 0.688 0.616 1.000 - - - 
Equity 
Market 
Subindex 
0.694 0.891 0.674 0.935 0.875 0.701 1.000 - - 
Currency 
Market 
Subindex 
0.691 0.635 0.615 0.723 0.660 0.738 0.703 1.000 - 
Banking 
Sector 
Subindex 
0.065 0.062 -0.192 -0.027 -0.229 -0.275 -0.008 -0.055 1.000 
 
The statistics relating to the other two criteria are presented in Tables 9.10 and 9.11. The 
KMO-MSA for the individual variables is reported in Table 9.10. With the exception of the 
banking sector subindex, measures of sampling adequacy for all other variables are greater 
than 0.6. Table 9.11 reports the KMO-MSA and the Bartlett's test of sphericity for the set of 
nine variables. The overall KMO-MSA is 0.831 which is greater than 0.6. The estimated chi-
                                                 
84
  Multicollinearity can lead to a number of problems. In particular, if an ordinary least squares regression 
model is estimated using highly correlated variables, the resulting model can contain coefficients with high 
standard errors or variances, coefficients with wrong signs and the hypothesis tests checking for significance 
of the estimated coefficients could yield incorrect results. See Kennedy (2008) for a more detailed discusion. 
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squared value for Bartlett's test of sphericity is 1411.134 with a probability of zero; this 
indicates that the test statistic is significant at a five percent level of significance. Overall, the 
first and third criteria were satisfied, while the second criterion was not satisfied. This study 
omitted the banking sector subindex from the set of variables in order to ensure the second 
criterion was satisfied. Once the banking sector subindex was excluded from the set of 
variable, the resulting set of eight variables were found to have a KMO-MSA that satisfied 
the second criterion. This meant that the three criteria were satisfied and that the use of PCA 
was acceptable. Consequently, this study will now proceed to estimate the principal 
components for the eight variables instead of nine variables.  
Table 9.10: KMO Test Results for Variables 
Variable Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
IOC-OIS 0.837 
Inverted Property Index 0.903 
Inverted Metals & Mining Index 0.881 
Inverted lagged Hang Seng Index 0.797 
Inverted lagged S&P 500 Index 0.753 
Bond Market Subindex 0.827 
Equity Market Subindex 0.954 
Currency Market Subindex 0.917 
Banking Sector Subindex 0.161 
 
 
Table 9.11: KMO-MSA and Bartlett’s Test Results 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Chi-squared statistic Degrees of freedom Probability 
0.831 1411.134 36 0.000 
 
 
PCA is able to express a set of correlated variables as a new set of independent uncorrelated 
variables, which are referred to as principal components. The number of principal 
components estimated depends on the number of variables being used in the analysis. In 
general, mathematically terms, it can be said that PCA will estimate k principal components 
for a set of k variables. In the case of this study, PCA will extract eight principal components 
from the eight variables. Each principal component is a linear expression of the original set of 
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variables which is obtained by calculating the weighted sum of the original set of variables 
(Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). A mathematical expression of principal components for k 
variables is provided in equation 9.2. Where 𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑘 represent the principal 
components for a set of k variables, 𝑤11, 𝑤12, … , 𝑤𝑘𝑘 represent the factor loadings or 
weights, and 𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑘 represent the original set of variables.  
𝑐1 = 𝑤11𝑦1 + 𝑤12𝑦2 + ⋯ + 𝑤1𝑘𝑦𝑘 
𝑐2 = 𝑤21𝑦1 + 𝑤22𝑦2 + ⋯ + 𝑤2𝑘𝑦𝑘 
      . 
      . 
      . 
    𝑐𝑘 = 𝑤𝑘1𝑦1 + 𝑤𝑘2𝑦2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑘   (9.2) 
 
The factor loadings are estimated using a procedure that restricts the sum of squares of the 
coefficients for each component to one. This constraint can be expressed mathematically as 
shown in equation 9.3. Since the variables used in this study have been standardised, the 
factor loadings are equal to the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix for the nine variables. 
𝑤11 + 𝑤12 + ⋯ + 𝑤1𝑘 = 1 
𝑤21 + 𝑤22 + ⋯ + 𝑤2𝑘 = 1 
      . 
      . 
      . 
  𝑤𝑘1 + 𝑤𝑘2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑘 = 1  (9.3) 
 
PCA with varimax rotation
85
 was performed in order to assess the underlying structure of the 
eight variables. The un-rotated factor loadings for the extracted component are provided in 
Table 9.12. PCA revealed there was only one component with an eigenvalue of 6.075, which 
was greater than one. This component explained 75.935 percent of the variance in the eight 
variables. Since there was only one component extracted, no rotation was performed on the 
factors. All variables load very highly (over 80 percent) on the extracted component but it is 
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 The Varimax Rotation technique is used to extract uncorrelated variables from correlated variables. 
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the inverted lagged Chinese Hang Seng Index that loads the highest (96.1 percent) on the 
extracted component. The IOC-OIS has the lowest loading on the extracted component. 
Figure 9.6 contains the scree plot of the eigenvalues of each component. An inspection of the 
scree plot shows that a one principal component solution was adequate.  
 
Table 9.12: Un-rotated Factor Loadings for PCA 
 Factor Loadings Communalities 
Inverted lagged Chinese Hang Seng Index 0.961 0.923 
Equity Market Subindex 0.935 0.874 
Inverted lagged American S&P 500 Index 0.894 0.799 
Inverted Australian Property Index 0.877 0.769 
Bond Market Subindex 0.837 0.700 
Currency Market Subindex 0.824 0.679 
Inverted Metals and Mining Index 0.819 0.670 
IOC-OIS spread 0.813 0.662 
 Eigenvalues percentage of variance 75.935 n.a. 
 
 
Figure 9.6: Scree Plot for the Eight Components  
 
Parallel analysis was also performed to check whether the use of one principal component 
was justified. This study uses statistical software developed by Marley Watkins to perform 
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Monte Carlo simulations of PCA for parallel analysis (Watkins, 2000). A hundred iterations 
were used to perform parallel analysis on a random data set with eight variables and 120 
subjects; this facilitated the generation of a data set that was similar to the one used in this 
study. Table 9.13 provides the output for the parallel analysis.  
Table 9.13: Output for the Parallel Analysis 
Eigenvalue Number Random Eigenvalue Standard Deviation 
1 1.4091 0.0851 
2 1.2458 0.0576 
3 1.1333 0.0415 
4 1.0328 0.0439 
5 0.9343 0.0432 
6 0.8418 0.0439 
7 0.7570 0.0457 
8 0.6460 0.0506 
Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis 
©2000 by Marley W. Watkins. All rights reserved. 
The random eigenvalues in Table 9.13 were compared with the actual eigenvalues reported in 
SPSS output for the PCA in order to determine how many components should be used in this 
study. Hypothesis tests were performed for the null hypothesis that the component should be 
included in the PCA. The alternative hypothesis is that the component should be excluded 
from the PCA. The criterion values for the hypothesis tests are the random eigenvalues that 
were obtained from the parallel analysis. The decision rule is that the null hypothesis is 
accepted if the actual eigenvalues greater than the criterion values, otherwise the null 
hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis. Table 9.14 provides comparison 
values and the decision for the hypothesis tests performed.  
Table 9.14: Comparison of PCA and Parallel Analysis Eigenvalues 
Component 
Actual Eigenvalue 
(PCA) 
Random Eigenvalue 
(Parallel Analysis) 
Decision 
1 6.075 1.409 accept 
2 0.898 1.246 reject 
3 0.384 1.133 reject 
4 0.297 1.033 reject 
5 0.161 0.934 reject 
6 0.094 0.842 reject 
7 0.072 0.757 reject 
8 0.019 0.646 reject 
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The parallel analysis confirms that the use of one principal component is warranted. 
Consequently, this study used the extracted component to estimate the financial stress index 
for Australia. The estimated PCA stress index is represented graphically in Figure 9.7.  
  
Figure 9.7: Composite PCA Stress Index (Jan 2005 to Dec 2014) 
Values of the PCA stress index that exceed two standard deviations from the long-run mean 
are identified as stressful events. One period of stress is identified that lasted from October 
2008 to April 2009 when the estimated values of the index are 2.9 and 2.6 respectively. The 
most stressful month for the period being studied is identified as November 2008 when the 
value of the index is 4.3. The timing of the episode of stress identified by this index 
corresponds to the timing of the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis as cited by Sykes (2010). 
This study compares the performance of the estimated PCA and VEW stress indexes in the 
next section of this chapter. 
9.5 Assessment of the Performance of the Indexes 
This section of the chapter is dedicated to examining two aspects of the performance 
of the VEW and PCA stress indexes; these are the monitoring and the forecasting 
capabilities of the estimated stress indexes. This study hypothesised in Section 3.2 of 
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Chapter 3 that the choice of index aggregation methods would affect the performance 
of the composite stress index. In the subsection that follows, this study evaluates the 
effectiveness of the stress indexes as tools for monitoring financial stress in the 
Australian economy. Here the ability of the stress indexes to capture the incidence of 
past and current episodes of financial stress or crisis was examined. Thereafter, this 
research explored the forecasting potential of both stress indexes. Here the forecasting 
performance of both indexes was evaluated in order to determine if one was superior 
to the other or if both are at par. Overall, this section seeks to determine whether 
either or both of the composite stress indexes are viable tools for monitoring and 
forecasting tools Australian financial stress.  
9.5.1 Monitoring Australian Financial Stress 
This research used two criteria to assess the potential use of the VEW and PCA stress indexes 
as a monitoring tool. The first criterion is that the stress indexes should adequately capture 
the incidence of past episodes of financial crisis for the period being studied; this is from 
January 2005 to December 2014. The second criterion is that the stress indexes should be 
able to gauge the prevailing level of stress in the Australian economy. For the second 
criterion, this study considered all monthly data available up to the time when this chapter 
was written. At the time of writing it was the month of July 2017, so this study attempted to 
obtain data for all stress variables until June 2017. With the exception of the credit to GDP 
gap variable, it was possible to extend the series for 21 stress variables until June 2017. With 
respect to the credit to GDP gap, no data for the real GDP
86
 was reported for the quarter 
ending June 2017 on the RBA website. The most recently available data for the real GDP was 
for the quarter ending March 2017. Consequently, this study opted to extend the stress 
                                                 
86
 Real GDP is one of the components that is required to estimate the credit to GDP gap. 
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indexes for the period ranging from January 2005 to March 2017 in order to examine the 
ability of both indexes to gauge the prevailing level of financial stress in Australia. 
A visual representation of the time series of VEW and PCA stress indexes was used to 
evaluate the first criterion. Figure 9.8 presents a comparative line graph in which both 
indexes adequately capture the incidence 2007-2009 GFC. There are two main differences 
between the two indexes. The first difference is that the PCA stress index indicates higher 
levels of stress compared to the VEW stress index especially during the peak month of the 
crisis (November 2008). 
 
Figure 9.8: Comparison of Composite Stress Indexes  
The second difference is that the duration of the episode of stress as identified by the two 
stress indexes differs slightly by a month. Specifically, both stress indexes highlight the onset 
of the GFC in October 2008, but the VEW stress index indicates that the episode of stress 
lasted for six months until March 2009 while the PCA stress index indicates that the episode 
of stress lasted until April 2009. Nevertheless, both indexes sufficiently provided indications 
that the Australian economy was in distress at the time of the crisis.  
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In order to assess whether the stress indexes could gauge the prevailing level of stress, this 
study extended the data set to include the most recently available data (at the time of writing). 
Consequently, data was sourced for the 22 variables and the VEW and PCA stress indexes 
were re-estimated for the extended period ranging from January 2005 to March 2017. All 
stress variables were standardised and four subindexes were assembled for use in both stress 
indexes. The descriptive statistics of the extended stress variables and subindexes after 
standardisation is provided in Table 9.15. The graphical representations of the extended stress 
variables and subindexes are provided in Figures 9.9 to 9.10 respectively.  
Table 9.15: Descriptive Statistics for Stress Subindexes and Variables 
Subindex / Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Equity Market Subindex -1.012 4.144 0.000 1.000 
Bond Market Subindex -1.146 5.234 0.000 1.000 
Currency Market Subindex -1.192 7.445 0.000 1.000 
Banking Sector subindex -1.929 3.089 0.000 1.000 
IOC-IOS spread -2.077 4.813 0.003 1.010 
Inverted CMAX Australian 
property index -0.498 4.691 0.002 1.010 
Inverted S&P/ASX 300 metals 
& mining -1.018 2.908 0.014 1.005 
Inverted CMAX for lagged 
Chinese Hang Seng Index -0.922 4.122 0.006 1.008 
Inverted CMAX for lagged 
American S&P 500 Index -0.667 3.486 0.013 1.006 
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Figure 9.9: Extended Series for Stress Variables (Jan 2005 to Mar 2017) 
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Figure 9.10: Extended Series for Stress Subindexes (Jan 2005 to Mar 2017) 
 
While the same procedure was followed when estimating the extended VEW stress index, a 
different procedure was used to estimate the PCA stress index. A different procedure had to 
be adopted because the principal component analysis for the extended series yielded two 
principal components instead of one. The extended series were examined based on three 
criteria
87
 in order to determine whether PCA was warranted. In order to assess the first 
criterion, pairwise correlation coefficients for the nine variables were obtained. Table 9.16 
presents the correlation matrix for the extended stress variables and subindexes. The first 
criterion is satisfied because there are several correlation coefficients are greater than 0.3.  
 
  
                                                 
87
 These criteria are, also, used to determine whether PCA was warranted in the subsection 9.4.3 of this chapter. 
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 Table 9.16: Correlation Matrix for Extended PCA Index Variables 
 IOC-OIS 
Spread 
Inverted 
Property 
Index 
Inverted 
Metals & 
Mining 
Index 
Inverted 
lagged 
Hang Seng 
Index 
Inverted 
lagged 
S&P 500 
Index 
Bond 
Market 
Subindex 
 
Equity 
Market 
Subindex 
Currency 
Market 
Subindex 
Banking 
Sector 
Subindex 
IOC-OIS 
Spread 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
Inverted 
Property 
Index 
0.551 1.000 - - - - - - - 
Inverted 
Metals & 
Mining 
Index 
0.636 0.420 1.000 - - - - - - 
Inverted 
lagged 
Hang Seng 
Index 
0.589 0.702 0.573 1.000 - - - - - 
 Inverted 
lagged S&P 
500 Index 
0.335 0.859 0.379 0.703 1.000 - - - - 
Bond 
Market 
Subindex 
0.661 0.816 0.549 0.769 0.748 1.000 - - - 
Equity 
Market 
Subindex 
0.763 0.567 0.744 0.557 0.444 0.615 1.000 - - 
Currency 
Market 
Subindex 
0.675 0.597 0.546 0.412 0.406 0.619 0.731 1.000 - 
Banking 
Sector 
Subindex 
0.201 0.294 0.008 0.307 0.293 0.428 0.102 0.116 1.000 
  
The statistics relating to the second and third criteria are presented in Tables 9.17 and 9.18. 
For the second criterion, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO-
MSA) (Kaiser, 1970, 1974) values for the individual and the set of variables were examined; 
values that exceed 0.6 are preferable for PCA. For the third criterion, the reported Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity statistic (Bartlett, 1954) was examined; a Bartlett test statistic that is 
significant at a five percent level of significance is preferable for PCA. The KMO-MSA for 
the individual variables is reported in Table 9.17. The measures of sampling adequacy for all 
variables are greater than 0.6. Table 9.18 reports the KMO-MSA and the Bartlett's test of 
sphericity for the set of nine variables. The overall KMO-MSA is 0.84 which is greater than 
0.6. The estimated chi-squared value for Bartlett's test of sphericity is 1090.825 with a 
probability of zero; this indicates that the test statistic is significant at a five percent level of 
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significance. Overall, three criteria were satisfied. Therefore, the use of PCA is acceptable. 
Consequently, this study estimated the principal components for the extended series.  
Table 9.17: KMO Test Results for Variables 
Variable Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
IOC-OIS 0.831 
Inverted Property Index 0.820 
Inverted Metals & Mining Index 0.846 
Inverted lagged Hang Seng Index 0.895 
Inverted lagged S&P 500 Index 0.752 
Bond Market Subindex 0.888 
Equity Market Subindex 0.855 
Currency Market Subindex 0.862 
Banking Sector Subindex 0.711 
 
Table 9.18: KMO-MSA and Bartlett’s Test Results 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Chi-squared 
statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Probability 
0.840 1090.825 36 0.000 
PCA revealed the presence of two principal components with eigenvalues exceeding one. The 
two-component solution explained 74.479 percent of the total variance in the variables. 
Specifically, the first and second components explain 41.842 and 32.637 percent % of the 
variance in the nine variables, respectively. Tables 9.19 and 9.20 present the un-rotated and 
rotated eigenvalues for the PCA. An inspection of the scree plot presented in Figure 9.11 
show that two component should be retained for further analysis.  
Table 9.19: Un-rotated Factor Loadings for PCA 
 Factor Loadings 
Communalities 
Component 1 Component 2 
Equity Market Subindex 0.908 0.226 0.875 
Inverted Australian Property Index 0.859 0.285 0.818 
Inverted lagged Chinese Hang Seng Index 0.826 0.203 0.723 
Bond Market Subindex 0.823 -0.408 0.844 
IOC-OIS spread 0.800 -0.323 0.745 
Inverted lagged American S&P 500 Index 0.761 0.438 0.771 
Currency Market Subindex 0.758 -0.326 0.681 
Inverted Metals and Mining Index 0.726 -0.445 0.725 
Banking Sector Subindex 0.334 0.639 0.521 
 Eigenvalues percentage of variance 41.842 32.637  
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Table 9.20: Rotated Factor Loadings for PCA 
 Factor Loadings 
Component 1 Component 2 
Equity Market Subindex 0.563 0.747 
Inverted Australian Property Index 0.487 0.762 
Inverted lagged Chinese Hang Seng Index 0.514 0.678 
Bond Market Subindex 0.896 0.201 
IOC-OIS spread 0.825 0.253 
Inverted lagged American S&P 500 Index 0.315 0.820 
Currency Market Subindex 0.794 0.224 
Inverted Metals and Mining Index 0.844 0.111 
Banking Sector Subindex -0.143 0.707 
 
 
Figure 9.11: Scree Plot for the Nine Components 
 
Parallel analysis was performed in order to determine if the use of two components was 
warranted. Table 9.21 shows the output for Monte Carlo simulations of PCA for parallel 
analysis using Marley Watkins software (Watkins, 2000). A hundred iterations were 
performed on a random data set of nine variables with 147 subjects. The random eigenvalues 
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from the parallel analysis were compared with the eigenvalues from the PCA in order to 
determine how many components to use in the composite stress index. Hypothesis tests were 
performed for the null hypothesis that a component should be included in the PCA. The 
random eigenvalues are used as the critical values for the hypothesis tests. The null 
hypothesis is accepted if the actual eigenvalue exceeds the critical values, otherwise it is 
rejected. Table 9.22 lists nine-hypothesis test the decisions. A comparison of the actual and 
critical eigenvalues indicates that using two principal components is justified. Consequently, 
the two principal components are used to estimate the extended PCA stress index.  
Table 9.21: Output for the Parallel Analysis (Extended series) 
Eigenvalue Number Random Eigenvalue Standard Deviation 
1 1.3872 0.0718 
2 1.2662 0.0428 
3 1.1586 0.0388 
4 1.0671 0.0341 
5 0.9904 0.0359 
6 0.9058 0.0363 
7 0.8242 0.0406 
8 0.7428 0.0407 
9 0.6577 0.0462 
Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis 
©2000 by Marley W. Watkins. All rights reserved. 
Table 9.22: Comparison of PCA and Parallel Analysis Eigenvalues 
Component 
Actual Eigenvalue 
(PCA) 
Random Eigenvalue 
(Parallel Analysis) 
Decision 
1 5.353 1.387 accept 
2 1.350 1.266 accept 
3 0.790 1.159 reject 
4 0.564 1.067 reject 
5 0.329 0.990 reject 
6 0.216 0.906 reject 
7 0.182 0.824 reject 
8 0.129 0.743 reject 
9 0.087 0.658 reject 
 
This study estimated the extended PCA stress index by obtaining the weighted sum of the 
principal components obtained from the PCA. The two principal components were weighted 
based on the variance explained by each component. The mathematical expression of the 
269 
 
extended PCA stress index is as shown in equation 9.4. Where 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 denote, respectively, 
the first and second principal component. A comparative line graph of the extended PCA and 
VEW stress index is provided in Figure 9.12. The extended PCA stress index reported a 
stressful period from November 2008 to January 2009 with index values of 2.45 and 2.05 
respectively. The extended VEW stress index reported high levels an episode of stress from 
October 2008 to March 2009 with index values of 2.54 and 2.10 respectively. Both indexes 
indicated that the stress peaked in November 2008 with the PCA and VEW stress index 
reporting index values of 2.45 and 3.02 respectively.  
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝐶𝐴 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0.41842𝑐1 + 0.32637𝑐2     (9.4) 
  
 Figure 9.12: Extended PCA and VEW Stress Indexes (Jan 2005 to Mar 2017) 
9.5.1.1 Which Index is a better Monitoring Tool? 
This subsection compares the performance of the estimated stress indexes as tools for 
monitoring financial stress. In particular, the VEW and PCA stress indexes were assessed in 
order to determine if either of the indexes was better at gauging the level of Australian 
financial stress. Table 9.23 gives a summary of the episodes of financial stress as indicated by 
the estimated stress indexes.  
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Extended PCA Stress Index Extended VEW Stress Index
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Table 9.23: Comparison of the Stress Indexes 
Stress Index 
Duration of Episode 
Peak Month 
Start End 
VEW  October 2008 March 2009 November 2008 
PCA October 2008 April 2009 November 2008 
Extended VEW October 2008 March 2009 November 2008 
Extended PCA November 2009 January 2009 November 2008 
 
All estimated stress indexes highlight November 2008 as the worst month of the 2007-2009 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The VEW stress indexes seem to provide a more consistent 
indicator of the duration of the episode of financial stress than the PCA stress indexes. 
Specifically, both VEW and extended VEW stress indexes indicate that the GFC lasted from 
October 2008 to March 2009. Conversely, the duration of the GFC as measured by the PCA 
stress indexes differs. While the PCA stress index suggests that the GFC lasted from October 
2008 to April 2009, the extended version of the PCA index indicates that the GFC lasted 
from November 2009 to January 2009. It is unlikely that the crisis lasted for three months as 
suggested by the extended PCA stress index. In fact, Sykes (2010) gives a detailed account of 
the GFC and states that at the very least the worst months of the crisis lasted from September 
2008 to March 2009. If this is the case then the extended PCA stress index seems to provide a 
late warning signal compared to the PCA stress index. This suggests that the monitoring 
performance of the PCA stress index is superior to the extended PCA stress index. However, 
the disparity in the estimated duration of stress as reported by the PCA stress index versus the 
extended PCA stress index indicates that the use of the PCA methodology is unlikely to 
produce a consistent measure of financial stress. Because the VEW stress indexes produce 
consistent estimates for the duration of an episode of stress, it can be argued that the VEW 
stress index is a more reliable tool for monitoring the level of financial stress in Australia. At 
this point, it is important to mention that there is no guarantee that an index that is a suitable 
measure of financial stress will also be useful for forecasting financial stress. Consequently, 
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the next section of this chapter examines the performance of the PCA and VEW stress 
indexes as tools for forecasting Australian financial stress. 
9.5.2 Forecasting Australian Financial Stress 
This section of the chapter explores whether the PCA and VEW composite stress indexes can 
be used to forecast financial stress in Australia. Data for both stress indexes was obtained for 
the months of January 2005 to December 2014 and used to estimate models that forecast 
financial stress. A notable stressful event occurred during the period under study and several 
months of financial stress culminated in the 2007-2009 GFC. Therefore, the predictive power 
of the estimated forecasting models was evaluated with particular emphasis on how well the 
forecasting models predicted the onset of the GFC. Before engaging in a forecasting exercise, 
it is important to note that there are some limitations as to what a forecasting model can 
achieve. This research will briefly discuss two key limitations of forecasting financial stress 
in order to clarify the potential uses of the forecasting models proposed in this chapter. 
The first limitation is that it is impossible to design a forecasting model that can predict the 
onset of a ‘Black Swan’ event (Misina & Tkacz, 2009). This is because forecasting models 
are often based on historical data, which is used to predict the potential for future crises. For 
this reason it would be easy for policymakers to discern the sequence of events that could 
lead to a financial crisis especially if history repeats itself. In this case, it would be possible 
for policymakers to propose and implement policies that would forestall a crisis. However, if 
a financial crisis occurs that is different from past episodes of crisis then it would be difficult 
for policymakers to recognise the early stages of a developing crisis. In this case, policy 
implementation would primarily be geared towards minimising crisis-related losses and 
restoring the health of the sectors that were affected by the financial crisis.  
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The second limitation of forecasting models is difficulty in forecasting fluctuations in 
financial stress, unless symptoms of distress are beginning to strongly perturb the financial 
system. For example, Vašíček et al. (2017) explored the use of models to forecast financial 
stress. In order to do this, five indicators of stress were used to estimate a composite stress 
index. The resultant stress indexes were used to forecast financial stress in 25 countries with 
particular emphasis on the GFC that had global impact on financial markets. Data for the 
composite stress indexes was sampled from the 1980s or 1990s until the last quarter of 2006. 
The sample dataset was used to estimate the level of financial stress for the subsequent 
quarters until the fourth quarter of 2010. It was established that forecasting models for all 
countries performed poorly especially when out-of-sample forecasts were examined.
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Particularly, it was impossible to predict the onset of the 2007-2009 GFC when using the 
sampled data to predict movements in the financial markets of the 25 countries. The findings 
of this research are unsurprising especially because the early signs of the GFC only became 
apparent in the second half of 2007. Another issue of concern is that it is unlikely that a 
forecasting model will be able to anticipate adequately the level of financial stress over a four 
years (or 48 quarters) time. A lot can change in financial markets within a 4-year period and 
one should bear in mind that composite stress indexes exhibit a random walk that is often 
absent of a seasonal
89
 and trend component.
90
 A more prudent approach to forecasting 
financial stress is to assess the prevailing level of financial stress regularly. This is because as 
the time of the financial crisis draws near, the symptoms of distress in the financial system 
will begin to emerge. Policy makers will then be able to see early signs of a developing crisis, 
especially if the onset of the crisis is gradual and decide whether intervention is necessary. 
                                                 
88
 The out-of-sample period ranges from the first quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of 2010. Therefore, out-of-
sample forecasts are the predicted values for financial stress from 2007 to 2010.  
89
  A series with a seasonal component is characterised by high (or low values) in specific months or quarters. 
Series with seasonal components tend to oscillate between high and low values in a manner that can easily be 
predicted by forecasting models.  
90
  It is easier to predict the values of a series especially if that series has a long-term trend either upwards or 
downwards.  
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According to Christensen and Li (2014), caution should be taken when deciding on the 
forecasting horizon, especially because it is possible to give a more accurate forecast as the 
timing of the stressful event draws nearer. For this reason, the aforementioned authors use a 
dataset from the second quarter of 1982 to the second quarter of 2010. In order to perform a 
forecast the data was split into two subsets where the first (in-sample) subset ranged from the 
second quarter of 1982 to the third quarter of 2007 and the second (out-of-sample) subset 
ranged from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2010. Better out-of-sample 
forecasts were obtained in the study by Christensen and Li (2014). 
The third limitation of forecasting models is that even if there are early signs of financial 
crisis, predicting the exact time when a crisis will occur is difficult (Borio & Lowe, 2002). 
Ideally, it would be desirable to have a forecasting model that is not only able to signal a 
developing (or ongoing) crisis
91
 but can also predict the timing of the onset of the crisis. This 
is because such a forecasting model would assist policy makers to determine if, and when, it 
is necessary to intervene in order to forestall a crisis. However, in practice it is difficult to 
anticipate the exact timing of a crisis and in some cases a forecasting model can provide 
incorrect forecasts of financial stress. For instance, it is possible that a financial stress index 
predicts financial stress even if in reality there is no stressful event; this is a Type II error. 
Alternatively, a financial stress index may fail to issue a warning even if a stressful event has 
actually occurred; this is a Type I error. In light of the potential for the occurrence of these 
errors, some studies have suggested that the preference of the policy makers for either of the 
errors should considered when assessing the forecasting performance of a composite stress 
index (Alessi & Detken, 2011; Christensen & Li, 2014; Duca & Peltonen, 2013). It should be 
noted nonetheless that the consideration of policy makers’ preference for errors fails to 
address this limitation of forecasting models. 
                                                 
91
 Tranquil periods are not as detrimental to an economy as crisis periods; this is why this study focuses on the 
latter instead of the former.  
274 
 
Overall, there is little that can be done to address the three limitations highlighted here. 
Rather it is important for the forecaster to bear in mind these limitations when making use of 
the stress index forecasts. The question is then of what use is a forecast of financial stress? 
Well, there is not much that can be done in regards to the ‘Black Swan’ events. However, in 
the short-term a forecast of financial stress could potential help predict a developing crisis 
especially if early signs of the crisis are already evident. While it is impossible to predict the 
exact timing of a crisis, the forecast of a crisis in the near future could help policy makers to 
begin planning and implementation of policies that could make an economy resilient enough 
to cope with the negative effects of a crisis in the future. For these reasons, this study 
proposes that financial stress forecasts are still useful. Consequently, this study will now 
proceed to perform the financial stress forecasting exercise. Before embarking on a 
forecasting exercise, it is important to identify a model that adequately forecasts Australian 
financial stress. In order to do this several models were estimated and used to assess the 
forecasting performance of the stress indexes. The rest of this section provides a detailed 
discussion of the criteria used to identify the model that is most suited for forecasting 
Australian financial stress. 
This research follows Misina and Tkacz (2009) who use linear models to evaluate the 
forecasting performance of a composite financial stress index. Two kinds of models are used 
to assess the forecasting performance of a stress index. The first kind of model is based on the 
idea that the past information from the composite stress indexes is sufficient to predict the 
prevailing level of financial stress. In this case past values of financial stress are used to 
predict current financial stress. The second kind of model is based on the notion that current 
financial stress can be predicted by using past information of financial stress and explanatory 
variables. In this case, lagged values of financial stress index and lagged values of 
explanatory variables are used to predict the prevailing level of financial stress. This study 
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uses linear regression models to estimate the two kinds of models. In order to make it easier 
to differentiate between the two kinds of model, the first kind of model is referred to as a base 
while the and second kind of model is referred to as the extended model. The subsections that 
follow discuss outline the model specification of the two kinds of models.  
9.5.2.1 The Base Model 
This study used Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models to estimate the 
base models for the PCA and VEW stress indexes. An ARIMA (p,d,q) model is made up to 
three parts. The first part is the autoregressive component of the model which is comprised of 
lagged values of a series. The letter ‘p’ denotes the number of lagged terms of the series that 
are included in the model. The second part of the model is the intergrated part which relates 
to the number of times a series must be differenced in order to achieve a stationary series. 
The letter ‘d’ denotes the degree of differencing involved in order to make a series stationary. 
If a series needs to be differenced once in order to make it stationary, that series is said to 
intergrated of order one and ‘d’ is equal to one in this case. However, if a series is already 
stationary then there is no need to difference the series and ‘d’ will be equal to zero. This 
kind of model can referred to as an ARMA model instead of an ARIMA model because there 
are no integrated series in the model. The third part of the model is the moving average part 
of model which is comprised lagged error terms. The letter ‘q’ denotes the number of lagged 
error terms that are included in a model (Makridakis, Wheelwright, & Hyndman, 1998).  
In practice it is common for researchers to embark on a trial and error exercise which 
involves estimating several ARIMA models and examining correlograms and information 
criteria in order to identify the model that is suitable for forecasting a series. This is because 
the values of ‘p’, ‘d’, and ‘q’ are rarely know before hand. The Akaike, Hannan-Quinn and 
Schwarz information criteria are commonly used information criteria that are used to 
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determine the optimal value of ‘p’ and ‘q’. Some statistical software, like Eviews (version 
9.5)
92
 provide tools that can automatically perform the trial and error exercise and identify the 
most suitable ARIMA model for a series. This study uses Eviews’ automated ARIMA 
forecasting feature and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to estimate ARIMA models 
for the two composite indexes. In order to do this the dataset is split into two parts. The first 
part is the in-sample dataset, which is used to initialise the forecasting process. The in-sample 
dataset contains monthly data from January 2005 until August 2008, which is just before the 
worst months of the crisis (Kolb, 2011; Sykes, 2010). The second part of the dataset is the 
out-of-sample set, which ranges from September 2008 to December 2014. The out-of-sample 
dataset is used to assess the performance of the forecasting model. Thereafter, the best 
forecasting models were used to perform forecasts.  
Base models for the PCA and VEW stress indexes were estimated as follows. The first 
difference of the PCA and VEW stress index was obtained in order to achieve a stationary 
series. ARIMA models were fitted to the differenced stress indexes and the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) was used to determine the appropriate model specification. Table 
9.24 provides a detailed summary of the AIC values for the models estimated for the PCA 
and VEW stress indexes. The model with the smallest AIC value was identified as the best 
model. In the case of the PCA stress index, it was found to be an ARIMA (4, 1, 2) model with 
an AIC value of -1.385. The estimated coefficients for the model are shown in equation 9.5. 
Where L is the lagged operator, 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 stands for the value of the financial stress index as 
computed by the PCA method and 𝜖 is the error term. In the case of the VEW stress index, an 
ARIMA (0, 1, 1) model was identified as the best model with an AIC value of -1.653. The 
estimated coefficients for the estimated model are as shown in equation 9.6. Where 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡
𝑉𝐸𝑊 
                                                 
92
 Older versions of Eviews do not have this feature. 
277 
 
stands for the value of the financial stress index as computed by the VEW method and 𝑢 is 
the error term. This study now estimates the extended models in the subsection that follows. 
(1 − 𝐿)𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝐴 = 0.002 + 0.039𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡−1
𝑃𝐶𝐴 − 0.555𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡−2
𝑃𝐶𝐴 − 0.334𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡−3
𝑃𝐶𝐴 
                −0.559𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡−4
𝑃𝐶𝐴 − 1.382𝜖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡−2                (9.5) 
(1 − 𝐿)𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡
𝑉𝐸𝑊 = 0.003 − 𝑢𝑡−1       (9.6) 
Table 9.24: Base ARIMA Models for Composite Stress Indexes 
Model 
# 
PCA Stress Index VEW Stress Index 
ARIMA specification (p,d,q) AIC Value ARIMA specification (p,d,q) AIC Value 
1 (4,1,2) -1.385 (0,1,1) -1.653 
2 (4,1,3) -1.375 (2,1,3) -1.635 
3 (0,1,3) -1.375 (0,1,2) -1.611 
4 (1,1,2) -1.354 (1,1,1) -1.609 
5 (4,1,4) -1.352 (0,1,3) -1.592 
6 (1,1,3) -1.327 (3,1,3) -1.588 
7 (0,1,4) -1.327 (2,1,4) -1.588 
8 (2,1,2) -1.326 (2,1,1) -1.584 
9 (0,1,1) -1.311 (1,1,2) -1.573 
10 (0,1,2) -1.309 (4,1,2) -1.570 
11 (1,1,1) -1.294 (0,1,4) -1.546 
12 (2,1,1) -1.289 (1,1,3) -1.546 
13 (2,1,3) -1.289 (2,1,2) -1.538 
14 (4,1,1) -1.282 (3,1,1) -1.538 
15 (1,1,4) -1.280 (4,1,1) -1.519 
16 (3,1,2) -1.279 (1,1,4) -1.499 
17 (2,1,4) -1.247 (4,1,3) -1.450 
18 (3,1,3) -1.244 (4,1,0) -1.441 
19 (3,1,1) -1.235 (3,1,4) -1.414 
20 (3,1,4) -1.204 (4,1,4) -1.403 
21 (4,1,0) -1.114 (3,1,0) -1.380 
22 (2,1,0) -1.081 (2,1,0) -1.352 
23 (3,1,0) -1.076 (1,1,0) -1.209 
24 (1,1,0) -0.832 (0,1,0) -1.024 
25 (0,1,0) -0.588 (3,1,2) 0.470 
 
9.5.2.2 The Extended Model 
In addition to estimating base models, this study also estimated forecasting ARIMA models, 
which include explanatory variables. Four explanatory variables were considered for 
inclusion in the forecasting models. These variables are the inverted CMAX measures for the 
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S&P/ASX 200 index, coal prices, iron ore prices and the 90-day bank accepted bill yield. The 
S&P/ASX 200 variable is used to gauge if there is any additional information about the 
Australian equity market that is not readily available from the All Ordinaries index. End-of-
the-month monthly data for the S&P/ASX 200 variable was sourced from the Yahoo finance 
website. This study chose to include measures of two of Australia’s lead exported goods to 
China; these are coal and iron ore (DFAT, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015c). It is hypothesised that 
the prices of coal and iron ore could be useful tracking developing stress levels in the 
resource sector that is driven for the most part by China. Monthly data of prices for both 
variables was sourced from the Index Mundi website (Index Mundi, 2017). The yield on the 
90-day bank accepted bill is used to gauge changing attitudes among lenders in the short-
term. Since bank accepted bills are a short-term debt instrument, it is expected that when a 
crisis is developing that lenders would be more reluctant to offer short-term debt. Instead, 
financial institutions would prefer to hold on to more cash with the expectation that the crisis 
could lead to a credit crunch. Consequently, the yield on bank accepted bills could be reduced 
in order to discourage purchase of bank bills.  
 
A 24-month window was used to estimate the inverse CMAX measure of the four variables. 
The explanatory variables under consideration were standardised and a graphical 
representation of the four series is provided in Figure 9.13. Thereafter, the variables were 
used to estimate the extended ARIMA models for the PCA and VEW stress indexes as 
follows. The first difference of the PCA and VEW stress index was obtained in order to 
achieve a stationary series. ARIMA models were fitted to the differenced stress indexes and a 
separate model was estimated by adding one explanatory variable to a base model at a time. 
This means that eight models were estimated: four models for the PCA stress index and four 
models with the VEW stress index. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to 
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determine the appropriate model specification. Table 9.25 provides a summary of the 
components of each model and the chosen model based on the minimum AIC value.  
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Figure 9.13: Explanatory Variables for Forecasting Australian Financial Stress 
 
Table 9.25: Summary of Extended Models for Stress Indexes 
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 Explanatory Variable included ARIMA (p, d, q) model selected 
P
C
A
 
Inverted CMAX for S&P/ASX 200 index (4,1,2) 
Inverted CMAX for coal prices (0,1,2) 
Inverted CMAX for iron ore prices (4,1,2) 
Inverted CMAX for 90-day bank bill (4,1,2) 
V
E
W
 Inverted CMAX for S&P/ASX 200 index (2,1,3) 
Inverted CMAX for coal prices (2,1,3) 
Inverted CMAX for iron ore prices (0,1,1) 
Inverted CMAX for 90-day bank bill (0,1,1) 
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So far, it is unclear whether any of the explanatory variables should be included in the 
forecasting model. It is possible to establish the forecasting potential of the explanatory 
variables by analysing information from the actual value of the stress index, the base model, 
and the extended models. The root-mean-squared error (RMSE) was used to perform this 
analysis. The RMSE can be considered as a measure of the average error of the forecasted 
values relative to the actual values of financial stress. The RMSE calculates the sum of the 
squared deviations of the forecasted value compared to the actual value of a series. When 
comparing two models the one with a lower RMSE value is considered as a model which fits 
the data better (Makridakis et al., 1998). This study follows Misina and Tkacz (2009) 
approach which the uses the RMSE of the estimated models to calculate the ratio of RMSE. 
This was done in the following manner. First, the forecasts of the extended model were 
compared with the actual value of financial stress as measured by the composite stress index 
and the RMSE value was calculated. Second, the forecasts of the base model were compared 
with the actual value of financial stress as measured by the composite stress index the RMSE 
value was calculated. Equation 9.7 provides the formula for estimating the ratio of the RMSE 
over the out-of-sample period from May 2005 to August 2008.  
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
√∑ (𝐹𝑆𝐼 ̂ 𝐸𝑋𝑇,𝑡 − 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡)2/76
2008 𝑀08
𝑡=2005 𝑀05
√∑ (𝐹𝑆𝐼 ̂ 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸,𝑡 − 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡)2/76
2008 𝑀08
𝑡=2005 𝑀05
 
(9.7) 
M08 and M05 stand for the months of August and May respectively. 𝐹𝑆𝐼 ̂ 𝐸𝑋𝑇,𝑡 represents the 
forecasted value of financial stress at time t as calculated by the extended model. 𝐹𝑆𝐼 ̂ 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸,𝑡 
represents the forecasted value of financial stress at time t as calculated by the base model. 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡 represents the actual value of financial stress as estimated by either the PCA or VEW 
weighting method. The numerator of equation 9.7 estimates the RMSE for the forecast of 
financial stress based on an extended model compared to the actual value of financial stress. 
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A summary of the calculated ratio of RMSE values for the eight extended models is provided 
in table 9.26. If the estimated value of the ratio of RMSE is less than one, then it is concluded 
that adding an explanatory variable to the base model has improved the forecasts of financial 
stress. If the value of the ratio of RMSE is greater than one, then it is concluded that the 
addition of the explanatory variable to the base model has impaired the performance of the 
model (Misina & Tkacz, 2009). An inspection of Table 9.26 reveals that the inclusion of the 
four explanatory variables to the base models improves the forecasts produced by the model. 
Therefore, this study will now consider the use of several combinations of explanatory 
variables when estimating extended models for forecasting financial stress.  
Table 9.26: Ratio of RMSE for Forecasting Models  
Model RMSE Ratio of RMSE
 
PCA stress index with inverted CMAX for S&P/ASX 200  1.132 0.173 
PCA stress index with inverted CMAX for coal prices 0.948 0.145 
PCA stress index with inverted CMAX for iron ore prices 4.061 0.620 
PCA stress index with inverted CMAX for 90-day bank bill 1.619 0.247 
PCA stress index base model 6.549 n.a. 
VEW stress index with inverted CMAX for S&P/ASX 200  0.692 0.100 
VEW stress index with inverted CMAX for coal prices 0.912 0.131 
VEW stress index with inverted CMAX for iron ore prices 3.391 0.488 
VEW stress index with inverted CMAX for 90-day bank bill 0.934 0.134 
VEW stress index base model 6.948 n.a. 
  Note: The ratio of RMSE is calculated by comparing each model to the actual value of financial stress as 
estimated by either the PCA or VEW stress model  
This study estimated thirty extended models and used the RMSE measure of each model to 
determine which extended model provided better forecasts of financial stress. Forecasting 
models were estimated by adding one to three variables at a time. The ARIMA specification 
of each model and the estimated RMSE measures for the extended forecasting models are 
contained in Tables 9.27 and 9.28. Extended forecasting models for the VEW and PCA stress 
index are presented in Tables 9.27 and 9.28 respectively. An inspection of the RMSE values 
reveals that the best forecasting model for the VEW stress index is one that includes the 
inverted CMAX of the S&P/ASX200 variable as an explanatory variable. This model was 
estimated with an ARIMA (2, 1, 3) process and has an RMSE of 0.692; this is the lowest 
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RMSE of the fifteen estimated models. In the case of the PCA stress index, the best 
forecasting model was identified as the ARIMA (0, 1, 2) model that included the coal 
variable. This model had an RMSE value of 0.948; the lowest of all the estimated models for 
the PCA stress index. The analysis of the RMSE values suggests that these two models would 
provide the adequate predictions of financial stress. The remainder of this chapter will focus 
on comparing and assessing the forecasting performance of these two models. 
Table 9.27: Extended Forecasting Models for VEW Stress Index 
Explanatory Variables 
ARIMA(p,d,q) 
specification 
R-squared RMSE 
S&P/ASX 200 (2,1,3) 0.537 0.692 
S&P/ASX 200, coal (0,1,3) 0.685 3.032 
S&P/ASX 200, iron (0,1,1) 0.524 7.453 
S&P/ASX 200, 90-day bank bill (0,1,1) 0.546 5.901 
S&P/ASX 200, coal, iron (0,1,3) 0.693 2.833 
S&P/ASX 200, coal, 90-day bank bill (0,1,3) 0.689 1.242 
S&P/ASX 200, iron, 90-day bank bill (0,1,3) 0.713 18.958 
S&P/ASX 200, coal, iron, 90-day bank bill (3,1,3) 0.807 58.707 
Coal (2,1,3) 0.681 0.912 
Coal, iron (0,1,3) 0.687 1.661 
Coal, 90-day bank bill (1,1,2) 0.672 1.046 
Coal, iron, 90-day bank bill (1,1,2) 0.737 60.668 
Iron (0,1,1) 0.523 3.391 
Iron, 90-day bank bill (0,1,3) 0.712 16.879 
90-day bank bill (0,1,1) 0.536 0.934 
 Note: The explanatory variables are all expressed in terms of an inverted CMAX measure with a 24-month 
window.  
Table 9.28: Extended Forecasting Models for PCA Stress Index 
Explanatory Variables 
ARIMA(p,d,q) 
specification 
R-squared RMSE 
S&P/ASX 200 (4,1,2) 0.731 1.132 
S&P/ASX 200, coal (0,1,3) 0.745 3.592 
S&P/ASX 200, iron (4,1,2) 0.734 5.273 
S&P/ASX 200, 90-day bank bill (0,1,2) 0.645 9.698 
S&P/ASX 200, coal, iron (0,1,3) 0.745 6.118 
S&P/ASX 200, coal, 90-day bank bill (0,1,3) 0.747 5.735 
S&P/ASX 200, iron, 90-day bank bill (0,1,3) 0.765 11.259 
S&P/ASX 200, coal, iron, 90-day bank bill (0,1,2) 0.791 57.843 
Coal (0,1,2) 0.662 0.948 
Coal, iron (0,1,3) 0.742 1.962 
Coal, 90-day bank bill (0,1,3) 0.715 1.040 
Coal, iron, 90-day bank bill (0,1,2) 0.788 64.502 
Iron (4,1,2) 0.726 4.061 
Iron, 90-day bank bill (4,1,3) 0.765 17.013 
90-day bank bill (4,1,2) 0.729 1.619 
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This study now compares the performance of the two models with regard to forecasting long-
term financial stress. Figure 9.14 and 9.15 provide graphical representations of the actual and 
forecasted values of the PCA and VEW stress index respectively. Unfortunately, both 
forecasting models fail to predict high levels of stress during the GFC. In fact, all predicted 
values of the stress index over the forecasting horizon fail to identify any episode of stress.  
 
Figure 9.14: Forecasting Australian Financial Stress-PCA Stress Index 
 
 
Figure 9.15: Forecasting Australian Financial Stress-VEW Stress Index 
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9.5.3 Section Summary 
In this section of the chapter, this study set out to design a model that forecasts financial 
stress. The estimated PCA and VEW stress indexes were used to estimate several ARIMA 
models, which were used to forecast financial stress. Apart from considering the estimated 
financial stress index, the forecasting potential of four explanatory variables was also 
investigated. After estimating thirty models, two models were found to be potentially useful 
in forecasting financial stress. Although, both models showed some promise each model fell 
short of providing adequate forecasts in financial stress especially at the peak time of the 
GFC. The findings of this analysis indicate that more research is needed to understand the 
complex nature of financial crisis, how crises develop, and the techniques (if any) that can be 
used to predict the onset of financial crises. 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on combining several stress indicators into a single measure that is a 
composite stress index. Two stress indexes were constructed using the PCA and VEW 
aggregation techniques. The performance of the estimated indexes was assessed with respect 
to the ability of the stress index to monitor the prevailing level of financial stress and the 
usefulness of the indexes in predicting future episodes of financial stress. The VEW stress 
index was found to perform better than the PCA stress index when monitoring the level 
financial stress. This supports the hypothesis that the choice of index aggregation approach 
would affect the performance of the stress index. However, neither the VEW nor the PCA 
stress index was useful in predicting the stress during the GFC. These findings suggest that 
the models proposed in this chapter are useful tools for monitoring the level of financial 
stress within Australia. However, at present the tools presented in this study are not 
sufficiently developed to be forward looking in predicting financial stress. The chapter that 
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follows provides a summary of the findings of this research and discusses the implications of 
the findings for future research. The limitations of the estimated financial stress indexes 
developed are also discussed.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis sought to develop a country-specific stress index that can monitor and forecast 
financial stress or crisis in Australia. Because Australia has limited experience of endogenous 
financial crises, Chapter 2 of this thesis investigated the concept of financial stress as an early 
indicator of financial crisis as proposed by Illing and Liu (2006). The general premise is that 
the lowest levels of financial stress are recorded during tranquil periods and financial stress 
begins to rise in the early stages of a financial crisis. A financial crisis is observed when 
financial stress has reached a crescendo. In order to identify some factors that could 
contribute to financial stress or crises in Australia, Chapters 4-8 of this thesis investigated the 
theoretical and empirical factors that contributed to the occurrence of past crises in other 
countries as identified in literature (Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Caramazza et al., 2004; 
Dabrowski, 2010; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009a; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2013; Sykes, 2010). Factors that can be used to develop 
stress variables which track the various stages of a financial crisis were of particular interest; 
the stages of financial crises that are the pre-crisis, crisis, and post crisis stages. To this end, 
this study identifies variables to gauge the stress level in Australia’s equity, bond, currency, 
money, and property markets. Moreover, several studies indicate that the collapse of a 
country’s banking sector was an indicator of increased probability of a financial crisis in a 
country in the near future (Claessens & Kose, 2013; Kaminsky, Lizondo, & Reinhart, 1998; 
Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Laeven & Valencia, 2008). Therefore, variables that gauge the 
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level of stress in the banking sector were also estimated. Given the importance of the mining 
industry to Australia as highlighted in Chapter 7 of this thesis, this thesis proposed the use of 
a variable to gauge the level of financial stress in the mining sector. This study also explored 
how foreign-based variables could be used to predict future movements in the Australian 
equity markets. This chapter will now focus on highlighting what this research found, the 
limitations of this study, and avenues for future research. The chapter is organised as follows. 
First, Section 10.2 discusses the findings of this research in response to the research gap and 
questions outlined in Chapter 1. A brief discussion of the research methods is also given in 
this section. The main emphasis, in this chapter, is on addressing whether there is evidence to 
support the hypotheses highlighted in Chapter 3. Second, the key findings of this research are 
discussed in Section 10.3. Third, Section 10.4 provides the implications of the research 
findings. Fourth, the main contributions made by this study to the existing knowledge are 
outlined in Section 10.5. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of this 
research and some recommendations for future work in Section 10.6. 
  
10.2 Research Gap, Questions and Methods  
10.2.1 Research Gap 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, this study notes that few studies have sought to construct a 
composite stress index for Australia (Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Cardarelli et al., 2011; Duca 
& Peltonen, 2013; Vašíček et al., 2017; Vermeulen et al., 2015). And, those studies have 
focused on the use of (at most) seven variables and the variance-equal-weights-index-
aggregation method. Even though there is growing body of literature suggesting that property 
bubbles are a precursor to financial crises, none of these studies developed or included a 
stress variable to measure the level of stress in the Australian property markets (Alessi & 
Detken, 2011; Claessens & Kose, 2013; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Luc & Valencia, 
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2008). Another issue of concern is that past studies did not consider the important role that 
mining plays in the Australian economy. Australia is primarily a resource-based economy 
and the export of mined resources is Australia’s top revenue earner (DFAT, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015c, 2016b). Because of the important role that the mining sector plays 
in the Australian economy a consideration of resource-based bubbles and the potential impact 
of a shock to the Australian mining sector is important. However, a variable to gauge the 
level of stress in the mining sector has not been incorporated into past composite measures of 
Australian financial stress. This study addressed these research gaps by developing a 
composite stress index that explores the use of 22 variables, including variables to gauge 
stress in Australia’s mining sector and property market. In addition to the variance-equal 
weights method of index aggregation, this study explored the use of the principal components 
approach to index aggregation when constructing the composite stress index.  
 
10.2.2 Research Questions 
The discussion in this subsection is geared towards addressing the research questions that 
were asked in Section 1.6 of Chapter 1. The research questions and subsidiary questions are 
reproduced here for the readers’ convenience. Thereafter, this section summarises responses 
to each of these questions based on the findings of this study. 
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The following were the research questions raised in this study: 
A) What are the primary stress indicators in Australia? 
B) How can the stress indicators in question A be combined to a composite index 
for Australian financial stress? 
C) What environmental, structural, institutional, and other key factors can 
contribute to the incidence of an Australian financial crisis? 
D) Is a comprehensive stress index for Australia an efficient and effective way to 
model and predict Australian financial stress? 
Regarding research question A, Chapters 4-8 identified 22 primary stress indicators that were 
used to model stress in the Australian financial markets. Relating to research question B, two 
index aggregation methods were identified in Chapter 9 as suitable techniques that could be 
used to construct a stress index; these are the variance-equal weights and the principal 
components approach. For this reason, the researcher chose to estimate composite stress 
indexes using both techniques. Relating to research question C, this study examined key 
factors that contributed to the onset and spread of financial crises in other countries in order 
to identify factors that could cause an Australian financial crisis. Based on this premise, this 
study found that a several factors (such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, lax 
regulation, and risk taking behaviour) interact in a manner that causes the onset and spread of 
financial crises from one sector to another. For example, an examination of the 2007-2009 
GFC revealed that the combination of information asymmetry and moral hazard created an 
environment where it was possible for American credit rating agencies to assign favourable 
ratings to financially engineered securities such as CDOs even though these securities were 
actually ‘toxic assets’ (Crotty, 2009; Edgar, 2009). In this manner, the rating agencies 
facilitated the acquisition of ‘toxic assets’ by unsuspecting investors and investment banks. 
During the same crisis Australian financial institutions fared better compared to financial 
institutions in the US and the UK, in part because strict regulation and supervisory practices 
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that were implemented, in Australia, by APRA. These measures fostered a culture of less 
risky behaviour among Australian financial institutions (Edwards, 2010). In the absence of 
such stringent regulations, close supervision, and intervention by regulatory authorities such 
as the RBA, levels of stress in various sectors of Australia could reach a crisis point. For 
research question D, this study found that the composite stress index proposed in this study 
was an effective and efficient way to model Australian financial stress. This is because the 
composite stress index proposed in this thesis is comprised of stress indicators which track 
rising asset prices and levels of credit in different sectors of the Australian economy. By 
monitoring the aggregate rise in asset prices and credit it is possible to identify a developing 
asset or credit bubble. Because asset bubbles are often a prelude to financial crises, higher 
than usual rises in several asset prices and/or credit would be reflected by a corresponding 
rise in the composite measure for Australian financial stress. Therefore, monitoring the 
aggregate level of financial stress would help policy makers to gauge when the overall rise in 
asset prices and credit is an issue of concern that requires policy intervention. The composite 
stress index proposed in this study was not found to be a suitable tool for predicting future 
episodes of Australian financial stress or crisis. 
The following were the subsidiary questions raised in this study: 
A) Potential uses of being able to predict the occurrence, extent, and magnitude of 
future periods of stress in Australia? 
B) Limitations and risks of using stress indicators to forecast financial crises? 
C) Policy implications of a stress index for Australia? 
In relation to the subsidiary questions, this study found that predictions the level of financial 
stress would provide policy makers and regulators with information about the future climate 
in the financial markets. If forecasts of a composite financial stress index predict a financial 
crisis in the Australian financial markets based on the prevailing financial and economic 
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environment then policy makers and regulators can implement policies that could forestall the 
onset of a crisis or mitigate the negative effects of a crisis on the Australian economy as it 
unfolds (Minsky, 1986). It is important to note that stress indicators are heavily reliant on 
historical data. As a consequence, composite measures of stress will predict crises if the 
historical pattern that led to the onset of historical crises are replicated in the future. The 
policy implications of a stress index for Australia are discussed in detail in Section 10.4 of 
this chapter.  
 
10.2.3 Research Methods 
Three hypotheses were presented in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. The first 
hypothesis was that there exist bilateral short-term movements between Australia and its key 
trading partners that can be used to gauge the potential for stress in Australian financial 
markets. This study used pairwise Granger causality tests and a five percent level of 
significance to examine the causal relationships between stock returns of Australia, China, 
Japan, the US and the republic of Korea. The test results indicated that in the short-run, 
movements in the Chinese and American equity markets lead those in the Australian markets. 
Moreover, movements in the Chinese equity market are a more important predictor of 
movements in the Australian equity markets than the movements in the American equity 
market. Based on these findings, this research used information from the lagged values of the 
Chinese and American stock indexes to develop stress indicators which could predict the 
potential for stress in the Australian equity market. The second hypothesis was that the choice 
of index aggregation method would affect the performance of the composite stress index. 
This study used two index aggregation methods, the variance equal weighting (VEW) and the 
principal components analysis (PCA) method to construct composite stress indexes. The 
VEW stress index was found to perform better than the PCA stress index when monitoring 
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the level Australian financial stress. Both indexes were found to be unsuitable for forecasting 
the level of Australian financial stress. The third hypothesis was that a significant decline in 
exports of the mining industry for a prolonged period would translate to increased 
vulnerability to stress in the Australian mining sector. This study found that the downward 
trend of the prices of mined resources from March 2011 to January 2016 was associated with 
rising levels in the stress indicator for the mining sector. In particular, the estimated stress 
indicator for the mining sector which is the inverted CMAX for the metals and mining index, 
recorded rising levels of stress from November 2015 to February 2016. Overall, it can be 
concluded that the results of this study support the three hypotheses raised in this study. 
 
10.3 Research Findings  
This section of the chapter discusses the main findings of this study with particular reference 
to the research objective and questions outlined in chapter one. The overall objective of this 
thesis has been to develop a stress index to monitor and forecast Australian financial stress. 
Unlike other studies that examine a limited number of stress indicators or variables, this study 
identified and examined a wide array of variables that gauge developing stress in different 
sectors of the Australian economy (Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Cardarelli et al., 2011; Duca & 
Peltonen, 2013; Vašíček et al., 2017; Vermeulen et al., 2015). A stress index was constructed 
using twenty two stress indicators that gauged developing stress in the Australian financial 
markets
93
 and the banking sector. This study estimated the stress index at a monthly 
frequency since there is limited literature on the performance of the monthly Australian 
financial stress index. Moreover, a stress index reported at monthly interval would allow 
policy makers to monitor the level of stress in the Australian economy more closely than a 
stress index reported at quarterly interval. In addition to the variance-equal weighting 
                                                 
93
 These include the equity, currency, bond, and money markets. 
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method, this study explored the use of the principal components analysis method of 
aggregation. The former was found to provide more reliable measure of stress than the latter. 
While this study successfully designed a composite measure of stress that gauged the level of 
Australian stress, it failed to develop a suitable tool for forecasting Australian financial stress. 
Consequently it can be concluded that the stress index developed in this study is not a 
suitable barometer for financial stress in Australia and extreme caution should be used if the 
index is used to forecast future episodes of financial stress. Nevertheless, practitioners can 
benefit from the use of the stress index developed in this study. The section that follows 
discusses the implications of this research’s findings.  
 
10.4 Implications of Research Findings  
This research successfully estimated a composite stress index for Australia that is useful for 
monitoring the prevailing level of financial stress at a monthly interval. Policy makers could 
make use of composite stress index proposed in this study to track the health of the Australian 
economy and determine two things. First, the index can be used to gauge when the levels of 
stress are about to approach a crisis point (e.g., if the stress index is trending upwards and 
financial stress levels are nearly exceeding two standard deviations above the long-term mean 
value of the stress index, it is possible that Australia is in the early stages of a crisis). At this 
point it is up to the policy makers to determine whether to intervene order to reduce distress 
in the Australian financial markets or to do nothing with the expectation that the period of 
high levels of stress may ‘self-correct’ and soon be followed by periods of lower levels of 
financial stress.  
 
Economists could use the stress index proposed in this study to compare the level of stress in 
Australia with other countries. If this were to be done, the index designed in this study should 
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be compared with country-specific stress indexes of other countries. This study posits that 
this is the more prudent approach to undertake when comparing the index prepared in this 
study against others for the following reason. Considering country-specific factors when 
constructing a country-specific stress index would yield an index which is a better measure of 
stress than a generic-stress index. Comparing generic stress indexes for other countries with 
this study’s stress index would not be appropriate since it is probable that stress indicators 
that contribute to the incidence of financial stress in the other countries could have been 
ignored. Nevertheless, this could be done as a last resort due to time and resource constraints.  
  
In the lead up to the construction of the composite stress indexes this study made use of four 
subindexes for the equity market, bond market, currency market, and banking sector. These 
subindexes are designed to signal developing stress in different sectors of the Australian 
economy. Additionally the subindexes are designed to cater for the specialised needs of 
various stakeholders in the financial market. For instance, buyers of shares may be interested 
in observing the prevailing level of stress in the Australian financial markets in order make a 
decision as to whether to alter the composition of their portfolios to reflect their individual 
risk preferences. Investors of bond and currency markets could adopt a similar approach. The 
Australian Prudential Regulator Authority may be interested in examining the subindex for 
the banking sector in order to assess the level of stress in the Australian banking sector. 
 
10.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
Some unique contributions of this study include: The addition of country specific factors that 
could contribute to the incidence of financial stress in the Australian economy which were 
ignored in previous studies. In particular, even though Australia is, to a large degree, a 
resource-driven economy, past studies have overlooked the importance of resource sector 
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when considering stress indicators for Australia. Unlike previous studies, this thesis gives due 
consideration to the relevance of resource sector in measuring the level of financial stress in 
Australia. Accordingly, this study included information from the S&P/ASX300 metals and 
mining index in the composite stress index. 
The importance of property prices was also overlooked by previous studies. Pais and Stork 
(2011) noted that Australian banks were particularly vulnerable to inter-sector contagion of 
risks from the Australian property sector and the risk of contagion increased during periods of 
crises such as the 2007-2009 GFC. Similarly, Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) found that a 
collapse in a property market could render banks bankrupt especially if it coincides with the 
collapse of the stock market as was the case in 1992 Japanese banking crises. Despite the 
evidence in the literature that property bubbles often precede crises, previous studies have 
failed to incorporate a stress indicator that tracks the level stress in the Australian property 
sector when estimating an Australian stress index (Hakkio & Keeton, 2009; Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2013; Scott, 2010). This study attempts to remedy this 
oversight by including a stress indicator for the Australian property market—which was also 
absent in previous Australian stress indexes. In particular, information from the S&P/ 
ASX200 Australia Real Estate Investments Trusts (A-REITs) was incorporated into the 
composite measure for stress used in this study. 
This study analysed equity market movements of Australia and four of its leading bilateral 
trading partners (i.e., China, Japan, the USA, and the republic of Korea; DFAT, 2015a, 
2015c, 2016a). Linear and nonlinear Granger causality tests were used to investigate the 
relationship between pairs of the five countries. It was found that past values of leading 
indexes of the Chinese and American equity markets were useful for predicting movements 
in the Australian equity market. In response, this study explores the use of foreign-based 
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variables for China and US and estimated inverted CMAX measures of the lagged Chinese 
Hang Seng and the American S&P 500. Before now, the use of such variables in a composite 
measure of stress has not been explored in other literature. 
 
LIBOR spreads are often used as a barometer of financial stress. However, it was not possible 
to use the Australian LIBOR for this purpose since it was discontinued due to allegations of 
manipulation (Wheatley, 2012). Therefore, this study explored the use of proxy spreads that 
mimicked some of the movements of LIBOR spreads. Chapter 7 of this study successfully 
estimated a proxy for the LIBOR-OIS spread (the IOC-OIS spread) which performed 
relatively well. The use of the IOC-OIS spread has not been explored in previous studies.  
 
In summary, this research has explored the use of stress indicators that were not examined in 
previous literature. This study provides a deeper understanding of factors that collectively 
contribute to the development of stress in the Australian financial markets. Instead of 
focusing on local factors that could lead to stress, this study also includes foreign-based 
variables that could show the potential for stress transmission from two of Australia’s 
bilateral trading partners (China and the US). The discussion in the section that follows will 
now turn to the limitation of this research. 
 
10.6  Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The stress index developed in this study was comprised of 22 stress indicators and reported at 
a monthly frequency. Reporting a stress index at the monthly interval presented one key 
challenge. Specifically, it was it was not possible to obtain large samples of historical data for 
all the variables that were included in the composite stress index. Monthly data was available 
for all variables for the months from January 2005 to December 2014. This meant that it was 
297 
 
only possible to evaluate the performance of the estimated stress index over one episode of 
financial crisis; this is the 2007-2009 GFC.  
 
When constructing the credit-to-GDP gap in Chapter 6, monthly values of the GDP were not 
readily available because GDP is reported at a quarterly frequency. For this reason, this study 
used quarterly values of GDP and an interpolation method to estimate monthly values of the 
GDP. Due to the use of interpolated values of GDP, it is possible that an unknown margin of 
error was introduced into the resulting stress indicator. Since monthly estimates of GDP are 
unavailable, it is not possible to estimate the exact extent of the margin of error. Thus, this 
research recommends caution when estimating or interpreting the credit-to-GDP gap variable.  
 
When developing a proxy variable for the LIBOR-OIS spread, the Australian Bank Bill Swap 
(BBSW) rate was found to be the best proxy for the Australian LIBOR. However, the data for 
the BBSW was not readily available. Therefore, this study resorted to the use of the interbank 
overnight cash (IOC) rate instead. This study proposes that researchers with access to 
historical data for the BBSW could develop a better proxy for the LIBOR-OIS spread; this 
would be the BBSW-OIS spread.  
 
Since past studies have primarily focused on the development and assessment of generic 
stress indexes of several countries, this study propose that future research consider country-
specific stress-indexes of several countries for the following reasons. First, such an analysis 
improves the understanding of the country-specific factors that contribute to stress or crises in 
different countries. Moreover, it sheds light on factors that make some countries more 
vulnerable to crises than others. Second, a comparative study may reveal relationships 
between transmission of stress or crises across borders or via trade or financial links.  
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This study only explored the lead and lag relationship between composite equity indexes of 
Australia and four of its key bilateral trading partners. It would be interesting to see how 
other factors could be early predictors of movements in the Australian market. For instance, it 
may be possible that certain cross-border connections between Australian banks and foreign 
banks could potentially make Australia more vulnerable to cross-border contagion of a 
banking crisis in a foreign country; future studies could explore this.  
Future studies could explore the use of qualitative data when assessing the level of financial 
stress in Australia. In particular, researchers could interview Australian industry experts in 
order to gauge the perceived level of stress in the Australian markets over a period of time. It 
would be interesting to assess whether there is correlation between qualitative and the 
quantitative aspects of Australian financial stress. Whereby, the qualitative aspects of 
financial stress are the perceived levels of stress as gauged by the Australian experts’ opinion 
and the quantitative aspects of financials stress are the estimated levels of financial stress as 
reported by a composite stress index. 
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